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Abstract
Fiscal reports have, since 2010, documented weak budget credibility in Sierra Leone
public financial management noting that the government budget does not constitute a
dependable framework for the planning, allocation and efficient use of the nation’s
resources. The purpose of this study was to develop a budgetary reform agenda and the
research question that guided the study related to the reasons for the high monetary
variances between the approved budget and the year-end financial reports. Government
budgets and financial reports were reviewed for 2010-2014 and senior government
officials were interviewed regarding the main stages of the annual budgetary process. The
new public management model constituted the overarching conceptual foundation based
on a qualitative case study of 7 government ministries and the House of Parliament. The
baseline criteria for efficient government budgeting developed by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development served as the analytical framework from which
four themes were established to analyze the planning, preparation, approval and the
execution of the annual budget. The main finding was that the government’s budget
exhibited a lack of credibility given the significant variances between the budget and the
actual outcomes; and the ineffective role of the legislature. As part of the financial
management reforms needed, the government would have to rewrite the budget law and
recruit experienced staff to strengthen the legislative budgetary function. These changes
could contribute to the enhancement of value in the government’s use of taxpayers’
monies, causing improved economic and financial reporting and thereby promoting
positive social change for the people of Sierra Leone.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Government budgetary estimates, especially expenditures in Sierra Leone, can
vary significantly from their actual amounts. Such variances may be due to factors like
estimation errors, unanticipated changes in economic conditions, or policy changes
(Kasdin, 2016). A credible budget has minimal variances in comparison to the actual
outcomes, comprehensive in coverage, and affordable regarding the availability of
funding (Deng & Peng, 2011). Also, a credible budget is made up of realistic estimates,
sustainable expenditure programs, and the legislature provides efficient oversight of the
process (Deng & Peng, 2011).
From 2010 to 2014, independent reports by international organizations providing
budgetary support to the government of Sierra Leone indicated a lack of credibility of the
government budget management (Gardner, Flynn, Gurr, Luca, &Wanyera, 2012; Harnett,
Hanson, Cooper, & Bailor, 2014). A credible budget serves as one of the primary
frameworks for the implementation of the economic and other developmental policies of
any government. Therefore, it was important to understand how government ministries
budget and whether the underlying system and processes are capable of producing a
credible budget. The factors contributing to the budget credibility concern, as well as
possible solutions, were the foci of the study. Restoring or enhancing the credibility of
the budget of the government of Sierra Leone will contribute to assuring value in the
government’s use of taxpayers’ money.
The rest of this chapter consists of several sections. Immediately following are
sections dealing with the background to the study, the research problem, the purpose, and
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the research questions. The conceptual framework for the study is next. After the
conceptual framework is the analytical framework section. The analytical framework
provided the contextual lens for analyzing the credibility of the budgeting system of the
government of Sierra Leone. Next are the research design and methodology section.
Toward the end of the chapter are sections relating to the definitions, assumptions,
limitations, and significance of the study.
Background of the Study
In fulfillment of its role, a government has to collect resources, particularly
money, mainly in the form of taxes, in an appropriate manner. These resources are then
allocated to meet societal needs (Mikesell& Mullins, 2011). The national budget provides
the medium for the planning and execution of these activities to take place. It is through
the budget that governments define their expected revenues and expenditures together
with the plans and activities for carrying out government policies.
Because budgets are estimates of future operations, changes are inevitable in the
course of implementation of the budget. However, there are prescribed ways of
minimizing the variance of the budget and the actual outcomes (Deng & Peng, 2011;
Mario, 2014). First, the government can do a better job by using scientific models to
forecast both revenue and spending (Deng & Peng, 2011). Second, governments should
allocate a reasonable amount of reserve funds to cover unanticipated events, thereby
preventing a reduction in existing programs (Deng & Peng, 2011; Mario, 2014). If budget
preparation is solid from the start, except for severe disruptions to the economy, any
changes to the adopted budget should be relatively small (Deng & Peng, 2011).
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A credible budget has both a technical and a governance meaning. A technically
credible budget’s variances are insignificant in comparison to the actual outcomes at the
end of the budget year (Whiteman, 2012). From a governance perspective, a budget is
credible when it has adequate oversight by both the administrative leadership and the
legislature (Whiteman, 2012).
Only a handful of researchers have examined the construct of budget credibility,
and most of these studies relate to the budgeting practices of the governments of
advanced economies (Alihegović & Slijepčević, 2012; Sample, 1993; Whiteman, 2012).
Few scholars have reviewed budget credibility in the context of African governments
(Marah, 2009). These African studies were part of the overall study of other components
of public budgeting practices as they provided only a brief coverage of the issue of the
credibility of the budget of a government ( Marah, 2009). Therefore, this study might be
the first to examine the credibility of a government budget as explained by the influences
of budget variances and legislative budgeting. The study contributes to the promotion of
good budgeting practices by highlighting the factors contributing to the weakening
credibility of the budget of the government of Sierra Leone as well as by suggesting a
reform agenda for addressing the situation.
Problem Statement
There is weakening credibility in the Sierra Leone government budget.
Independent reports by the international institutions providing budgetary support to the
government have identified weak budget credibility as a problem besetting public
financial management (Gardner, Flynn, Gurr, Luca, &Wanyera, 2012; Harnett, Hanson,
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Cooper, & Bailor, 2014). ). In essence, the government budget does not constitute a
dependable framework for the allocation and efficient use of the nation’s resources. Also,
the lack of budget credibility means that the government does not have a reliable
framework for executing its long term developmental plan.
This study fills a gap in the current body of knowledge as I examined the
construct of budget credibility. Only one previous study was identified that briefly dealt
with budget credibility, and that study was about participation and transparency in the
budgetary process of the government of Sierra Leone (Marah, 2009). By using a
qualitative case study design, the study provides an in-depth examination of the construct
of budget credibility from the perspective of budgetary variances and the role of the
legislature in budgeting.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this qualitative study was to develop a budgetary reform agenda
for some of the changes needed for enhancing the credibility of the budget of the
government of Sierra Leone. Through face-to-face interviews and a review of documents,
I identified and described the primary factors influencing the credibility of the budget of
the government. The study involved a case study of seven government ministries and the
House of Parliament and embodies an interpretive paradigm by arguing that reality is
contextual in nature.
For the purpose of the study, budget credibility was defined from both technical
and governance perspectives. From a technical viewpoint, budget credibility was
measured by the level of monetary variance between the budget and the year-end
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financial reports, the comprehensiveness of the budget, and the sustainability of the
budget. From a governance viewpoint, budget credibility was measured in terms of the
adequacy and effectiveness of the role of the Parliament in the budgetary process. This
study may contribute to the overall reform efforts of the government in developing a
stronger public financial management organization causing improved economic and
financial reporting, thereby promoting positive social change for the people of Sierra
Leone.
Research Questions
The following constituted the research questions designed to achieve the abovestated purpose:
1. What are the variances between the approved annual budget and the financial
reports as measured by (a) total personnel expenditure compared to budget, (b) total
nonsalary and noninterest expenditure compared to budget, (c) total development
expenditure compared to budget, (d), and total domestic revenue compared to budget?
2. What are the sources of these variances as explained by the processes relating
to the preparation, approval, and execution of the annual budget?
3. What is the governance system over the budgetary process as it relates to the
adequacy and effectiveness of the role of the Sierra Leone House of Parliament?
Conceptual Foundation
Government Budgeting
A government budget is the medium for the making and carrying out of decisions
regarding the acquisition, allocation, and use of resources, particularly money (Liou,
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2011). A government budget should serve to ensure discipline, control, and fiscal
sustainability (Mikesell& Mullins, 2011).Such a budget ensures that financial resources
are directed toward the programs of greatest public return as well as inducing programs to
make the most efficient use of resources (Mikesell& Mullins, 2011).
Government budgeting has much in common with budgeting in the private sector,
including the decision of how to generate income, allocate that income to different needs,
and keep track of spending. There are, nevertheless, distinctive features of government
budgeting, some of which include the frequent occurrence of conflicts regarding
budgetary decisions (Dumitrescu& Degaru, 2014). Government budgets are open to
outside influences, including many rules, regulations, and procedural guidelines. Also,
public budgets are intrinsically and appropriately political (Epp, Lovett, & Baumgartner,
2014; Rubin, 2015).
Government budgeting systems require recognition that there are constraints in
the various stages of governmental decision making. The overriding objective is to enable
timely and effective decision making on the use of public money via the determination of
the government policies and objectives and the resources required to accomplish them
(Al-Ali, 2012). The process includes the allocation of the resources for the attainment of
the desired objectives and assurance that the designated programs are carried out
economically, efficiently, and effectively (Schick, 2013).
As a multidisciplinary field of study, government budgeting is open to different
theoretical perspectives, and, therefore, the theory underpinning the subject is evolving.
Nevertheless, many of the theories proceed mainly on the assumption of rational decision
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making. Rationality in government budgeting assumes technical explanations of
budgeting systems and objective processes, structures, and information that move choices
toward the best interest of the public (Schick, 2013). A significant development in budget
theory in recent times has been a distinction between macro budgeting and micro
budgeting (Guess, 2015; Guess &Leloup, 2010). Micro budgeting represents decisions
about the parts or components of the budget, such as activities and programs, in
particular, departments and agencies of governments (Guess, 2015; Guess & Leloup,
2010).Macro budgeting relates to decisions that affect the budget as a whole more than its
constituent parts(Guess, 2015; Guess & Leloup, 2010).These decisions include choices
about the budget totals, the size of the budget deficits and debt, and relative proportions
of spending categories, like defense expenditure (Guess, 2015; Guess &Leloup, 2010).
Government budgets are not merely technical, managerial documents as described
above; they are also intrinsically political (Stephen, Moses, & Basil, 2013). Budgets
reflect choices about what governments will and will not do, as well as a general public
consensus about what kind of services governments should provide (Rubin, 2015). For
instance, budgets reflect priorities between free education for girls and agricultural
subsidies for farmers. Budgets essentially mediate among groups and individuals who
want different things from the government and determine who gets what (Doreen,
Caluwe, &Lonti, 2012).
The government budget reflects the relative power of different budget actors
within and between branches of government (Molenaers, 2012).The executive, the
legislature, and other government stakeholders influence budgetary policies and
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outcomes. Even when the budgetary numbers follow strictly technical rules and
established practices, they have political consequences (Stephen, Moses, & Basil, 2013).
For instance, the numbers in the budget influence the perceptions of the public about the
size of the surplus or deficit. Making some types of transactions more or less expensive
than others may also influence the behavior of politicians.
Typically, there are two categories of any government budget: capital or
development budget and recurrent budget (Osagie&Orheruata, 2013). The capital budget
is an estimate of the expenditure of future assets whose use will usually cover more than
a year. Road construction works, bridges, machinery, and other infrastructural projects
fall in the capital or development budget category (Osagie&Orheruata, 2013). A recurrent
budget provides estimates of expenditures needed to meet day-to-day operational
requirements of the organization. Operational requirements include salaries, wages, rents,
electricity bills, and other consumables (Osagie&Orheruata, 2013). Government budgets
often incorporate both the capital and recurrent budgets in one document.
Government Expenditure Budgeting
It is the aim of budgeting to limit the power of those in elected or appointed office
to spend public money (Schick, 2007). Thus, budgeting has long remained rooted in
procedures to control the actions of spenders (Schick, 2009). The growing size of
government budgets has necessitated increasing focus on the expenditure side of the
budget. Some of these concerns involve the government’s accountability for what it
spends and how well it manages its overall finances through the budget (Lee, Johnson, &
Joyce, 2013).
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Budget accountability may take several forms, some of which include tight
control over the resources and emphasis on the efficiency of ongoing activities. As many
government programs span over 1 year, budgeting requires long term planning
(Guess&Leloup, 2010; Lee et al., 2013).
All budgets have a funding component—the revenue budget and a spending
component, the expenditure budget. Taking the revenue budget as given, the public
expenditure budget consists of a set of components. Foremost, there is the information
connection to the expenditure planning, which provides a set of organizational
objectives and priorities (Lepori, Usher, &Montauti, 2013). The next step is to define the
expenditure budget within the limits laid down by the organizational goals and priorities
(Lepori et al., 2013).
Public expenditure budgeting has three core objectives, which are fiscal
discipline, efficient resource allocation, and operational efficiency (Ryu, 2013).
Transparency is another key objective. To attain effective expenditure management
requires coordination of these activities. Expenditure control also demands that the
budget should include all revenues and all expenditures of the government (Robinson,
2013).
There are four components in the expenditure budget: the functional primary
level, the accountability regime, the scope, and the time horizon (Lepori et al.,
2013).The assembling of budgetary information takes place at the functional primary
level, and this can take the form of programs, activities, or functional units within the
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organization. The accountability regime is about those responsible for budget
preparation, and this can take procedural accountability or consequential accountability.
According to procedural accountability, users of resources cannot be assumed to
be honest. Hence, it is necessary to generate and display information that will attest to
the propriety demonstrated in discharging the stewardship of scarce resources (Lepori et
al., 2013). Procedural accountability is about the inputs into the expenditure budget.
Consequential accountability requires recognition that resources that go into the
expenditure management cycle in any organization are not free but scarce. Therefore,
information on the outputs or benefits consequential on the use of scarce resources is
needed (Lepori et al., 2013).
The third subcomponent of the expenditure budget is the specification of the
scope of the information provided on capital and operating expenditures. The scope of
the expenditure budget may extend to one or more of these categories, or some
combination (Lepori et al., 2013). The final component of the expenditure budget is the
time horizon that the budget will cover, and this may take several years into the future.
The Credibility of Budgets
Few themes in public administration have been more constant than the search for
greater effectiveness and efficiency (Helpap, 2015). According to several studies, budget
credibility is critical for the attainment of greater efficiency and effectiveness in
government operations (Botlhale, 2013; De Renzio, & Masud, 2011; Helpap, 2015).
Budget credibility entails consideration from two separate but related perspectives:
technical and governance (Folcher, 2006; Whiteman, 2012).
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From a technical standpoint, a credible budget is one whose implementation goes
as planned with insignificant variances. A credible budget means that if an activity has
funds allocated to it, it will happen, and if it does not have allocated funds, it will not
(Bothale, 2013; Folcher, 2006). Technical credibility also means that the budget is
comprehensive, affordable, and sustainable. A credible budget covers every aspect of the
government's operations, is based on realistic estimates of expected revenue streams, and
remains relevant throughout the budget period (Folcher, 2006; Whiteman, 2012).From a
good governance point of view, a credible budget is one that has strong internal
governance, including adequate oversight by both the legislature and the political
leadership (Folcher, 2006; Whiteman, 2012). Budgetary governance is an essential part of
the administrative and political process of making quality budgets (Helpap, 2015).
Empirical Trends in Government Budgeting
Budgeting is the attempt to balance scarce means with public needs and ends
(Guess, 2015).The context of scarcity looms large in the 21st century, and the budgets of
almost all governments across the globe reflect the pruning effects of this scarcity (Guess,
2015).Scarce tax revenue and fixed budget ceilings have meant the cancelation of a
significant number of infrastructural projects, deep cuts in spending for essential social
services including health care (Guess, 2015; Naert, 2016). The Great Recession of 200709 compounded the situation as the recession undermined state and local revenues while
at the same time increasing expenditures (Guess, 2015;Naert, 2016).
In Europe, Greece and Spain are witnessing the looming effect of scarcity as the
two countries debate the relationship between fiscal austerity and growth (Guess, 2015;
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Laffan & Schlosser, 2016).The debate is about whether greater fiscal austerity will reduce
budget deficits at the detriment of growth in incomes and public revenues. The heart of
the matter is whether austerity will result in more of the very problems it is supposed to
solve (Guess, 2015; Laffan & Schlosser, 2016). The Greece situation was so dire that
Greeks had to vote in a referendum for or against bankruptcy. In the United States,
Congressional efforts have been preoccupied with budget cutting, reducing the size of
government, and expenditure restraint (Guess, 2015;Naert, 2016)..
In response to the traditional question of the basis on which decision makers
allocate money to one activity instead of another, Kelly (2014) argued that the prevailing
general public perception about the role of a government determined the answer. When
the public perception trusts the private sector more than the public sector, budgeting is
about cost control and improved efficiency (Kelly, 2014). However, when the public
perception is that government has to solve problems that the private sector cannot,
budgeting becomes centered on the effectiveness of programs (Kelly, 2014). It follows
that a theory of budgeting is a theory of political cycles driven by changing public
opinion about the proper role of government (Kelly, 2014).
Morozov (2013) studied budgeting practices in Louisiana and noted that,
historically, significant changes in government budgets have been pragmatic responses to
major external events such as war, recessions, or industrialization booms. The future is
likely to be the same in that revenues from natural resources exhibit a higher level of
volatility than revenues from sales and income taxes (Morozov, 2013). Hence,
governments are advised to pay attention to anything that would inject uncertainty into
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public funds as uncertainty in the public sector is detrimental for everybody (Morozov,
2013).
Joyce (2011) examined the state of public budgeting in the United States, and
noted of the domination of public budgeting by continuing high demands for government
services and large budget deficits. The struggles are likely to continue up to 2020 because
the federal government’s 10-year budget outlook is bleak (Joyce, 2011). Also, the longerterm outlook is, even more, dismal driven by growth in health care costs (Joyce, 2011).
Three major revenue sources—income, sales, and property taxes--are candidates for
reform (Joyce, 2011).On the spending side, health care and education will dominate the
budgetary provisions at both state and local levels. The control of entitlement spending
will remain the primary federal challenge (Joyce, 2011).
McNulty (2012) investigated the process of budget system reform as explained by
the change from traditional centralized input-oriented systems to more modern devolved
performance-based systems, in the context of emerging countries. McNulty outlined a
three-prong reform process as follows. First, there has to be an increase in the flexibility
in the operating environment of agencies. The second stage is to increase the certainty of
the availability of resources to meet the spending needs of agencies. The third stage is the
need to exert pressure on agencies to improve their performance. Also, for successful
reforms, agencies need to attain some essential public expenditure management
thresholds in the area of restructuring the budget and its classification, as well as
strengthening financial management skills (McNulty, 2012).Seal and Ball (2011)
described the last 2 decades of public sector budgeting as an era of public sector financial
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stringency. Accordingly, a theory of public budgeting should be robust enough to explain
the turbulence of modern public sectors (Seal & Ball, 2011).
Transparency and wider participation are critical features of a credible budget (
Van Roestel, 2016). The regular and uninterrupted flow of information into and out of the
budget process is an essential attribute of better budgeting practice. More accurate and
transparent budget information leads to a better budget process and better budget
outcomes, all of which improves the credibility of both the underlying processes and the
budget itself (Krenjova&Ringa, 2013; Van Roestel, 2016). The International Monetary
Fund, for example, in its Code of Fiscal Transparency, holds countries to standards such
as the availability of budgetary information to the public and the openness of the
budgetary process (Carlitz, 2013; Mirko, 2014). A failure to maintain an open access to
information can lead to a range of undesirable outcomes. Such outcomes could range
from the simple lack of congruence between resource allocation and public preferences to
extreme cases such as corruption (Carlitz, 2013; Mirko, 2014).
An important component of budget transparency is citizenry participation in the
process. Hossain, Begum, Alam, and Md. Islam (2014) explored citizen participatory
budgeting in Bangladesh as part of their assessment of the extent of citizen participation
in local government decision-making. Hossain et al. asserted that understanding
participatory budgeting as a concept led to improved governance and this contributed
productively to policy-making within the local municipality. The study about
transparency and participation in the budgetary process of the government of Sierra
Leone also documented similar conclusions (Marah, 2009).
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Sych (2011) reviewed the present state of budgeting practices in the United States
using the three classic budgetary functions of control, management, and planning. The
control function of budget dominates most of the today’s budget processes. Control is
critical given the prevalence of fiscal stress, budget reductions, cutback budgeting, and
environments where spending exceeds revenue capacities (Sych, 2011).
The management functions of budgeting place emphasis on efficiency and
economy in government (Nazarova, Shtiller, Selezneva, Kohut, & Seytkhamzina, 2016)
The Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) is one of the several programs introduced
for inducing efficiency and economy in government operations (Sych, 2011).The Bush
Administration introduced PART to assess programs, identify and publicize strengths and
weaknesses, and encourage administrators to improve agency performance (Sych, 2011).
The planning function of budgets enables top executives and other administrative heads
to use their respective offices to influence policy and spending decisions (Sych, 2011).
While several promising reforms have emerged in advancing the budgetary functions of
control, management, and planning, the movement toward clarity in budgetary theory has
not kept pace (Nazarova et al., 2016). Both practitioners and scholars need to expand
theoretical and applied understanding of public budgeting.
In a separate study of budgetary reforms in China, Wu and Wang (2011) observed
that while there was progress in some aspects of Chinese public expenditure
management, some weaknesses remain. A major weakness was that important decisions
take place outside of the budget process. Also, the highly decentralized fiscal system did
not enable achievements at the provincial and lower levels (Wu and Wang (2011). Wu

16
and Wang concluded that strengthening accountability mechanisms and enforcing
aggregate fiscal discipline constitute the main challenges to reforms in China.
When it comes to developing countries, modernizing budgeting system is a
challenging issue. Researchers have suggested that developing countries must first put
into place basic budgetary controls before moving to more advanced models of budgeting
(Ma &Yu, 2012). Others, however, have questioned this approach of basic first
(Ogujiuba & Ehigiamusoe, 2013). Drawing on China's budget reforms of the mid-2000s,
Ma and Yu (2012) reconfirmed the validity of the basic first approach. In China, budget
reform in 1999 evidenced the installation of budgetary controls for state finance, leading
to an enhancement of budgeting capacity and financial accountability (Greiner, 2015).
However, the system had severe setbacks due to the unexpected problem of delays in
spending and the accumulation of significant under expenditures (Greiner, 2015).This
problem arises not because the new budgeting system exercised too much control, but
rather because the new system was not yet effective in exerting budgetary controls (Ma
&Yu, 2012).
Accountability in the government budgeting process serves as one of the main
obstacles to the development of Sub-Saharan Africa (Delechat, Ramirez, Fuli, Mulaj, &
Xu, 2015; von Daniels, 2016). The mechanisms of accountability within the government
budget process include parliamentary budget committees, supreme audit institutions,
citizen budget monitoring, and advocacy groups (Delechat et al, 2015).The above four
mechanisms should hold the central government responsible for ensuring that the national
budget is designed and implemented in a manner that best promotes national
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development goals. However, a host of legal, capacity, and political constraints often
hinder these mechanisms from being able to monitor effectively and sanction executive
misuse of public funds (Delechat et al, 2015).The weak accountability regime in the
government budgeting process partly explains the snail pace development of Sub-Saharan
Africa ( Delechat et al, 2015).
Conclusion
In Chapter 2, I expound on the above theories as well as other related budgetary
theories including popular budgetary practices prevalent in many jurisdictions. These
theories combined and empirical studies are relevant for understanding the conceptual
foundation of credible government budgets. In the next section, I examine the contextual
lens for assessing the credibility of the budget of the government.
Analytical Framework
The Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA), an
initiative of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), is
one of the pioneering bodies propagating best practices for sound public financial
management. The SIGMA developed the baseline criteria for a well functioning
government budgeting systems following studies of the budgeting systems of different
governments around the world(Allen &Tomassi, 2001).The baseline criteria, which have
wider international applicability, provided the contextual lens for analyzing the
credibility of the budgeting system of the government of Sierra Leone.
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The baseline criteria served as a benchmark for assessing the credibility of the
budgeting system of the government of Sierra Leone. Allen and Tommasi (2001) set out
the SIGMA baseline criteria as follows:
•

An institutional framework that provides clearly defined principles in the
country's constitution, the organic budget law, and related laws.

•

A medium-term fiscal framework that provides budgetary information within
the medium-term and sets medium-term fiscal objectives.

•

Budgetary preparation process that is well-defined and widely understood
allowing sufficient time for each step in the budgetary process.

•

Budget execution and monitoring in which line ministries enforce limits
stipulated by parliament, and the ministry of finance can supervise these
limits.

•

Accounting and reporting system that entails a common system of
classification of expenditures with procedures for evaluating the efficiency
and effectiveness of expenditure policies and programs.

•

Financial control: A coherent and a comprehensive statutory base defining the
systems, principles and functioning of management control are required.

•

An efficient procurement system in which competition is encouraged for
contracts awarded by public sector bodies.
Nature of the Study

The study followed a qualitative methodology and a case study design to allow
for the description of the budgeting system of the government of Sierra Leone. In a case
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study, the goal is to explore a bounded system through detailed, in-depth data collection
involving multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 2011).In general, case studies are the
preferred method when "how," "why," and “what” questions are under investigation (Yin,
2011).Further, a case study uses purposive sampling with main informants and events set
within a time frame and space (Yin, 2011).A case study approach best served the purpose
of answering the research questions because the study was about developing an in-depth
description and analysis of the budgeting system of the government of Sierra Leone. I
provided a detailed chronology of activities surrounding the different stages of the
government annual budget.
Data triangulation strategy involved the use of direct interviews and review of
budgetary-related documentation. I collected data from representatives of seven
government ministries, one of which was the Ministry of Finance and Economic
Development. The ministry of finance has the Budget Bureau as one of its constituent
organs, and the Bureau has overall responsibility for the management of the government
budget. I interviewed the director of the Bureau and three other senior officials of the
ministry of finance with direct roles in the budgetary process. For the other six ministries,
the interviewees included the permanent secretary and chief accountant in each ministry.
These two officials are the most senior ministry officials with direct responsibility for the
budget. Also, four members of Parliament formed part of the interviewees. Therefore, I
interviewed a total of 20 participants. Content analysis of both the interview transcripts
and budgetary-related documentation constituted the central platform for analyzing data.
The OECD baseline criteria for efficient government budgeting provided the contextual
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lens for documenting and describing the government budgeting system, and this formed
part of the data analysis.
Definitions
Budgets: The documents containing the annual estimates of revenue and
expenditure prepared by the ministry of finance and submitted to the Parliament for
review and approval (Haruna & Vyas-Doorgapersad, 2016).
Budgeting: Constitutes the processes, practices, and systems governing the budget
documents (Haruna & Vyas-Doorgapersad, 2016). .
Government: The government of Sierra Leone. The words public and government
are used interchangeably to mean the central government and its ministries, departments,
and agencies. For purposes of this study, the words government and the public sector are
used interchangeably to mean a unitary government, as in the case of Sierra Leone. Also,
the phrase public budgeting, wherever used, is taken to mean government budgeting.
Assumptions
A major assumption underpinning this study was that government budgeting is a
managerial process with defined technicalities as to the governing systems, processes,
and procedures. Once these technicalities are in place, the resulting budget constitutes a
credible framework for the identification, allocation, and use of the nation’s financial
resources. It was, therefore, assumed that the political ideologies of the government of the
day will have little or no adverse impact on the effective functioning of the budgeting
system. Thus, the variances between the approved budget and the financial reports were
assumed to be a purely technical affair with little or no political connotation.
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While this study took a purely managerial perspective, it is important to keep in
mind that success in reforming the government budgeting is fundamentally dependent on
political commitment. Therefore, I further assumed that politicians, particularly
government politicians, are committed to such a course.
Scope and Delimitations
The study was limited to describing the underlying problems attributable to the
weakening credibility of the annual budget of the government of Sierra Leone. The
research question guiding the study related to the reasons for the high monetary variances
between the approved budget and the year-end financial reports. To this end, the study
covered the various stages of the annual budgeting process with the aim of identifying the
factors giving rise to the credibility concerns. The OECD baseline criteria for good
government budgeting provided the benchmark for the development of a budgetary
reform agenda.
The study spanned 2010 to 2014 and covered seven government ministries,
including the ministry of finance. The study did not include other government
departments or government agencies. Also, the study made an important distinction
between the budgetary policy questions of "what" is to be done and the question of "how"
it is to be done. The focus was on the latter because, among other things, the mechanics,
techniques, and skills for proper government budgeting are different from those needed to
formulate sound policy.
The focus of the study was on the microeconomic impact of government
budgeting as it pertained to the processes underpinning the preparation, approval and

22
execution of the annual budget. The study did not include an examination of the
macroeconomic implications of government budgeting, especially regarding economic
growth, inflation, and the balance of payments of the government of Sierra Leone.
Limitations
The main analytical framework for this study, consisting of the OECD Baseline
Criteria and the OECD questionnaire for efficient government budgeting system, was
based on the experience of other countries with contexts that are different to that of Sierra
Leone. The conditions for and problems of government budgeting may be significantly
different in Sierra Leone. Some of the features of least developed countries like Sierra
Leone include a high rate of poverty, a narrow revenue base, and weak systems of
governance. These factors represent significant constraints on effective government
budgeting systems in such countries (Schick, 2013). Despite these limitations, the
baseline criteria have wider international applicability and endorsement by international
financial institutions; hence, they constituted a useful benchmark for this study.
The study covered only four budgetary account heads: one revenue account head
(domestic revenue) and three expenditures account heads (personnel expenditure,
noninterest and nonsalary expenditure, and development expenditure). The 2014
government budget revealed that domestic revenue accounted for about 10% of the total
annual budgeted revenue. For the same period, the budget showed that the total of
personnel expenditure, noninterest and nonsalary expenditure, and development
expenditure accounted for about 80% of the total budgeted expenditures. The study,

23
therefore, did not cover the entire budget, and the study was more skewed toward
budgeting for expenditures.
Significance of the Study
This study is of significance to practice, theory, and positive social change as
follows.
Significance to Practice
Governments of almost every country prepare budgets as a basis for the
identification, allocation, and use of the nation's financial resources in fulfillment of
societal needs. Besides being used internally by the government, the annual budget also
serves the needs of international financial institutions that provide budgetary support to
the government of Sierra Leone. The government annual budget communicates both the
economic and financial plans of the government regarding revenues and expenditures
from a short- to a medium-term basis.
One of the biggest challenges facing the government is convincing the
international financial institutions providing budgetary support to Sierra Leone that the
government not only has a sound budget but will also carry it out. The study contributes
to the promotion of good budgeting practices by highlighting the problems undermining
the credibility of the annual budget as well as proposing reforms for addressing same.
The research findings may serve as a basis for change and may create awareness of the
reform efforts of other countries that could serve as valuable lessons for the government.
A credible budget is characterized by minimal variances when compared to the actual
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situation. Furthermore, such a budget, if implemented, will go a long way toward solving
the problems of the country concerned.
The OECD baseline criteria for a sound budgeting system are an attempt to
standardize government budgeting systems across countries. This study represented an
attempt to actualize that standardization in Sierra Leone. The study served as a basis for
promoting sound public financial management practices by way of refined budgetary
practices that promote budget credibility. In turn, there may be increased confidence
among both donors and the citizenry in the use of taxpayers’ monies by the government.
Significance to Theory
So far, researchers have not examined budget credibility issues dealing with the
Sierra Leone situation. Budget credibility matters relating to the government of Sierra
Leone are mainly documented in the reports of donors such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, providing budgetary support to the government. Only one
academic study was identified that briefly dealt with the credibility of the budget of the
government (Marah, 2009). The study was about the role and the impact of political
leadership in facilitating budget participation and transparency (Marah, 2009). The
existing research theory is yet to explore the construct of budget credibility dealing with
the government of Sierra Leone from the perspective of budgetary variances and the role
of the legislature. Therefore, from a theoretical standpoint, the significance of this study
was that it may be the first study to articulate in details the construct of budget credibility
of the government.
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Significance to Social Change
Since Sierra Leone emerged from its decade-long civil war in 2002, several
economic reviews have been conducted by international organizations providing
budgetary support to the government. For instance, both the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund have documented progress in many aspects of economic
and fiscal management that are serving as a foundation to build on for the future.
However, these institutions also cited the need for ambitious improvements in budgetary
planning and execution procedures, core aspects of credible budgeting practices. These
recommendations have come against the background of criticisms of the apparent
declining trend in the credibility of the government’s annual budget. This study
contributed to addressing some of the problems mentioned above associated with the
government budget. I described the budgeting system and practices as they operate
regarding the allocation and use of the nation's financial resources. The study identified
the main factors undermining the credibility of the annual budget and then proposed
potential reforms to address the situation. Also, the budget, especially the expenditure
budget, is one main source of potential corruption, mainly in the form of large
procurement of works, goods, and services. Strengthening the credibility of the existing
budgetary practices will constitute a way to curb the opportunities for corruption.
Improvement in the credibility of the annual budget of the government would
mean improvements in the use of taxpayers' monies by the government. It would also
mean improvements in the procedures, processes, and goals that the annual budget is
expected to achieve. The ultimate positive impact could be in government efforts at
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reducing the high level of poverty in a country that still ranks in the bottom 10 of the
United Nations Human Development Index.
Summary and Transition
In this chapter, the underlying research problem was articulated as the
deterioration in the credibility of the annual budget of the government of Sierra Leone. I
used a qualitative case study approach to describe the problems underpinning the
deteriorating trend in the credibility of the annual budget of the government of Sierra
Leone. I suggested reforms that could address the issue of the weak credibility of the
government budget and, in so doing, contribute to improving value-for-money in the use
of monies at the disposal of the government. Restoring the credibility of the budget of the
government will increase the confidence that citizens have in the government and provide
comfort for the international financial institutions providing budgetary support to the
government of Sierra Leone. The next chapter provides a synthesis of some the relevant
theories underlining government budgeting in general and, in particular, theories related
to the credibility of budgets.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The problem addressed by the study pertains to the weakening credibility of the
budget of the government of Sierra Leone. The research problem encompassed the
credibility of both the budget itself and the processes underpinning its preparation,
approval, and execution. The purpose of this qualitative study was to propose a budgetary
reform agenda for some of the main changes needed for enhancing the credibility of the
budget of the government of Sierra Leone. To this end, I identified and described the
primary factors influencing the credibility of the budget of the government from both a
technical and a governance perspective.
According to budgeting theory, a government’s budget is credible if the budget
outcome regularly and with few variances matches the budget as approved (Folcher,
2006). A credible budget is consistently in line with actual happenings both in terms of
revenues and expenditures and regarding the programs and activities carried out
(Whiteman, 2012). A credible budget is also the product of a governance system that is
adequate and effective, especially regarding the role of the legislature (Whiteman,
2012).The role of the legislature is important given its statutory function to review,
approve, and oversee the budget prepared by the executive arm of government.
The rest of this chapter provides a detailed narrative of the supporting theoretical
constructs including empirical evidence crucial to understanding the construct of budget
credibility. The next section contains an outline of how the supporting theoretical
constructs for this study were accessed using library databases and search engines.
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Literature Search Strategy
The search for the relevant literature and other supporting materials was done
mainly in traditional libraries and online libraries. The Walden Library and the British
Library provided the primary sources of materials relevant to understanding government
budgeting and other associated concepts. Google Scholar and Electronic Thesis On-Line
(ETHOs) also served as sources for materials used for the study. Based on the study
topic, government budgeting, the main search terms used were the following : budgets,
budgeting, budgetary control, budgeting systems, budgetary practices, budget policies,
budgeting principles, government budgets, government budgeting, public budgets, public
budgeting, credible budgets, credibility of budgets, budget credibility, public expenditure
management, public revenue, strategic planning, forecasting, and planning. Searches
were done mainly by subject area and resource type. Resource type included past
dissertations, books, journal articles, newspapers, and professional magazines. The above
search terms were run through the following main databases and search engines:
1. Social Science Electronic Resources: Management and Business Studies
2. ABI/INFORM Complete
3. Business Source Complete (EBSCO)
4. Emerald
5. Management and Business Studies Portal
6. Political Science Complete
7. Political Science Complete: A Sage Full Text Collection
8. Academic Search Complete
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9. ProQuest Central
10. ERIC
11. Informit Humanities and Social Science Collection
The Political Science Databases were mainly searched for terms including the
word government, government budgeting, and government budgets. Searches were done
progressively from basic searches to advanced searches. Advanced searches involved the
use of filters like relevance, dates, journal articles, and peer reviewed. Boolean logic
operators (AND, OR) enabled independent or combined used of different search terms.
These operators were used to separate or combine two or more search terms with filters
such as the name of the author, title, and year of publication, so as to focus on the most
relevant materials. The search for the literature and research materials was an ongoing
exercise performed throughout the study.
Conceptual Foundation
This section builds upon the foundational concepts of the study introduced in
Chapter 1. The conceptual framework relates mainly to the theories underpinning budgets
and budgeting as the main framework for the allocation and use of scarce financial
resources by governments. In government or the private sector, budgeting involves a
decision about funds to raise, a request for funds, and an allotment of funds (Schick,
1971).
Definition of Budget and Government Budgeting
Public finance provides the political platform on which to manage the resources
of a country (Deng & Peng, 2011). Public finance enables a government to decide the
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kind and level of resources to collect as well as the nature and level of public goods and
services to provide (Deng & Peng, 2011). It is the goal of public finance to guide nations
toward the efficient use of public resources, and the government budget provides the
framework for such to take place (Deng & Peng, 2011).
The word budget comes from budjet, a Middle English word derived from an
ancient French word bouge. The two words refer to a small bag, specifically the king’s
bag containing the money necessary for public expenditure (Allen &Tommasi, 2001). A
budget authorizes the executive arm of government to spend and collect revenues while
the approval of the budget (the power of the purse) is entrusted to the legislature (Schick,
1990). For centuries, most government work has primarily involved the process of
allocating a substantial portion of a nation’s financial resource through public spending
(Schick, 1990). A budget provides the framework for this process to take place. Budgets
are not a merely long list of numbers, but go to the root of prosperity for individuals and
the strength of their countries (Schick, 1990).
Budgeting has remained one of the most important decision-making processes in
any government, with the budget itself serving as government’s most important reference
document (Lepori, Usher, &Montauti, 2013). In jurisdictions where the budgeting system
functions well, the budget of the government cites policy priorities as well as program
goals and objectives. The budget also outlines government’s total service effort and
measures its performance, impact, and overall effectiveness (Lepori et al., 2013).
There are four dimensions to any government budget (Lapsley, & Ríos, 2015).
Firstly, the government budget is a political instrument that allocates scarce public
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resources among the social and economic needs of a country. Secondly, a budget is a
managerial or administrative tool or both. As a managerial tool, the budget specifies the
means of providing goods and services to the public, the costs involved, and evaluating
the efficiency and effectiveness of activities (Lapsley, & Ríos, 2015). Thirdly, a budget is
an economic tool that directs a nation’s economic growth, its investments, and its
development ((Lapsley, & Ríos, 2015). Fourthly, a budget serves as an accounting
instrument that holds government officials responsible for both the expenditures and the
revenues of the programs with which they have entrusted (Lapsley, & Ríos, 2015).
The four dimensions to a government’s budget are interconnected and depict the
budgeting process as one of the most pervasive and informative operations of any
government. Through the budgeting process, elected and nonelected officials cooperate,
bargain, and haggle over the control and use of public money (Schick, 1990).
Objectives of Budgets
Mikesell (2011) posited that the basic budgeting problem concerns the basis on
which to allocate x dollars to activity A instead of activity B. While each government
may have a framework for making such decisions, the budget process ought to move
resources to the best advantage of the population (Mikesell, 2011). The budget process is
expected to document the choices of the citizenry of any country for government
services. Also, the budget provides the framework for the efficient management of the
financing and delivery of government services (Schick, 1990).
Government budgets are meant to attain three complimentary objectives: fiscal
discipline, efficient resource allocation, and operational efficiency (Allen &Tommasi,
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2001).Fiscal discipline is about effectively controlling the budget totals by setting
expenditure limits both at the aggregate level and the level of individual government
agencies. The control of budget totals, especially regarding expenditure, is the foremost
purpose of every budget system (Allen &Tommasi, 2001). Budgets would be useless if
the total of expenditures were permitted to move upwardly to meet all the needs (Allen
&Tommasi, 2001). A credible budget operates within the expenditure limits approved by
the legislature.
Allocative efficiency means that given the scarcity of resources, the budgeting
system has to define priorities in line with the agenda of the government as well as the
effectiveness of programs (Ryu, 2013). Also, allocative efficiency entails the transfer of
resources from old to new programs or from less productive programs to more productive
ones (Ryu, 2013). The goal of operational efficiency is to ensure the implementation of
programs within government agencies by efficient and effective management systems.
The efficiency of the budgeting system is about the capacity of the budget system to
implement and deliver services at the lowest possible cost (Allen &Tommasi, 2001).
The Budgetary Function
The budgetary function is about allocating and controlling resources. Whether
developed for governments, companies, or individuals, budgets are plans with price tags
(Guess, 2015). Also, budgets express the dominant political values and policy
preferences, and they indicate in narratives and numbers who gets what for what purpose
and who pays (Guess, 2015). Government budgeting has three uses: the control of
government spending, the management of government activities, and the determination of
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governmental objectives through planning (Mikesell, 2014; Schick, 2013). The
government budget process should attain a right balance among aspects of control,
management, and planning, as an emphasis on any one may diminish the use of the others
(Schick, 2013).The control aspect of budgeting is about enforcing the conditions set in
the approved budget and guaranteeing compliance with the spending restrictions imposed
by the governing budget authority (Schick, 2013). For example, if the budget imposes
restrictions on the spending discretion of ministries, the Budget Bureau will use its power
to uphold such restrictions.
Management in the budgeting process entails the use of the budget to ensure the
efficient use of resources in the execution of the authorized activities of the spending
agencies (Jarvinen, 2016). The management function of budgeting is about outputs of
government agencies and ministries. That is, what is being done or produced and at what
cost, and how that performance compares with budgeted goals agencies (Jarvinen, 2016;
Schick, 2013).The planning aspect of budgeting involves the determination of
government objectives and the evaluation of alternative programs for the attainment of
such goals. In fulfillment of the planning function of budgeting, the central budget
authority must have information concerning the purposes and effectiveness of programs
on a long-term basis (Schick, 2013). The process of budgeting compels managers to
become better administrators because budgeting is a veritable tool for planning, control,
communicating, decision making, and value creation (Jarvinen, 2016; Segun, 2011).
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Overview of the Conceptual Framework
In the first section, I examined the theory of the new public management model as
well as the four main overarching theories that have shaped the budgeting literature since
the 1940s.The next section covers the budget cycle, the medium-term expenditure
framework, extra budgetary funds, and the formats of the budget proposal. Towards the
midpoint of the chapter is an outline of the accounting basis for budgeting, budgeting
strategies, and coping with the complexity and conflicts inherent in budgeting. The fourth
section provides an overview of public expenditure management as the primary platform
for budget execution and monitoring. In the final section, I outline the respective roles of
the executive and legislative arms of government in the budget process. The final section
also covers the topical issue of budget transparency and the open budget index. The
conceptual framework concludes with empirical studies underlying the construct of
budget credibility as the basis on which the present study is carried out.
Management of the Public Sector
Traditional/Old Model of Public Administration
Until the early 1980s, administration of the public sector was highly centralized,
hierarchical, and rule-based, with governments evident in the production, provision, and
regulatory activities (Flynn, 2012). The old public management is a traditional
bureaucracy rooted in the philosophies of Woodrow Wilson, Frederick Winslow Taylor,
and Max Weber and characterized by centralization, hierarchical authority, and excessive
rules and regulations (Flynn, 2012).This traditional system of public administration has
come under criticism for various reasons. Flynn (2012) argued that fiscal crises of
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government, poor performance of the public sector in different areas, imperious
bureaucracy, lack of accountability, and corruption characterized the traditional model of
public administration. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and the
Organization for Economic Corporation and Development (OECD) argued that
governments were becoming too large, consuming too many scarce resources, and
involved in too many activities (as cited in Springer, 2011).
The New Public Management
The new public management (NPM) is an integrated administrative reform
framework with the aim of reinventing government. NPM seeks leaner and better
governmental performance by challenging agencies of government to do more with less
(Page, 2005).NPM places emphasis on economic efficiency and budgetary control as
priorities for governments. The primary aim is to enhance the responsiveness of
governments to citizens and to move decision making closer to the main constituents of
the public sector (Eakin, Eriksen, & Oyen, 2011). For over 3 decades, NPM has been
trumpeted as a managerial system for adapting private sector management principles and
practices to the public sector. The NPM promotes a high degree of accountability and
transparency in government operations (Flynn, 2012). It is in this regard that the NPM
encourages public sector organizations to adopt profit maximizing goals akin to those of
private corporations.
Other defining features of the new public management include the curtailment of
the role and the scope of government in the economy through privatization and economic
liberalization (Flynn, 2012). NPM demands the separation of policy and implementation
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functions through the devolution of some central government functions (Flynn, 2012).
Also, NPM has brought about incentives for state actors based on aligning performance
targets with policy objectives (Eakin et al., 2011). The overriding goal was to cut
spending, downsize government, and promote a management culture in the public sector.
Despite its broad appeal across many countries, NPM has faced criticism with
some arguing that it tends to blur the distinctions between the private and public sectors.
The other criticism of NPM is that it treats the public sector as homogeneous in
organizational terms rather than the differentiated systems of organizations that are linked
into complex policy networks (Flynn, 2012). Despite some of these criticisms of NPM,
its principles remain widespread as a framework for encouraging public agencies to adopt
profit maximizing goals similar to those of private corporations.
Dominant Budgeting Theories
Four dominant theories have pervaded the government budgeting literature:
•

normative/economic rationality

•

incrementalism/political rationality

•

reformist theory

•

organizational life cycle theory

Normative/Economic Rationality Theory
The normative theory of budgeting holds that governments should examine all
possibilities for spending and allocates money where they can achieve the most of an
agreed upon goal (Rubin, 2015). Rubin (2015) furthered that governments have to define
their objectives, pinpoint the programs for the attainment of the objectives, and outline
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the expected outcomes of the programs. Economic rationality presupposes that a
government has the capacity and capability to evaluate rationally all of its programs.
Rationality further means that a government only spends on those programs whose goals
would provide the highest satisfaction (Rubin, 2015).Essentially; the rationalist paradigm
assumes technical explanations of budgeting systems and objective processes, structures,
and information that move choices toward the best interest of the public.
Critics have contended that budgeting is not a rational process. People often do
not know or agree on what they want, and there are often conflicting demands regarding
social goals (Kadri, Peter, & Giuseppe, 2012; Rubin, 2015). Also, governments are made
up of different interest groups that do not act rationally at all times (Rubin, 2015). The
concept of rationality fails to capture both the political undercurrent as well as the
emotional aspect of government budgeting (Rubin, 2015). The rationality paradigm fails
to capture the realities and complexities of public budgeting.
Incrementalism and Political Theory
Budgeting along the economic rationality lines ignored politics (Boris, 2013;
Schick, 2013). Boris argued that governments and the societies they rule are not single
entities with a single set of goals. Peoples, communities, and organizations want different
things from the budget and these needs have no common denominator (Schick, 2013).
With economic rationality, there is no way governments can choose between roads for
rural farmers and free health care for infants, and such conflicting goals can only be
resolved through politics (Boris, 2013).
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According to incrementalism, government budgeting is a reflection of politics.
Hence, budgetary allocations only change incrementally (marginally) because the
existing allocations are already reflective of the political power of various interest groups
(Rubin, 2015). Accordingly, unless leaders change the politics, they cannot
fundamentally change a country’s budget (Rubin, 2015).
Incrementalism, therefore, became probably the single most influential budgetary
theory, pioneered by Wildavsky, since the 1960s. The central premise of incrementalism
is that previous commitments and political considerations severely limit flexibility in
budgeting. Significant increases in government spending would require substantial tax
increases, which would anger taxpayers, and similarly, drastic spending reductions would
aggravate program beneficiaries (Schick, 2013). Given this situation, incrementalism
holds that decision makers will often use the current budget as a guide for next year’s
budget and focus is therefore on modest budgetary changes (Schick, 2013).
There are several criticisms of incrementalism. It assumes that a particular year’s
existing conditions will hold sway for the following budget year. Also, incrementalism
assumes that the planned activities for the year have been thoroughly and objectively
appraised to warrant their continuation (Boris, 2013). Critics have further argued that if
budgets change gradually, they may not be able to respond to rapidly changing conditions
especially in times of crisis (Boris, 2013).
Proponents of incrementalism responded by noting that modern budgetary
practices are all routed on one key fundamental assumption underpinning
incrementalism. That is, this year’s spending is a function of last year’s spending
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regardless of the level of potential variations (Boris, 2013). In practice, incrementalism is
an old budgetary theory that is still relevant to current practice as it provides a unifying
perspective for understanding modern budgetary practices (Schick, 1990).
Budget Reform Theory
The reformist approach holds that, over the long-term, budgetary practices do
change (Schick, 2007). In contrast to Wildavsky’s view, significant budget changes do
take place, and hence reforms are possible (Schick, 2007). A government budget shows
the imprint of the period to which it relates (Schick, 2007). Schick described the budget
reform process as having gone through three stages over the past 5 decades.
The earlier years of government budgeting in the 1940s to 1960s were all about
spending control, ensuring that spending targets and work plans strictly follow the budget
(Schick, 1990). From the 1970s to the new millennium, Schick argued that budget
reforms shifted to emphasize management functions (i.e., ensuring that government
agencies carry out their activities effectively and efficiently). Schick ended his theory by
noting that the new millennium has shifted the focus of budget reforms to planning and
goal selection, the choice of what to do rather than how to do it. So, for Schick, each
government budget contains these three orientations: spending control, management, and
planning. Furthermore, at any point in time, the budget places more emphasis on one than
on the others. Accordingly, Schick modified Wildavsky’s conclusion by arguing that
budgetary reform is possible.
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Organizational Life Cycle Theory
In line with the Schick’s approach, Levine (1978) looked at government budgets
over a longer time span as a basis for his organizational life cycle theory. Levine’s central
point was that governments, like other organizations, go through stages from their
establishment to extinction or demise. Levine established a link between the environment
in which government operates and the resources available for the budget. The budget
process represents the response of government to the scarce resources in its environment
and not a reflection of the relative political power of the dominant interest groups as
opined by Wildavsky. Budgets respond to the scarce resources in the environment.
Consequently, there will be good, bad, and moderate times and the government budget
will reflect it, at least economically (Levine, 1978).
Conclusion
It is worth noting that much of the present literature revolves around a
combination of all of the four budgetary theories as described above. While Wildvasky
said reform in the government budget was far-fetched, Schick argued that some reforms
had and did take place. Levine discussed the conditions under which reforms are likely
to succeed.
The second segment of the conceptual framework includes the budget cycle, the
medium-term expenditure framework, extra budgetary matters, and the budget formats.
These issues are sequentially dealt with in the sections following.
The Government Budget Cycle
The government budget cycle is typically made up of four phases, as follows.
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Preparing a Budget Proposal
The preparation of the budget proposal is the first phase of the budgetary process,
and this function typically falls within the executive arm of government. The proposal
stage is often a complex and controversial first stage mainly because of the variety of
government departments and other competing interest groups (Mikesell, 2011). The
proposal stage requires government agencies and other related departments to make an
assessment of the programs and activities they intend undertaking in the coming years.
After that, the evaluation of these programs and activities takes place in terms of their
costs and revenue for inclusion in the proposal (Allen &Tommasi, 2001).
At the proposal preparation stage, it is common for the agencies of governments,
political parties, local councils, or other entities to develop ambitious budget
requirements. The budget proposals will often demand increased funding in respect to
some favored programs and reduction in taxes with a heavy burden. Also, budget
proposals would incorporate proposed legislative changes, or the public demanding new
services through their local members of parliament (Mikesell, 2011). Coping with such a
variety of competing needs is a difficult and complex task. The overriding task is to
prepare proposals with accurate predictions of future conditions well in time to avoid
substantial revision at a later date within the budget year (Mikesell, 2011). As part of
reform efforts, budget proposals have been a subject of many changes, with sophisticated
techniques introduced for minimizing forecast errors and assessing the likely impact of
program outputs.
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Enacting the Budget
Enacting the budget constitutes the formal adoption of the budget and is usually
the joint responsibility of the executive and legislative arms of government. This phase
involves the executive trying to persuade the legislature to approve the budget proposal
with few or no changes at all. Depending on the constitutional provisions of the country,
the legislature has the responsibility to approve, decline, or request an amendment to the
budget proposal submitted by the executive arm of government (Mikesell, 2011; Perci,
2016).
In some jurisdictions like the United States, constitutional provisions confer
powers on the president to veto the decisions of the legislature in respect to some aspect
of the budget proposal (Mikesell, 2011). Also, in the United States, the courts have
jurisdiction to make amendment to the legislated budget (Mikesell). In some other
countries, voters must approve certain budgetary provisions such as increases in the tax
rate beyond a certain threshold (Nice, 2001).
Budget Execution
Once the legislature has enacted the budget, the next phase is implementation or
execution. This stage involves administrative procedures for the transfer of funds to
individual agencies and ministries, contracting out functions of government, and
governmental borrowing to fill budgetary needs (Helpap, 2015). Controls by the central
budget office help to ensure that funds are being spent as per the budget and in line with
the legislated amendments and veto thereto, as appropriate.
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Given that budgets relate to future periods that cannot be predicted with absolute
certainty, situations that may necessitate revisions to the budget while execution is in
progress are bound to arise (Whiteman, 2012). The revision of the approved budget is a
common occurrence, and there are varieties of methods for doing so. It is relevant to note
that funds approved during the adoption phase of a particular budget and the funds
eventually spent during the actual execution of that budget may not necessarily be
identical (Whiteman, 2012).Some factors can cause such variations including change in
major government policy or significant forecasting errors in the estimate of revenues and
expenditures (Whiteman, 2012). However, budgeting theory holds that an effective
budgeting system should be able to produce a budget that minimizes the variances
between the approved budget and the actual outcomes on a sustainable basis (Whiteman,
2012).
Review and Audit
The review and audit stage is the final and crucial stage in the budget process,
focusing on adherence to budgetary policies, procedures, and guidelines. Was the amount
spent for the free healthcare initiative established in the budget? Were the requisite
legislative approvals obtained? Over the decades, the review and audit phase has
expanded its scope to include a greater emphasis on determining the productivity,
efficiency, and effectiveness of government policies and programs (Schick, 1990).
There are disagreements as to what government policies and programs should
achieve, and this is attributable to factors such as political ideology or the preferences of
citizens. Regardless of such disagreements, there is still need to evaluate government
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programs as to their effectiveness and outputs, and hence the justification for the audit
and review phase (Schick, 2009).
Conclusion
In concluding this subsection, it is relevant to note the linkages across the
different phases of the budget process. The outcome of one phase is connected to and
crucially dependent on both the preceding phase and the subsequent phase. Also, the
phases overlap as the budget of the current year is being implemented, while at the same
time that for next year is being planned and the previous year’s budget is under review
and audit. These linkages make the budget a continuous process with overlapping
activities. In the next section, attention is given to the time frame for preparing budgets,
and the importance of ensuring that budgets relate to periods that exceed 1 year.
Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
Over the last 3 decades, the timeframe for government budgets has shifted from a
single fiscal year to several years into the future. The process entails the preparation of
forward estimates that project expenditures and other budget elements for each of the
next 3 years or more (Schick, 2009). These projections usually assume that current
policies will continue without significant changes. By assuming as such, the government
has a basis to forecast the fiscal situation that will ensue if the budget policies already in
place are maintained (Schick, 2009). With such information at their disposal, government
officials can estimate the impact of proposed policy changes on future budgets (Schick,
2009).
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Some governments, including Sierra Leone, have taken it further by constructing
medium-term expenditure frameworks (MTEF) that limit spending in each of the next 3
or more fiscal years (Schick, 2013). The MTEF serves as a constraint that bars
governments from taking actions that would cause estimated future spending to rise
above the preset limit. For a government budget to be credible, the expenditure programs
must be sustainable at least over the medium term (Schick, 2013). Moreover, the
budgeting system should provide a strong link between government policies and the
allocation of resources on a multiyear perspective (Schick, 2013).
Clearly, the feasibility of a multiyear perspective is greater when revenues are
predictable, and the mechanisms for controlling expenditures are well developed (Schick,
2013). The MTEF is, therefore, essential to frame the annual budget preparation process.
Experience with MTEF suggests that politicians who are under pressure by exigencies to
focus on the current budget year often ignore medium-term projections, even when such
decisions adversely impact future budgets (Schick, 2013).Thus, the MTEF existed on
paper but breached in practice.
In the next section, the issue of extra-budgetary activities and off-budget activities
are examined as an important feature of the budget process.
Extra Budgetary Funds and Off-Budget Transactions
Extrabudgetary refers to government activities whose funding do not go through
the budget (Zan&Xue, 2011; Zhan, 2013). Such funds are often the subject of different
reporting and control distinct from the government budget itself. Off-budget transaction
or activities are transactions conducted by a government ministry or agency whose
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transactions should be within the budget. A typical instance is when fees collected by an
agency are utilized by that agency for other purposes instead of remitting such monies
direct to the Treasury (Zan&Xue, 2011; Zhan, 2013). Typically, an extra budgetary fund
conducts transactions that are, by definition, outside the budget.
Zhan (2013) sought to understand local extra-budgetary ﬁnance within Chinese
local governments against the background that a significant amount of revenue fell
outside the budgetary system. The findings revealed that extra budgetary funds were
prevalent because the local government authorities can conveniently exploit their
administrative power to extract revenue from the local economy (Zhan, 2013).
In the next section, consideration is given to the types of budget format or
approaches in fulfillment of the functions of public budgets in the overall governance of
the resources of a nation.
Formats of the Budget Proposal
Different formats of budgets have emerged over the years of which the following
are worth reviewing given their ongoing relevance in the management of public funds.
These budgets format are the line-item budgeting, performance budgeting, planningprogramming-budgeting, zero-based budgeting, and activity-based budgeting.
Line-Item/Traditional Budgeting
Line-item budgeting is otherwise called the object-of-expenditure budgeting or
traditional budgeting. The line item divides the budget into departments and agencies of
governments and within each department are details of the items of expenses (Schick,
2013). These items of expenditure, some of which include salaries, travel, office supplies,
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are categorized according to set classes with totals and subtotals. The line-item budget
dates back to the 1940s and is still in widespread use.
The proponents of traditional budgeting argue that its primary benefits include
control over unwarranted expenditure and the provision of information on the activities
underpinning each expense item (Sopanah, Sudarma, Ludigbo & Djamhuri, 2013). The
past provides a strong base on which to develop the current period budget, instead of the
future, which cannot be comprehended (Wildavsky, 1978). Another sustaining virtue of
traditional budgeting is that while it acknowledges that budgeters may have objectives,
the functions of the organization determine the budget (Ferguson & Johnson, 2011).
Traditional budgeting does not demand analysis of policy, but neither does it inhibit it. Its
neutrality with policy makes traditional budgeting easily comparable to a variety of
policies, all of which translate into line items (Sopanah, Sudarma, Ludigbo & Djamhuri,
2013).
Despite its widespread appeal and ease of applicability, the line-item budget has
come under severe criticisms as follows. Firstly, it focuses exclusively on the inputs side
of the budget (i.e., the amount of money spent ignoring the outputs of government
agencies and ministries (Schick, 2013). Secondly, the line-item budget is incremental
rather than comprehensive. Also, the line-item budget fragments decisions, usually
making them piecemeal. The line item budget is heavily historical, looking backward
more than forward, and it is indifferent about objectives (Wildvasky, 1978). A further
criticism levied against the traditional budget is the lack of information about
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management, processes, planning, and efficiency of government programs and functions
(Schick, 2013).
In spite of the above weaknesses, the line-item budget remains prevalent, and
there is little empirical evidence that organizations alter their existing budgeting
practices(Waal, Hermkens-Janssen,& de Ven, 2011). This paradox is explainable through
a deeper insight of the process by which organizations decide on changing and renewing
budgeting practices (Waal et al., 2011).
Performance Budgeting
Performance-based budgeting (PB) emerged in the 1940s in response to the above
shortcomings of line-item budgeting. Performance budgeting presents the purposes and
objectives for allocating funds, and examines costs of programs and activities established
to meet those objectives (Ryu, 2013). Performance budget provides information on the
activities identifiable with a government agency as well as highlighting the linkages
between targets and expected results. (Joyce, 2011).
PBB is one of many initiatives to improve the management of public sector
programs as it increases accountability, and influence funding decisions (Kelly &
Rivenbark, 2015). By focusing on both the inputs into budgets as well as the outputs,
performance budget provides a clear guide as to the likely effects of budgetary changes
than would be the case for the line-item budget (Marti, 2013; Willoughby, 2011).
Like the line-item budgeting, performance budgeting too has shortcomings.
Performance budgeting has a rather elaborate process and requires a great deal more
effort than the line-item budget (Allen, 2014). Budgeters have to take care to prevent the
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use of overly simplistic measures of agencies’ outputs, as this may yield distortions in the
operations of agencies with unintended consequences (Allen, 2014; (Kelly & Rivenbark,
2015). Also, in a typical political environment, it is not an easy task to set up agreeable
outcome targets among various stakeholders. Even if agreeable outcome targets are set
up, it will be difficult to determine who (or what program) is responsible for the
outcomes because there are many rival causes (Allen, 2014).
On the whole, performance budgeting represents a valuable tool for effective
budget decision making at all levels of government. However, it is only a tool; it is not a
panacea for all budgetary problems
Planning-Program-Budgeting Systems
Program budgeting is also sometimes referred to as planning-program-budgeting
systems (PPBS). PPBS emerged in the 1960s as a more ambitious approach to improving
the performance of government operations (Schick, 2013). The principal goal of PPBS is
to improve the basis for major program decisions in government ministries and agencies
as well as in the Executive Office of the President (Schick, 2013).
PPBS calls for relating the three management processes constituting its name:
planning, programming, and budgeting. Planning is related to programs that are central to
the budget process. Programs and their cost estimates reflect a longer timeframe, with
emphasis given to program outputs and objectives (Schick, 2013). In PBBS, the budget is
organized by programs or activities that share the same objectives, regardless of which
agency or departments carry out those activities (Schick, 2013). To this end, there has to
be a clear statement of program goals and objectives and the identification and systematic
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comparison of the alternative methods of meeting those desired objectives (Schick,
2013). Thus, the budget data is organized by programs, reflecting current as well as
future implications of decisions.
The PPBS system reigned until the mid-1970s, and like its predecessor budgeting
systems, it phased out as a result of several factors. PPBS were allegedly merely imported
from defense environments to civilian environments without much adaptation and
preparation (Schick, 2013).
Zero-Based Budgeting
With the planning-programming-budgeting system falling out of favor, zerobased budgeting (ZBB) emerged to fill the vacuum. ZBB also represented a rejection of
the incremental model of budgeting, as it demands a justification of the entire budget
submission from ground zero (Lauth, 2014). An agency preparing a budget must justify
every dollar that it requests. ZBB refutes the incremental mode of budgeting, which
essentially respects the outcomes of previous budgetary decisions as constituting the
basis for the current budget (Lauth, 2014).
ZBB places emphasis on the concept of priorities to reflect the concern that the
things that governments do should be the most important of all the things they could do
(Achim, 2014). So for ZBB, examination of public programs should go beyond the
features of accountability, efficiency, effectiveness, and impact to incorporate relevance
(Achim, 2014). The most significant and critical problems are the subject of the
budgetary process (Achim, 2014).
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Thus, ZBB demands a full justification of each governmental program, regardless
of whether it is a new or an existing program. A three-stage process characterizes ZBB.
The first stage is the identification and description of each program. The second stage
involves the evaluation and ranking of programs using cost-benefit-analysis, and the last
stage is about the allocation of resources (Achim, 2014; Lauth, 2014).
ZBB has several objectives, as follows: to include managers at all levels in the
budgeting process and to justify the resources requirements for existing activities as well
as for new activities. ZBB focuses on the evaluation of programs, and the establishment
of objectives for the measurement of accomplishments. Also, there is the objective to
assess alternative methods of accomplishing objectives, and the provision of a credible
rationale for reallocating resources (Achim, 2014; Lauth, 2014).
Like other budgeting systems, ZBB too has problems ranging from the resistance
of government employees and the lack of understanding of the basic concepts. There is
the problem of poor quality of some of the information generated. A major problem was
the complaints by agencies that their program activities are so interrelated that it is
impractical to separate one activity for funding purposes without affecting several other
program activities (Schick, 2009). It was useful to note that many of these problems of
ZBB mirrored the same problems that were experienced by PPBS.
Activity-Based Budgeting
Another variant of budgeting is activity-based budgeting, designed to strengthen
the link between activity and budgets. Linking budgets to activity increases competition,
enhances efficiency, and facilitates control in times of reduced demand (Hansen, 2011).
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Activity-based budgeting puts budgeting on autopilot in the sense that politicians need
not actively decide to change budgets whenever activities change (Hansen, 2011).
Activity-based budgeting appropriations depend at least in part on information
about achievements, demand, or output (Hansen, 2011).Activity-based budgeting has
become a common way of financing schools and hospitals. Hansen (2011) further opined
that activity-based budgeting is an extension of activity- and capacity-based concepts into
the budgeting realm, and the aim is to increase an operation’s flexibility to respond to
unforeseen events.
At its heart, activity-based budgeting creates an explicit model of the
organization’s activities, processes, resources, and capacity that it uses to generate plans
and budgets (Hansen, 2011). Another important element of activity-based budgeting is
that it explicitly ties capacity planning more firmly into the firms’ processes. The success
of the system is, however, dependent on the degree of institutionalization (Hansen, 2011).
Conclusion
Although traditional budgeting has inherent defects, it remain a dominant
approach to budgeting (Douglas, 2012; Lande, Luder, & Portal, 2013; Monteiro &
Rodrigo, 2013).Traditional budgeting lasted so long because it has the virtue of its
defects. It makes calculations easy precisely because it is not comprehensive.
Also, by budgeting for only 1 year, traditional budgeting avoids the chaos and
conflicts that take place in multiyear budgeting. Traditional budgeting lasts because it is
simpler, easier, more controllable, and more flexible than modern alternatives like PPBS,
ZBB, and ABB.
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In the third segment of the conceptual framework, consideration is first given to
the accounting basis for preparing government budgets. Next is a review of modern
budgeting strategies prevalent in many jurisdictions. The section ends with a discussion
of some of the methods of coping with the complexity and conflicts inherent in the
budgetary process. These issues are discussed in the sections following.
The Accounting Bases for Budgeting
There are two accounting bases for preparing budgets. A budget prepared
according to cash accounting principles or according to the accrual accounting principles
(Maciuca & Socoliuc, 2014; Monteiro, Rodrigo & Gomes, 2013). The difference
between the two methods consists at the moment where the transactions occur. The
budget developed under the accrual accounting principles will estimate the revenues and
expenses of a given period to determine the expected level of profit (Maciuca&Socoliuc,
2014).On the contrary, a budget developed under the cash accounting rules will relate
only to cash items. That is, items bought in cash and income received in cash. The
purpose of this type of budget is to determine whether there is sufficient cash
(Maciuca&Socoliuc, 2014).
From a macro level perspective, accrual budgeting provides a framework for the
planning, management and control of public expenditure (Steger, 2013). Also, a budget
prepared based on accrual accounting presents long-term events while the budget
prepared under the cash accounting rules presents short-term ones (Maciuca&Socoliuc,
2014).
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New Zealand was the first country to adopt accrual budgeting in the early 1990s,
followed by Australia, Great Britain, Sweden, Canada, and the United States
(Maciuca&Socoliuc, 2014). Following demands made by the IMF and the World Bank
for information on the accrual budgeting, Romania commenced a gradual process of
accrual budgeting in 2014. As a result of accrual budgeting, Romanian politicians were
reportedly able to increase their control over all the public resources. The accrual process
enables the government agencies responsible for policies to hold more comprehensive
and significant information for the development of policies (Maciuca&Socoliuc, 2014).
The shift to the accrual budgeting meant that the budget stops being an
authorization tool for public expenditure and becomes a planning and management tool
(Steger, 2013). Accrual budgeting helps to align public finances with economic reality
and makes it harder for the interested parties to ignore the challenges imposed by the
future budget (Steger, 2013).
Budgeting Strategies
The variety of budgetary theories as outlined previously, including others not
mentioned here, indicates that different forces may be at work in public budgeting.
Budgeting decisions affect governments and the lives of their peoples in many ways. Can
a farmer afford to send his three children to college? Will a village have pipe-borne
water supply instead of a health center? These questions and many more are answered, at
least in part, during the budget process.
Lepori, Usher, and Montauti (2013) studied the uses of budgeting in higher
education institutions and noted that budgeting concerns the decision on the level of
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expenditures and the repartition of resources among organizational subunits. Lepori et al.
held that budgeting is a critical organizational process, which is closely related to
fundamental choices concerning strategic priorities and resources acquisition strategies.
Interested parties who want to influence the budgetary process have some options
to adopt, and a few established strategies for doing so are as follows.
Cultivating Clientele Support
Clienteles are groups with continuing and strong interests in a government
program, such as the beneficiaries of government social security payments. Cultivating
clienteles’ support is important in obtaining executive and legislative approval of budget
proposals. Often, government programs that lack strong clientele support may be easily
susceptible to budget cuts, especially in difficult times when funds are very scarce
(Charles & Niels, 2012).
Gaining the Trust of Others
An important budgetary strategy is to build and maintain the trust and confidence
of other participants in the budget process. Almost always, there are some participants
whose approvals are required for a budget proposal to sail through. Good preparation,
honesty, and awareness of the expectations of those participants are critical for success in
the government budgetary process (Hills & Schleicher, 2011).
The extent to which any budget is successful is very much dependent on its
acceptance and the attitudes of workers towards it (Raghunandan,Ramgulam,
&Raghunandan-Mohammed, 2012).Therefore, budgeting cannot, afford to ignore the
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impact of human behavior so as to ensure satisfactory outcomes (Raghunandan et al.,
2012).
Documenting a Need
A related budgetary strategy entails developing and presenting convincing
evidence of the need for some course of action or program. For instance, an analysis
showing that a particular education reform improves student performance may help gain
approval of the funds required. A major development in budgetary reforms over the years
is the requirement for a systematic analysis of needs and program performance in
budgeting (Annesi-Pessina & Sicilia, 2012).
Coping with Painful Actions
Where certain budgetary actions may yield painful consequences, such as deep
cuts in funding, budget officials may resort to different tactics. Schick (2007) noted that
tactics in this regard may include shifting blame to other decision makers or cutting back
on less visible and less painful items, such as maintenance. In a similar vein, budgetary
officials may employ the tactic of cutting down on popular programs so as to raise a
public outcry that will eventually lead to a restoration of funding.
The Camel’s Nose
The Camel’s Nose is a budgeting strategy that involves asking for a small amount
of money for the first year and a somewhat larger amount in each succeeding year. The
trick is not to ask for a huge sum at the outset (Mikesell, 2011). The presumption is that
budgeting moves through incremental changes, which is less likely to attract opposition
than large changes (Boris, 2013). The idea is to seek some funding at the initial stage
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with the hope that decision-makers will find it wasteful not to continue with the programs
already started (Mikesell, 2011).
Capitalizing on Temporary Circumstances
Budgetary officials may take advantage of unique prevailing conditions that may
temporarily improve a program’s attractiveness. For instance, in a crisis, a program may
gain funding if it can serve as a potential remedy for whatever is causing the crisis. A
friendly political environment may also offer an opportunity to undertake or expand on a
particular program (Sacco, Stalebrink, & Posner, 2011).
Minimizing the Risk of Future Cuts
Where there are strong threats of cuts in funding, government agencies may fend
off such threats by spending or otherwise committing the money as quickly as possible
(Schwartz, Sudbury, & Young, 2014). For instance, equipment or supplies may well be
purchased as soon as money becomes available.
Coping with the Complexity and Conflict of Budgeting
Another essential feature underpinning the government budgetary process is the
complexity and conflict inherent in the process. Because there is never enough money to
satisfy all demands, budgeting is in some sense a fight over money and the things that
money buys. This perspective sees budgeting as an allocative process in which there is
never enough money to allocate (Schick, 2007).
Government budgeting is thus an enormously complex undertaking. The process
entails the efficient participation of the president, principal advisers, and many members
of the legislative branches, as well as numerous interest groups (Schick, 2007). The
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process consists of thousands of decisions, complicated rules and procedures, and debate
over the composition and amount of public revenue and spending. Budgeting has two
inherent features: one that broadens the scope of conflict and another that narrows and
resolves it.
Schick (2007) noted that conflicts in budgeting arise in different forms. Who
should pay and who should benefit? Which categories of peoples are to bear a heavy tax
burden, and which programs should grow and which should shrink? Budgeting is a
redistributive process in which some gain and others lose; it allows for choosing among
the many claims on public resources (Schick, 2007). Also, as a rationing process,
budgeting is resolved by excluding some claimants from its bounty, allowing
governments, either expressly or indirectly, to decide on its role and set priorities (Schick,
2007). All of these characteristics increase the potential for conflict, not only between
political parties and between the executive and the legislature but also among the
thousands of agencies and other interest groups.
There is a resolution feature of government budgeting that exerts a contrary force
to contain conflict and constraint ambition (Schick, 2007). The resolution element of
budgeting demands solution to all conflicts in the budgetary process. The resolutions of
conflicts start from the early stages of the process, in which agencies ask for less than
they want. The resolution of a conflict is also identifiable with the final stages, in which
the fight over resources ends (Schick, 2007). The budget is concluded by setting aside
residual differences to reach an agreement (Schick, 2007). Essentially, budgeting is not
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an all-out war, for if it were, even the best efforts of the disputants would not bring
closure (Schick, 2007).
The task, therefore, for central budget officials is the challenge of assessing the
many programs and diverse activities as to their effectiveness, and sorting through claims
and counter-claims. In fulfillment of this goal, the following constitute some of the
strategies for coping with conflicts and complexity in government budgeting.
Incrementalism
Incrementalism focuses on familiar grounds in terms of confining the budgetary
process to what is being done now. The argument for this approach is that it reduces the
level of uncertainty inherent in the budgetary process (Dan, 2014). Also, a fundamental
assumption is that dramatic and drastic departure from existing programs will not take
place, and if they do, such programs would be few and far apart (Wildavsky, 1978). The
assurance that existing programs will continue with incremental increases across the
board reduces some of the conflicts that are inherent in the budgetary process.
Fair Share
The strategy of fair share demands that all programs should be given some share
of any additional funding or planned cutbacks. In doing so, all budgetary programs are
given a share of the available funds (Mike, 2012).
Separate Pools
This strategy involves the division of the budget into pools that are treated
separately from one another (Mirko, Nicholas, & Richard, 2014). By so doing, the
complexity and conflicts associated with government budgeting are minimized.
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Earmarking a particular source of revenue to fund a specific program is a case in point.
For instance, fuel tax revenue held in a separate pool for road maintenance purposes only.
Postponement
Given the repetitive nature of the budgetary process, budget officials do not have
to deal with every possible issue now (Mike, 2012). Hence, some issues require attention
in the current year, some in the next budget, and still others at a later date in future years.
Further, urgent matters that cannot wait until the next budget cycle can be handled by
revising the current budget midyear (Mike, 2012).
Public Expenditure Management and Control
Public expenditure management is the central part of the budget execution
process. The objective of public expenditure management is to ensure the effective and
efficient utilization of resources in fulfillment of the goals and objectives set out in the
approved budget (Allen &Tommasi, 2001).
Three main categories of public expenditures feature prominently in the budget of
many countries, namely entitlements, discretionary expenditures, and mandatory
expenditures (Schick, 2009). An entitlement is a provision of law that establishes a legal
right to public funds. The law provides a definition of the eligibility requirements, and
entitlements include payments such as social security, unemployment compensation, and
disability payments (Schick, 2009). Discretionary expenditures arise if appropriation
authorizes them.
There is no substantive law requiring the government to spend on discretionary
items, and no right of recipients to payments from the treasury. If no appropriation is
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forthcoming, no expenditure is made, and such expenditures are common in the purchase
of goods and services. Mandatory expenditures arise out of contractual obligation entered
into by the government such as debt and interest payments by the government (Schick,
2009).
The last few decades have seen a significant growth in the composition and size
of entitlements and discretionary and mandatory expenditures, reflective of the growing
size of what governments do for their respective countries. Governments have adopted
certain popular practices to control these expenditures as follows.
Top-Down Limits
Many countries sets goal for total spending within which expenditure allocations,
detailed decisions about program cost, cost increases, and other factors should be
accommodated (McNulty, 2012). These limits constitute a limit on total spending and are
intended to condition behavior and constraint demand for more resources. These limits,
which extend to individual agencies and programs, help to minimize the tensions that are
typical of budget negotiations.
Adherence to Financial Limits
The practice in most countries is a strong emphasis on the need to manage the
budget within previously approved limits to the greatest feasible extent (Schick, 2009).
The downside of top-down limits is that they support the idea that the central budget
office, not individual spending agencies, handles adherence to the approved budget.
Hence, in some countries, the preference is to increase the accountability and authority of
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individual spending agencies to achieve continuing spending restraint and greater value
for money (Schick, 2009).
Value-for-Money
Value for money is about promoting economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of
government activities and programs. To this end, governments rely on various review
mechanisms, external experts, and external auditors supported by several other practices
(Schick, 2009). Focused attention on outputs or results is one main value-for-money
practice prevalent in some countries (Csuros, 2013). The heightened attention on results
is an incentive for agencies and their managers to strive to achieve savings and to live
within limited budgetary provisions (Schick, 2009).
Other value-for-money practices include the implementation of a multiyear
agreement on resource levels rather than the traditional annual review (Csuros, 2013).
This process allows for greater independence of spending agencies to adjust priorities and
rearrange a mix of policies and programs delivered. Other complimentary practices are
the decentralization of expenditure management and the development of adequate
performance measures and effective accounting and reporting systems for monitoring
agencies (Schick, 2009).
As part of the budget implementation process, governments often seek robust and
flexible expenditure control systems to cope with future uncertainties, and there is a range
of instruments to achieve this end. Three popular instruments for keep spending in check
are the use of unallocated reserves, in-year monitoring and control of cash flow, and
monitoring and controlling of commitments (Schick, 2009).
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Unallocated Reserves
In some jurisdictions, provision is made for an unallocated reserve or contingency
funds to deal with unexpected expenditure requirements. In Australia, Canada, Italy, and
Sweden, some contingency funds are appropriated to the budget office at the start of the
fiscal year (Schick, 2009). In Australia, a specific amount known as advance to the
Minister of Finance is appropriated for allocation at the discretion of the minister of
finance. In exceptional circumstances, spending agencies may apply to expend fund from
this appropriation (Schick, 2009).
In Italy, 8-10% of the total spending approved by the legislature is set aside to
meet unexpected cost overruns in some programs (Schick, 2009). In Turkey, a
contingency reserve of 3% of the total consolidated budget is appropriated to the ministry
of finance for use in emergencies (Schick, 2009).
Both Canada and the United Kingdom, which use multiyear expenditure plans,
include an unallocated reserve of 3-4% of the planning total of expenditure shown for
each forward year (Schick, 2009). In the UK, the Treasury manages the reserve, and an
agency faced with emergency need is required to seek offsetting savings in its other
programs. The access to the reserve is only as a last resort, and there are procedures for
accessing such funds. If a claim is accepted and is for a program financed from money
voted by Parliament, a suitable supplementary appropriation has to be sought (Schick,
2009). If the vote is subject to a cash limit, a suitable change in the limit has to be agreed
upon and announced (Schick, 2009).
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Unallocated reserves or contingency reserves are often sourced to deal with
unexpected expenditure needs. However, to maintain the credibility of the use of such
reserves, the practice in some countries is to strictly ration access to the said funds. The
imposition of cash limits within which agencies are allowed to accommodate changes in
wage rates of inflation rates is another common practice (Schick, 2009). Schick (2009)
further noted that in some jurisdictions, the central budget office handles cash limits.
Effective information systems help the central budget office to monitor the flow of
spending throughout the year. The goal is to control the pace of the release of funds for
purposes of tight commitment and debt management practices (Dan, 2014).
In-Year Monitoring and Control of Cash Flow
In-year monitoring and control of cash often serve two purposes. These purposes
include the effective management of debt and assurance of value for money (Schick,
2009). Where budget deficits are significant, the ministry of finance may need timely
information about actual spending and likely spending a few months ahead. Such
information would help with forecasting of the cash flow and the management of
government borrowing activities (Kraan, Kostyleva, Duzler, &Olofsson, 2012).
Besides overall cash management, there is also a need to monitor spending
compared with the budget, so as to stay within the available budget and to get the best
value for money. In the United Kingdom, when Parliament votes an appropriation, it
delegates to the Treasury the authority to sanction payments from the vote in question
(Schick, 2009). The Treasury in turn delegates authority to the spending departments in
respect to most routine expenditures. However, specific Treasury approval is required for
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significant new proposals and individual projects above agreed financial limits (Schick,
2009).
The US system is different in that the authorities provided in the budget are not
directly concerned with outlays or cash spending. Instead, the US budget provides
authority to enter into an obligation that will give rise to immediate or future outlays and
does not make cash appropriations (Schick, 2009). After the approval of the budget by
Congress, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), distributes the authority arising
from the appropriations and other budgetary resources to each agency. The distribution is
by time periods or by activities to ensure their effective use and minimize the need for
additional appropriations (Schick, 2009).
Monitoring and Controlling of Commitments
The main purpose served by monitoring and controlling commitment is to ensure
that spending stays within the prescribed cash limit for a given period. By extension, it
also means a limit on commitments likely to mature in the same period (Schick, 2009).
Besides requiring cuts in some spending areas to offset unavoidable cost overrun, there is
also a need to ensure as few commitments as possible. The goal is to enhance short-term
cash flexibility for spending agencies (Whited, 2014).
Countries differ in how they monitor and control commitments. For instance, in
Italy, where the approved budget constitutes authority to undertake commitments, it was
the case that significant outstanding liabilities developed (Schick, 2009).This situation
prompted legislative limits on new commitments and on cash outlays in the years covered
by the budget (Schick, 2009). In the Netherlands, the budget presented to Parliament
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shows for some line-items, a separate column indicating the maximum of any new
commitments, which will lead to outlays in future years (Schick, 2009). Parliamentary
approval is required to exceed the indicated maximum, and the minister of finance may
determine individual line items for which any new commitments require his or her
approval in advance (Schick, 2009).
In the next segment of the conceptual framework, the review narrows down to the
primary themes underlying the research problem. These themes include legislative
budgeting and budget credibility as the foundational theories underpinning the study.
Budgeting: The Roles of the Executive, the Legislature, and Agencies
Success in the management of government budget requires a clear delineation of
responsibilities and duties among the arms of government; combined with a careful
balance of their respective powers. The powers of the legislature and the executive arms
of government are particularly important to guarantee proper stewardship and
accountability (Deng & Peng, 2011). For this purpose, the legal framework governing
the budget must be properly designed.
As the manager of the government budget, the minister of finance must be
sufficiently empowered. The minister must have adequate legal and technical instruments
and sufficiently skilled staff (Massood, 2012).The cabinet of ministers constitutes the
key decision-making body at the center of government. The success of the budgeting
system relies in large part on a close co-ordination and alliance between the ministry of
finance and the line ministries. Line ministries are accountable for defining and
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implementing government policies in their sector, within the policy framework and the
budget constraints defined by the government (Massood, 2012).
The legislature should have adequate means to assess government policies,
scrutinize the budget, and control the effectiveness of its implementation (Deng & Peng,
2011). The government must present to Parliament a budget that specifies government
fiscal policy and macroeconomic objectives (Allen &Tommasi, 2001). The common
practice is for a special parliamentary committee that review the budget and another
committee to study the final accounts and external audit reports (Deng & Peng,
2011).The annual budget cycle consists of the formulation of the president’s budget in
the executive branch, the review and approval of the legislature, implementation by the
agencies, and concludes with the independent audit.
The President’s Budget
The preparation of the budget in the executive arm of government begins with
each ministry and agency using defined procedures for assembling its request.
Government agencies submit their budgets to the central budget office or bureau for
review and approval. Once the central budget authority agrees to the request, it is
incorporated into the main budget for consideration by the legislature (Schick, 2009).
High-level budgetary targets typically mark the budget prepared by the executive.
These targets reflect the view of the government of how the public sector affects the
economy and its priorities for levels of taxation, borrowing, and expenditure. Such targets
are the product of complex considerations regarding fiscal and monetary policy options,
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the size and role of government, taxation policies, and, possibly, future sectoral policies
(Schick, 2009).
Schick (2009) grouped these high-level budgetary targets into three as follows:
•

A ratio expressed as a percentage related to the gross domestic product or
similar indicator of aggregate economic activity. These indicators include
budget balance or government borrowing, or revenue, or expenditure, or a
combination of these.

•

A rate of change in expenditure. A guideline could be zero real growth, some
rate of increase, or a real decline.

•

An absolute value for the target variable in nominal terms; for example, the
future level of expenditure or the deficit.

Each president brings to the office personal characteristics, along with political
considerations that usually impact the preparation and implementation of the country’s
budget. Some presidents are interested in financial matters and embrace the chance to
make revenue and expenditure policies that shape the budget to suit their program
ambition(Schick, 2009).Through the budget, the president takes on responsibility for the
performance of the economy and for policies that affect disposable income, prices,
growth, and other key indicators (Schick, 2009).
A budgeting system provides policy tools, processes, and institutions for a
government to plan, manage, and control the design and implementation of economic
development policies (Kuotsai, 2011).It is, therefore, advisable for the president not to
ignore the budget and its submission to the legislature, as this is one important task that
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must be completed. Presidents must, therefore, be attentive to how the budget fares in the
legislature and must be prepared to intervene when critical matters are at stake. When the
legislature releases the budget, it puts the president’s political standing on the line. The
capacity of the president to move legislation through the legislature is partly dependent
on how well the Legislature receives the budget (Schick, 2009).
Budgeting: Legislative Dimensions
A fundamental principle of public finance is the separation of the ownership of,
decision-making on, and management of public funds. Public funds belong to all
taxpayers, the society as a whole (Deng & Peng, 2011; Perci, 2016). The legislative body
elected by the taxpayers has the responsibility for deciding on how to use public funds.
The management of the public funds is carried out by the government (Deng & Peng,
2011). The separation of ownership and decision making is necessary because it is
practically impossible for taxpayers to make a direct decision on every issue.
Similarly, the separation of decision making and management helps to prevent the
opportunism in a fiduciary relation. The separation is to ensure that those who decide
how the funds should be used and those who use them are not the same people (Deng &
Peng, 2011). Accountability becomes the focal issue in terms of protecting the interest of
the taxpayers and society as a whole. It is in this regard that the legislature is the guardian
of the taxpayers' purse. Therefore, a prerequisite for the protection of the interest of
society is that the legislative body has the final decision-making authority on a budget
(Deng & Peng, 2011; Perci, 2016). Hence, a budget approved by the legislature is legally
binding on the government (Deng & Peng, 2011). In this sense, a budget is a legal
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contract between the government and the legislature about what the government should
do in the new fiscal year (Breaux, Finn, & Jones, 2011). The budget is, therefore, a
powerful tool of accountability for citizens to know how the government spends their
money (Baker, 2011; Csuros, 2013).
Itis thus evident from the previously stated that in theory at least, the legislature
constitutes the most important body of external accountability to society in public
financial management. The literature on legislative budgeting has identified three key
elements in the institutional arrangements of the legislature to fulfill its responsibility:
legal authority, organizational structure, and capacity (Deng & Peng, 2011).
• Legal Authority: For the legislature to have any real power in the budgeting
process, the constitution or budget law and other related statutes should contain clear
provisions (Deng & Peng, 2011). These provisions should spell out the authority of the
legislature to amend the budget submitted by the government. These laws should further
set out the parameters of the amendment power, such as whether the legislature can
revise the spending up or down (Perci, 2016).
• Organizational structure: For the legislature to function efficiently and
effectively, a committee structure has to be in place. The generic format consists of two
components: the central committee usually called the finance or budget committee,
responsible for all budgetary matters and multiple subcommittees responsible for various
policy areas covered by the budget (Perci, 2016). This structure enables the legislature to
have both overall control over the budget process and more specific in-depth inquiry into
various government programs or activities (Deng & Peng, 2011).
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• Capacity: Also, the legislature needs to have the capacity to analyze the
government's budget, and this is dependent on three factors: time, information, and
expertise (Deng & Peng, 2011; Perci, 2016). Foremost, the legislature needs a sufficient
amount of time to review and analyze the government's budget. Secondly, the legislature
also needs to have the necessary information on the cost of government programs. The
legislature can itself collect such information or have in place a framework for sharing
information. Thirdly, to aid its effective review of the budget, the legislature also needs a
staff with good knowledge of the specific programs covered by the government budget.
Legislators simply do not have the time needed to review the entire budget by
themselves. Other notable legislative weaknesses include the absence of legislative
budget research capacity and specialized budget committees (Perci, 2016). The absence
of any of these factors will substantially affect the review of the government budget by
the legislature.
In general, legislative budgeting as a process concerns authorizations and
appropriations (Deng & Peng, 2011). In countries like the US, Congress has committees
responsible for designing and recommending bills that would establish various public
policies and programs. In the US system, an authorization committee recommends a bill
for a program that may span several years. After that process, the decision on exactly
how much funding to provide for a given fiscal year rests with an appropriation
committee. (Schick, 2009). The appropriation committee conducts hearings with the
responsible program officials as part of their review of the executive budget. The
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appropriation committees have effective jurisdiction over discretionary spending and less
so for direct/mandatory spending.
The effectiveness of legislative budgeting is also dependent on the established
rules and procedures in individual countries. Two models are worth considering: the
strong executive model and the strong legislative model ( Maciuca & Socoliuc, 2014). In
the strong executive model, the president has formidable budgetary powers, such as the
line-item veto power in the US (Maciuca & Socoliuc, 2014). This veto power sets the
president’s budget recommendation as a ceiling above which the legislature cannot go, or
the president will veto it. When the legislature reduces a program’s budget below the
presidential ceiling, this must be accepted by the president. Essentially, the president can
veto anything outside the initial budgetary recommendations.
The strong legislature, weak executive model, forbids line-item veto. In this type
of environment, the legislatures can virtually rewrite the budget to their liking, and
present it to the president on a take-it-or-leave-it basis (Schick, 2013). The US system has
a strong legislative model following the enactment of the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
The current US system is such that the president and Congress are interdependent
on budget matters. The president cannot get his or her budget adopted without legislative
action, and Congress cannot get its budget resolution implemented without the
concurrence of the president. This situation is to encourage opposing sides to seek
accommodation, given that conflict is unavoidable in the budgetary process (Dirk-Jan,
2012).
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The Role of Spending Agencies
Government ministries and agencies cannot spend appropriations until the central
budget office apportions the funds among periods or programs. Agencies often have an
allotment process that distributes available funds among their administrative units. With
few exceptions; agencies cannot obligate funds in excess of an appropriated or allotted
amount (Schick, 2009). Sometimes, agencies can reprogram funds by shifting them from
one purpose to another in the same account. The US President is also empowered, under
defined conditions, to impound funds either by delaying expenditures or by seeking to
rescind original appropriations (Schick, 2009).
Budget Transparency-the Open Budget Index (OBI)
Budget transparency is an essential requirement for better economic and
governance outcomes (Carlitz, 2013). The right of citizens to know how their
government handles public money is not a new phenomenon. There is growing
consensus that citizens should have a free and unlimited access to all information relating
to a government budget. Empirical evidence suggests that governments with more
transparent public ﬁnance also have a better ﬁscal performance and lower levels of
corruption (Renzio, & Masud, 2011). Some of the critical success factors for budget
transparency include building horizontal and vertical alliances between stakeholders, the
production of legitimate information, legal empowerment and international support
(Carlitz, 2013).
The Open Budget Index (OBI) is a tool that documents the state of budget
transparency across the world for the purposes of research and advocacy
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(Renzio&Masud, 2011). Produced every 2years since 2006 by the International Budget
Partnership (IBP), the OBI provides comparative evidence on the information that
governments make publicly available on how they manage public ﬁnances. The Open
Budget Index (OBI) is the world’s only independent and comparative measure of budget
transparency (Renzio, & Masud, 2011).
The Open Budget Survey assesses whether the central government in each
country makes eight key budget documents available to the public. The Survey also
makes a determination as to whether the data contained in these documents is
comprehensive, timely, and useful (Renzio, & Masud, 2011).The Survey uses
internationally accepted criteria to assess each country’s budget transparency in the form
of the Open Budget Index.
The 2012 Open Budget Index assessed 100 countries and Sierra Leone scored
39%- 39 out of 100. The Sierra Leone score ranked lower than the average score of 43
for all the 100 countries surveyed. It is also lower than the scores of its neighbors,
Ghana, and Liberia, but above those of Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria. Sierra Leone’s
score indicated that the government provides the public with minimal information on the
national budget and financial activities during the budget year. The citizens of Sierra
Leone are therefore constrained in not been able to hold the government fully
accountable for its management of the public’s money, thereby adding to the credibility
concerns.
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The Credibility of Government Budgets
A credible budget is a budget that fulfills the three budgetary objectives of fiscal
discipline, allocative efficiency, and operational efficiency. For a budget to be credible
also means that the budget system functions to serve spending control, management, and
planning. For purposes of this study, budget credibility is confined only to mean the
attainment of fiscal discipline and adequate oversight by the legislature. Fiscal discipline
means the control of the budget totals such that the actual outcomes show minimal
variances in comparison with the approved budget.
Folcher (2006) studied nine African countries at the forefront of African budget
reforms as to the milestones achieved and lessons learned both on the content of reforms
and how they were sequenced and managed. The product of this study was 10 lessons to
serve the purposes of budgetary reforms, especially in Africa, and budget credibility
ranked topmost (Folcher, 2006). The findings of this study re-echoed the importance of
budget credibility as being at the center of outstanding budgeting practices. According to
the study, budget credibility has two dimensions: technical and governance credibility
(Folcher, 2006).
From a technical standpoint, a government budget is credible when the actual
outcomes are closely reflective of the initial budget (Folcher, 2006). A technically
credible budget reveals minimal variances when compared to the actual outcomes, both
in terms of amounts and composition of budgetary activities (Folcher, 2006). For a
budget to be technically credible, the following must hold (Folcher, 2006):
•

Prudent macro-fiscal framework
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•

Realistic revenue projections

•

Credible assessment of the cost of existing programs and cost of new ones

•

A transparent and disciplined budget planning process

•

Robust system of budget classification, execution, financial management, and
accountability

•

Availability of enough information on spending and service delivery

From a governance perspective, a credible budget is one that provides access to
information internally and externally through the budget process. Governance credibility
also demands a clear and effective mechanism for political oversight including oversight
by the legislature (Folcher, 2006).
Budget credibility crucially depends on having predictable rules and processes in
place for the formulation and implementation of the budget, including dealing with
changing circumstances. As a whole, budget credibility goes beyond ensuring that
numbers contained in the budget are correct and based on a realistic macro- economic
foundation. It involves wider ownership of the budget priorities, predictable budget rules,
and processes and systems that ensure discipline in implementation (Folcher, 2006).
Whiteman (2012) expressed similar views, describing a credible budget as a
budget whose implementation proceeds as planned. Whiteman also covered aspects
relating to budget credibility as part of the overall study of the capacity and capability of
public financial management (PFM) systems of 69 countries. According to the author, the
credibility of a budget is one of six critical or core dimensions of public financial
management (PFM) performance. These core dimensions include (a) budget credibility;
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(b) comprehensiveness and transparency; (c) policy based budgeting; (d) predictability
and control in budget execution; (e) accounting, recording, and reporting; and (f) external
audit and scrutiny (Whiteman, 2012).
Each of the above six core dimensions has a set of high-level indicators that
measure the operational performance of the essential elements of associated public
financial management. Whiteman (2012) defined budget credibility as a budget whose
actual outputs are not significantly different from the plan, and such a budget is measured
by the following four high-level indicators:
1. Aggregate expenditure outcomes compared to original approved budget
2. Composition of expenditure outcomes compared to original approved budget
3. Aggregate revenue outcomes compared to original approved budget
4. Stock and monitoring of expenditure arrears as measured by (a) stock of
expenditure arrears and (b) availability of data for monitoring the stock of
expenditure arrears.
Sample (1993) investigated the budgeting and reporting practices of 394 school
districts in Pennsylvania to determine the credibility of the budgets when compared with
the district’s financial report. The study confirmed that the class 3 district budgets lacked
a high degree of credibility when compared with the district financial reports. According
to the results of the study, the variances between the budgets and financial reports were
deliberately planned. In doing so, district administrators were provided with a cushion
against estimation error, to disguise the district’s financial condition, and to hide the
existence of a fund balance (Sample, 1993). Thus, the credibility of a budget can be
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compromised as a result of deliberate under-budgeting of revenues and over-budgeting of
expenditure.
Alihegović and Slijepčević (2012) studied the possibilities of setting up
performance measurement at the sub-national government level in Croatia. They
identified budget credibility as a prerequisite for successful performance measurement,
and defined budget credibility as follows:
1. the difference between the aggregate expenditure outcomes and the original
approved budget at the sub- national government level in Croatia;
2. the difference between the composition of expenditure out- turn and the
original approved budget at the sub- national government level in Croatia;
3. the deviation of aggregate revenue outcomes from the original approved
budget at the sub- national government level in Croatia.
Conclusion
The above four studies by Sample (1993), Folcher (2006), Alihegovic and
Slijepcevic (2012), and Whiteman (2012) focused on the construct of budget credibility
covering different contexts. These four empirical studies and the study relating to the
reforms in the budgeting process in China by Deng and Peng (2011) together provided
the primary conceptual foundation for this study.
Summary and Conclusions
This chapter reviewed some of the existing literature on government budgeting in
general and, in particular, the literature on the construct of a credible government budget.
The literature presented included empirical evidence showing that a government’s budget
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is credible if the budget outcomes regularly and, with few variances, match the budget as
approved. A credible budget has both a technical and a governance meaning.
From a technical standpoint, a credible budget is a budget whose implementation
goes as planned and is comprehensive, affordable, and sustainable. A technically credible
budget is one whose variances are insignificant in comparison with the actual outcomes.
From a governance perspective, a credible budget has an adequate governance structure,
including strong oversight, especially by the legislature. Such a budget enables the easy
access to budgetary information not only to government officials but also to the general
public.
This study may be the first documented academic research about the credibility of
the budget of the government of Sierra Leone. Therefore, from a theoretical standpoint,
the significance of this study is that it will augment existing research theories on the
construct of budget credibility in the Sierra Leone context.
Chapter 3outlines the methodology of the study as regards the determination of
the budget variances, the sources of such variances, and the framework used for assessing
the adequacy of legislative budgeting in Sierra Leone.

80
Chapter 3: Research Method
In this chapter, I describe the research design and methods adopted to investigate
the credibility of the budgets of seven government ministries in Sierra Leone. The
purpose of the study was to propose a budgetary reform agenda in support of some of the
main changes needed for enhancing the credibility of the budget of the government of
Sierra Leone. In the following sections, I outline the qualitative case study design
adopted for the study with supporting data from both primary and secondary sources.
Research Design and Rationale
The design of any study depends on the research approach adopted, and the
approach is dependent on ontological and epistemological assumptions (Yin, 2011).
There are two popular research methodologies, qualitative and quantitative, which are
briefly reviewed in the section following.
Quantitative Research Design
In a quantitative research design, a research problem is defined by a theory (a
hypothesis) of a given phenomenon. The hypothesis is measured numerically using
variables. The variables are analyzed using statistical techniques to either accept or reject
the hypothesis (Yin, 2011). In quantitative research, the aim is to confirm or refute
generalizations about a theory. The researcher is able to understand, predict, and explain
events, behaviors, or processes (Yin, 2011). Quantitative research methodology assumes
an objective paradigm in which reality is independent of the researcher and needs to be
accessed using objective methods and processes (Yin, 2011).
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Qualitative Research Design
Scholars using a qualitative research methodology seek to understand and explain
a social phenomenon within the natural setting of the study (Yin, 2011). A qualitative
researcher assumes an interpretive paradigm by arguing that multiple realities exist in the
social world, which is dependent on the interpretation and construction of the researcher
(Yin, 2011). The researcher is, therefore, considered as a vital part of the research
process, and reality is contextual in nature. Qualitative researchers use inductive forms of
logic. They seek to discover holistic issues, rather than the priori biases of the researcher
based on predetermined theory or hypothesis (Yin,2011). Furthermore, rather than
attempting to test hypotheses, qualitative researchers seek to unveil patterns or theories
that can illuminate the phenomena being investigated (Yin, 2011). Through data and
methodological triangulation, qualitative research enhances the accuracy and reliability of
the complex relationships and patterns of the research phenomena (Yin, 2011).
Rationale for a Qualitative Research Design
A qualitative methodology was compatible with the critical interpretive paradigm
adopted for this study. For the critical interpretive paradigm, social reality is created and
maintained through the subjective experiences of the actors (Yin, 2011). Theorists who
subscribe to this critical paradigm argue that social systems are made up of ideological
superstructures, such as imposed budgetary practices, which constrain the actions of
human agents (Yin, 2011).
The main phenomenon of interest was a credible government budget as measured
by the variances between the approved budget and the financial reports of selected
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government ministries. To identify such variances and their sources, coupled with the
reforms that may be needed to address the situation, I sought answers to the following
questions:
1. What are the variances between the approved annual budget and the financial
reports as measured by (a) total personnel expenditure compared to budget,
(b) total nonsalary and noninterest expenditure compared to budget, (c) total
development expenditure compared to budget, and (d) total domestic revenue
compared to budget?
2. What are the sources of these variances as explained by the processes relating
to the preparation, approval, and execution of the annual budget?
3. What is the governance system over the budgetary process as it relates to the
adequacy and effectiveness of the role of the Sierra Leone House of
Parliament?
Only a qualitative study can provide answers to the above questions. As a
qualitative inquiry, the study involved analyzing and interpreting documents and
transcripts of interviews. A quantitative methodology was inappropriate, as the research
was not about investigating government budgeting in terms of a relationship between an
independent and a dependent variable (Yin, 2011). The research problem and questions
met the five features of qualitative research as put forward by Yin (2011):
•

The study was about understanding the meaning of budgeting and budget
credibility under real–world conditions (i.e., within government ministries in
Sierra Leone).

83
•

The study was about representing the views and perspectives of the major
budget actors.

•

The study covered the contextual conditions governing the preparation,
approval, and execution of the annual budget.

•

The study provided insights into existing or emerging concepts that may help
to explain the phenomenon of a credible government budget; and

•

The study used multiple sources of evidence (i.e., direct interviews and
documentary analysis).

The Case Study Research Approach
A case study approach is used to investigate a contemporary phenomenon in its
real life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context
are not clearly evident (Stake, 2010; Yin, 2011). Unlike surveys or experiments, where a
researcher manipulates variables to determine their causal relationships, a case study
involves observing the various characteristics of a single unit (Yin, 2011). A case study
was adopted for this study because it provided a holistic and in-depth investigation of the
phenomena of budget credibility.
Arguments For and Against Case Studies
There are arguments for and against the use of case studies in empirical work.
Some scholars have argued that case studies can lead to generalized conclusions, based
on theoretical or analytical, rather than statistical methodology (Yin, 2011). Yin (2011)
argued that case studies not only provide greater insight into a particular phenomenon or
situation, but they also help in generating a general understanding of similar
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circumstances or events. The argument against the use of case studies is the idea that
generalization is not possible because case study findings are context-specific. The
relative results of one study cannot be a basis for predicting similar behavior in other
contexts (Yin, 2011).
Justification for the Case Study Approach
There are five prominent methods of doing qualitative research: phenomenology,
grounded theory, narrative inquiry, ethnography, and case study (Yin, 2011). Each of the
five methods presents researchable opportunities that are dependent on the research
problem, purpose, and research questions. For this study, a case study design was the
preferred approach. A case study design provided answers to the research questions
because of the following reasons:
•

The study involved developing an in-depth description and analysis of the
budgeting practices of the government.

•

The study detailed a chronology of activities surrounding the budgeting
process of government.

•

Multiple sources of data came into play, mainly direct interviews and
document review.

•

Data analysis entailed the description of the setting within which budgets are
prepared and implemented, providing an understanding of the associated
processes and practices.
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•

As part of the analysis of the data, I employed relevant theoretical constructs
to serve as the lens for looking at the entire budgeting system of the
government.

Arguments against Other Qualitative Research Approaches
Phenomenology, grounded theory, narrative inquiry, and ethnography were not
suitable for this study. Researchers use narrative analysis to tell stories of individuals or
groups of individuals to reveal a particular phenomenon about those individuals and their
world. A narrative researcher will focus on collecting data through the collection of a
person’s stories, reporting their experiences, and chronologically ordering the meaning of
those experiences (Yin, 2011).Unlike narrative research, which mostly reports the life of
a single individual, a phenomenological scholar describes the meaning of several
individuals lived experiences of a particular concept or phenomenon (Yin, 2011). In this
design, the researcher focuses on describing what all participants have in common as they
experience the phenomenon under study.
Whereas phenomenology focuses on the description of an experience for some
individuals, grounded theory takes a further step to generate or discover a theory (Yin,
2011). A theory emerges from systematic comparative analysis and is grounded in
fieldwork to explain what has and is observed (Yin, 2011). The theory does not already
exist, as in the case of case studies, narrative inquiry, and phenomenological research.
Instead, the theory is generated or observed from the data collected from the participants
who have experienced the process. In ethnographic research, the researcher focuses on
the norms, understandings, and assumptions that are taken for granted by people in a
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setting. The researcher’s interest is how people get things done, how they transform
situations, or how they persevere, step by step and moment by moment (Yin, 2011). The
researcher describes and interprets the shared and learned patterns of values, behaviors,
beliefs, and language of a group of people. The objective is not to develop a theory as
with grounded theory (Yin, 2011).
A case study methodology best served the purpose of this study and, therefore,
was the most suited methodology for the study. A case study was the most useful
approach to providing a holistic explanation of the factors underpinning the credibility of
the annual budget of the government of Sierra Leone.
Role of the Researcher
As a qualitative researcher, I was the primary research instrument, and this placed
me in an influential role in the entire process. To adequately describe and analyze the
budgeting system of the government of Sierra Leone, I had to design interview protocols,
conduct interviews, undertake document review, and carry out the data analysis. I
conducted direct interviews with some of the important government officials involved in
the main phases of the annual budget cycle. I was an observer in the 2015 budget
hearings organized by the ministry of finance. I reviewed the annual budget of the
government, financial reports of the government, and other related documentation for the
last 5years ending in 2014.
As an independent researcher with no formal relationship with the government, I
had no influence over the research participants, so I was not in a position to unduly
influence them. To minimize the potential inherent biases of a qualitative researcher,
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some of the interview questions were open-ended to allow participants to share their
experiences with the annual budget processes. I worked to understand individual
perceptions of how the budgeting system works to ascertain the sources of the budget
variances. I sought the participants’ perspectives and frames of reference while avoiding
unwarranted intrusion. I did not offer incentives to any of the participants, and I did not
encounter any situation that may have given rise to a conflict of interest.
Methodology
In this section, I outline the particular details of the methodology.
Participant Selection Logic
Sampling techniques. A researcher must collect data to answer the research
question(s) and meet the research objectives. For many research questions and objectives,
it is impossible to collect or to analyze all of the data available to the researcher due to
restrictions of time, money, and often access. Sampling enables a researcher to reduce the
amount of data needed by considering only data from a subgroup rather than all possible
cases or elements (Yin, 2011). Every sampling requires a definition of the population, the
selection of a representative sample, and the determination of the sample size (Yin,
2011).
The technique for selecting a sample is either to use probability or non probability
techniques (Yin, 2011). Non probability sampling techniques include relying on available
subjects and purposive or judgmental sampling, and these techniques do not necessarily
guarantee that the resulting sample is representative of the population being studied.
Probability sampling methods provide away of selecting representative samples from
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large, known populations. These methods counter the problems of conscious and
unconscious sampling bias inherent in non probability sampling by giving each element
in the population a known probability of selection (Yin, 2011). The key to probability
sampling is the random selection.
The most carefully selected sampling will not provide the perfect representation
of the population as there will be some degree of sampling error (Yin, 2011). Once the
sampling strategy (i.e., probability or non probability sampling) is established, the
determination of the sample size becomes the next task. The sample size is directly
dependent on the level of accuracy expected (Yin, 2011).
The distinction between probability and non probability sampling relates mainly
to quantitative studies. For qualitative studies, the decisions about samples are largely
dependent on prior decisions about the appropriate unit of analysis to study (Yin, 2011).
The unit of analysis enables the researcher to decide what it is that he or she wants to say
something about at the end of the study. Often, individual people, clients, programs, or
organizations are the unit of analysis (Yin, 2011).
In qualitative research a non probability sampling technique is akin to purposeful
sampling, which typically focuses in-depth on relatively small samples, even single cases,
selected purposefully (Yin, 2011).Purposeful or purposive or judgmental sampling means
the same. The technique requires the researcher to select information-rich cases
strategically and purposefully with the specific type and number of cases selected
dependent on the study purpose and resources. The logic and power of purposeful
sampling lie in selecting information-rich cases for in-depth study. Such cases provide
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greater details about the issues of central importance to the purpose of the inquiry (Yin,
2011). There are no rules for sample size in qualitative inquiry. The sample size is
dependent on what the researcher wants to know, the purpose of the inquiry, and what
will be useful (Yin,2011).
Research population and sample size. The government budget is a national
budget relating to the entirety of Sierra Leone. The population under study was, therefore,
the three arms of government: the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. As it
would be impractical to consider the entire population, selecting a sample was the
practical route to follow.
I employed the use of non probability sampling (i.e., purposeful sampling) by
deliberately interviewing the most senior government officials with primary
responsibility for the budget of their ministries. The sample covered seven ministries
including the ministry of finance. The ministry of finance was included by default
because it bears primary responsibility for the government budget under one of its
principal organs-the budget bureau. I interviewed the financial secretary, the director of
the budget bureau, the director of economic and policy research unit, and the accountant
general. They are the four most senior officials of the ministry of finance with direct
responsibility and oversight of the government budget.
In determining the technical credibility of the annual budgets, I examined the
approved budgets and the year-end financial reports to identify the monetary variances
that occurred between the two documents. The variances were computed with respect to
four major budgetary heads: total domestic revenue collection; personnel expenditure;

90
non salary, noninterest recurrent expenditure; and total domestic development
expenditure. For each of the four budgetary heads, I computed the variances for all the 21
ministries for each of the year 2010 to 2014. The budget head domestic revenue
collection accounts for about 10% of the total annual revenue budget. The budget heads’
personnel expenditure, noninterest and non salary expenditure, and development
expenditure together account for about 80% of the total annual expenditure budget.
Using the 2014 Public Accounts of the government, I computed the average
variance for the four budget heads in respect of each of the 21 ministries. By ranking the
resulting average variances, the top six ministries were selected to constitute the sample
for the study. Six line ministries and the ministry of finance constituted the sample for
direct interviews. In total, seven ministries constituted the sample. In each ministry, I
interviewed the permanent secretary and the head of finance.
As regards the Parliament, I also adopted a purposeful sampling technique by
restricting the sample to members of the parliament finance committee. The finance
committee is the parliamentary subcommittee responsible for reviewing the annual
budget. That committee makes recommendations to the full House. I purposefully
interviewed the chairperson of the committee and two other members of the committee,
one from each of the two political parties represented in parliament. The fourth Member
of Parliament interviewed was the chairman of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC).
The PAC has responsibility for reviewing the year-end financial statements prepared by
the accountant general as well as reviewing the report of the auditor general on the
financial statements.
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A total of 20 participants constituted the sample for the study. The participants
included four from the ministry of finance, two each from the six line-ministries with the
highest ranking average variances, and four parliamentarians. In conclusion, the sampling
strategy was exclusively the non-probability technique called purposeful sampling.
Hence, the sample consisted of those participants that were judged to be rich in the data
required to answer the research questions. Sample (1993) adopted similar methodology in
the study of the credibility of the budgeting and reporting practices of 394 school districts
in Pennsylvania.
Instrumentation
The data collection instruments included interview protocols and documentary
analysis. The interview protocol was an adapted version of a comprehensive
questionnaire developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) for evaluating government budgeting systems in transition
countries (Allen &Tommasi, 2001). The OECD questionnaire needed modification to suit
the context of the government of Sierra Leone. The modifications mainly entailed
omitting questions that had to do with the European Union, European funds, or European
legislation. Three amended versions of the questionnaire are in the appendices. Appendix
A was the questionnaire for the ministry of finance, Appendix B was the questionnaire
for the line ministries, and Appendix C represented the questionnaire for the
parliamentarians.
Direct interviews. Interviewing is a conversation with a purpose. An interview is
a meeting of two persons to exchange information and ideas through questions and
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responses. Interviews are in effect a form of communication and joint construction of
meaning about a particular topic (Janesick, 2011).
The interview questions were adapted to suit the roles of the different participants.
That is, interview questions for the ministry of finance were mostly different from those
for the Parliamentarians, as well as those of the other line ministries that recorded the
highest budget variances. The majority of the questions required ayesornoanswer. A no
answer suggests that action is required to produce the situation described in the question.
The use of interviews enabled the generation of a holistic view of the budgetary
practices as they applied to the different participants. Each interview session was targeted
to last a maximum of half an hour. A pilot study was not considered necessary for this
research.
Documentary analyses. Besides direct interviews, I obtained and reviewed a
broad range of official documents and records. Some of these documents included the
Government Budget and Statement of Economic and Financial Policies from 2010 to
2014; the Government Fiscal Reports from 2010 to 2014; Citizens Budget ; Published
Financial Statements of the Government of Sierra Leone from 2010 to 2014; Auditor
General’s Report on the Accounts of Sierra Leone from 2010 to 2014; strategic plans of
government ministries; budget call circulars; budget framework papers; initial budget
proposals of ministries; the Government of Sierra Leone Medium-Term Expenditure
Framework (MTEF) 2012; Sierra Leone Public Expenditure Management Report, 2012;
Sierra Leone Public Financial Management: Reform Priorities in the New Fiscal
Environment; The Public Financial Management Regulation, 2007; The Government
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Budgeting and Accountability Act, 2005; The Republic of Sierra Leone—An Agenda for
Change; and other relevant documents. The analyses of these documents enhanced the
internal validity of the findings from the direct interviews and facilitated data
triangulation.
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
I collected data from the following sites: the ministry of finance, the six lineministries with the highest budget variances, and the Sierra Leone House of Parliament. I
visited each of these sites to conduct direct interviews and obtain supporting internal
documentation. I carried out all the interviews.
The historical documents outlined previously constituted the source of secondary
data. I studied these documents and reports for purposes of documenting the existing
budgetary processes. The website of the ministry of finance served as a valuable source
of historical data. I downloaded the following documents from the ministry of finance
website: the government budgets for the years 2010 to 2014, the annual financial reports,
and reports of international agencies providing budgetary support to the government.
I collected all of the data over a span of 15 working days starting the last week of
November 2015. The interviews started off with the budget bureau to gain a wider
understanding of the processes involved before proceeding to interview the other
participants. The interviews with the other participants did not follow any particular
order, depending on when each is available.
At the outset of each interview, I fully briefed each of the participants as to the
academic essence of the study. The interviews were less formal in approach as
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participants were able to accommodate interruptions like phone calls during the
interview.
Each interview ended with a debriefing summarizing my initial understanding
and seeking clarifications. I gave assurance regarding the anonymity of individual
participants’ views and the confidentiality of personal details. I ended each interview by
expressing my gratitude to each participant.
Data Analysis Plan
The strategy was to enable data reduction through sorting, categorizing, and
prioritizing the data emanating from both the interviews and the document review (Yin,
2011). To this end, the responses to the interviews as well as the review of the related
documentation followed the thematic headings in the OECD framework for sound
government budgeting. To respond to the first research question on the budget variances,
I arithmetically computed the variances between the budget and the financial reports in
tabular format for each year, 2010 to 2014. The related variances were the primary and
technical measure of budget credibility for purposes of this study. The tabular
presentation of the variances both in absolute amounts and in percentage terms
established the pattern in budget variances over the period and helped to explain the
credibility of the budget or the lack of it.
The OECD analytical framework for effective government budgeting. The
answers to the other two research questions emerged from the use of the OECD baseline
criteria for effective government budgeting system. These baseline criteria provided the
analytical framework for evaluating the other principal indicators of budget credibility:
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the comprehensiveness and sustainability of the budget as well as the effectiveness of the
role of the legislative arm of government. The approach was to assess the extent to which
the government budgeting system and processes fulfill the OECD baseline criteria as
outlined below:
1. Institutional framework. Clearly defined principles should be set out in a
country’s constitution, the organic budget law and related laws. The
regulatory framework should provide a sound balance between the legislative
and executive powers. Parliament must be enabled to scrutinize properly the
budget and debate and review fiscal policies. For sound macroeconomic
management and efficient allocation of resources, the budget should cover all
revenues and expenditures. The national budget should include extra
budgetary funds and sources of external finance.
2. Medium-term fiscal framework. A government should be able to provide
budgetary information within a medium-term framework and set mediumterm fiscal objectives.
3.

Budgetary preparation process. A well-defined and widely understood
sequence of steps in the budget preparation process. The system must allow
sufficient time for the efficient implementation of each step. An integrated
system in terms of the procedures used for preparing the budget for
operational and capital investment expenditures. The draft budget is presented
to parliament in an appropriate format to allow parliament to scrutinize it
properly. It should specify the government’s fiscal objectives, the
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macroeconomic framework, the budget policies, and identifiable significant
risks. The budget is clear and accessible to the public.
4. Budget execution and monitoring in which ministries enforce limits stipulated
by parliament, and the ministry of finance can supervise these limits. There
exists a robust system in the ministry of finance for the monitoring and control
of the flow of expenditures. A reporting mechanism that compares actual
spending with forecasts based on the budget appropriations should exist.
Parliament and the council of ministers has appropriate responsibilities for
reviewing periodic reports on financial performance relative to the budget and
for revising targets and policies as required by changed economic or financial
circumstances. The use of a treasury single account for cash management.
Budget and accounting categories at the national level have a standard system
of classification that facilitates policy analysis and promotes accountability.
Accounting concepts must be made compatible with concepts related to
commitments, payments, and eligible expenditures. Fiscal reporting should be
timely, comprehensive, and reliable and identify deviations from the budget.
Procedures for evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of expenditure
policies and programs should be established.
5. Financial control. A coherent and comprehensive statutory base defining the
systems, principles, and functioning of management control or internal control
is required. The following are essential for sound management control:
standards and regulations for financial reporting, a modern accounting system
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conforming to international standards, a defined audit trail. An efficient
internal audit mechanism with the following criteria: be functionally
independent, have an adequate audit mandate, and use internationally
recognized auditing standards. Systems should be in place to prevent and take
action against irregularities and to recover any amounts lost as a result of
irregularity or negligence.
6. Procurement systems. As part of the essential elements of good governance,
there has to be in operation an efficient procurement system in which
competition is encouraged for contracts awarded by public sector bodies.
Sound public procurement policies and practices can reduce costs of public
expenditure. Some of the measures to improve procurement procedures
include sound public procurement legislation and the establishment of a
central public procurement organization with overall responsibility for the
design and implementation of procurement policy and national training
programs. Also, there is a need for an effective control and complaints review
procedures.
7. Management of external funds from agencies such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Governments should have the capacity to
present multi-annual programs involving careful coordination between
partners at different levels of governments, well-designed co-financing
procedures, and sound technical and economic appraisal of such programs.
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The above provided the analytical framework for assessing the adequacy of the
annual budget and the existing budgeting system of the government. These criteria,
therefore, provide the basis for the approach, arguments, and key analysis.
Issues of Trustworthiness
Trustworthiness is the extent to which one can have confidence in the study
findings (Yin, 2011). Trustworthiness is an essential ingredient for qualitative research as
it is the parallel of reliability, validity, and objectivity in quantitative research (Yin,
2011). For qualitative studies, trustworthiness is dependent on four criteria: credibility,
transferability, dependability, and confirmability as follows.
Credibility
The credibility of the study came about by triangulating the findings by using
more than one data source. I corroborated answers to the direct interviews through the
review of the related documents and reports about the budgets of the government.
The use of the OECD budgeting questionnaire and their baseline criteria for
assessing the budgeting system of governments assured the dependability and
transferability of the findings. Both of these OECD frameworks have wider international
applicability and are thus likely to yield trustworthy results.
Transferability
All line ministries in Sierra Leone have almost the same organizational structure.
The minister is the head of the political hierarchy, followed by the permanent secretary as
the administrative head and vote controller. Each ministry has professional heads
overseeing specific functions including financial matters. Given this structure of

99
government ministries, the research findings can potentially apply to the other ministries
not included in the sample.
Dependability
The triangulation of the findings by using face-to-face interviews and review of
budgetary related documentation largely assured the dependability of the study. Content
analysis by way of detailed review of the supporting documents and other relevant
reports corroborated the interview findings. Importantly, the findings purely reflect the
views as expressed by the individual participants. Common themes or issues emerged,
thereby corroborating the truthfulness of the results.
Ethical Procedures
Ethics is a critical consideration in the design of social research. Some ethical
considerations include voluntary participation by respondents, the anonymity of
participants, confidentiality, and the obligation of the researcher to report the results fully
and accurately (Yin, 2011). This study followed these fundamental ethical principles. I
did not offer monetary incentives and did not exert undue influence over participants. The
government officials who constituted the sample received sufficient briefing and
debriefing as to the rationale of the study and the confidentiality out of that.
I wrote to the financial secretary in the ministry of finance requesting formal
permission for the study to take place in the seven government ministries. The approval
of the financial secretary came through the director of the budget bureau by way of a
letter of cooperation. I also obtained a letter of cooperation from the Deputy Speaker of
the Sierra Leone House of Parliament. All participants gave their consent to the
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interviews. Participants were assigned unique codes so as to disguise their true identities.
The OECD Secretariat granted approval for the use of the slightly modified versions of
both their budgeting questionnaire and their budgeting baseline criteria.
Validity and Reliability of Instrument
Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA), an initiative
of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), is one of the
pioneering bodies propagating best practices for sound public financial management.
Following extensive studies of the budgeting systems of different governments around
the world, SIGMA developed baseline criteria that set out the essential requirements of a
well-functioning government budgeting system (Allen &Tomassi, 2001). These baseline
criteria, which have wider international applicability, provided the contextual lens for
analyzing the credibility of the budgeting system of the government of Sierra Leone.
As the OECD is a reputable international organization, the use of its framework provides
reasonable assurance as to the validity and reliability of the framework as a research
instrument.
Summary
In summary, the study was a qualitative inquiry based on a case study design.
Data emanated from both primary and secondary sources through mainly direct
interviews and documents review. A total of 20 participants formed the sample, and their
selection followed the requirement of purposeful sampling. That is, the sample consisted
of participants who are rich in the data required for the study. I documented the existing
budgeting system including a description of the main features of the annual budget of the
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government. After that, the adapted version of the OECD baseline criteria constituted the
main framework for analyzing the data. This framework guaranteed the trustworthiness
of the study. The related findings are presented in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4: Results
In this chapter are the results of the study. The purpose of the study was to
develop a budgetary reform agenda in support of some of the changes needed for
enhancing the credibility of the budget of the government of Sierra Leone. The first and
second research questions addressed the main factors attributable to the significant
monetary variances between the approved budget and the year-end financial reports of
the government. The third research question addressed the governance over the budgetary
process as it relates to the adequacy and effectiveness of the role of the Sierra Leone
House of Parliament in the budgetary process.
There are four sections in this chapter. The section immediately following
includes the research setting, the demographics of the study, and a description of the case
study. The description of the case study includes the historical background and profile of
Sierra Leone, the profile of the seven government ministries that constituted the sample,
and a description of the government medium-term-expenditure framework (MTEF). The
next section provides an assessment of the principal phases of the budgetary process:
budget formulation, budget approval, and budget execution. Next is a tabular presentation
of the budget variances for the period from 2010 to 2014. Towards the end of the chapter
is an assessment of the adequacy and effectiveness of the role of the Sierra Leone House
of Parliament as the part of the overall governance over the budgetary process.
Research Setting
Data collection took place over a span of 15 days commencing in the last week of
November 2015. This time marked 18 months since the ebola virus disease (EVD)
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emerged across the three countries of the Mano-River basin: Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra
Leone. The EVD ravaged these countries killing about 3500 people in Sierra Leone
alone. While the World Health Organization had already declared Sierra Leone Ebolafree 3 weeks earlier, the public health emergency was still in force in the country.
Government functionaries were galvanizing resources and activities for the post- Ebola
recovery agenda that the President had announced to turnaround the economy of Sierra
Leone.
According to the Government of Sierra Leone Fiscal Report for 2014, total Ebola
spending for the year amounted to 3.5% of total government spending and most of the
related expenditure was unbudgeted. The Fiscal Report also noted that the adverse impact
of the Ebla virus outbreak on the economy resulted in revenue loss with actual total
revenue declining from 15.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) to 10.8% of GDP.
Consequently, the budgetary implications of the fight against the Ebola outbreak
impacted some of the responses to the interview questions, especially as regards the
monetary variances for 2014.
Demographics
I interviewed 20 senior government officials directly involved in the budgetary
process. The participants in the ministry of finance included the financial secretary, the
director of the budget bureau, the accountant general, and the director of economic and
policy research unit. The participants also included the permanent secretary and the head
of finance in the six line ministries. The participants in the Sierra Leone House of
Parliament were four Members of Parliament: the Chairman of the Parliamentary Finance

104
Committee (PFC), the Chairman of Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee (PAC),
and two members of Parliament serving on the Parliamentary Finance Committee, one
each from the two political parties in Parliament.
Both the 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone and the Government Budgeting and
Accountability Act (2005) bestow upon the Minister of Finance the responsibility for the
management of the consolidated fund and the control and direction of all the public
money of Sierra Leone. The Financial Secretary is the administrative head of the Ministry
of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) and the principal adviser to the
Minister of Finance and Economic Development. The financial secretary oversees the
Budget Bureau, the Accountant General Department, and the Economic and Policy
Research Unit (EPRU).
The director of the budget bureau is the administrative head of the Budget Bureau,
which has responsibility for the preparation, execution, and reporting of the annual
budget of the government. The Accountant General is the chief accounting officer of the
government and is responsible for keeping, rendering, and publishing the statements of
the public accounts as required by law. The EPRU handles the preparation of the
medium-term economic forecasts and the annual medium-term fiscal framework and
facilitates the production of the Budget Framework Paper (BFP).
Together the Financial Secretary, the Director of Budget Bureau, the Accountant
General, and the Director of the EPRU are among the most important government
officials primarily responsible for the government budget. Purposive sampling was also
the basis for selecting the other 16 participants.

105
Data Collection
I conducted face-to-face interviews with all of the 20 participants from the 25th
November to 4th December, 2015.These participants were in four categories consisting of
four from the ministry of finance, 12 from the six line ministries, and four from the
Parliament. Three sets of questionnaires constituted the main instruments for collecting
the interview data. The questionnaires that are in Appendixes A, B, and C represented
three versions of the OECD questionnaire for sound government budgeting adapted to
suit the respective budgetary roles of the ministry of finance, the six line ministries, and
the Sierra Leone House of Parliament.
I reviewed a broad range of government-budgetary-related documents and reports.
This avenue served as a source of secondary data, thereby triangulating the findings
obtained from the direct interviews. The sample consisted of the Ministry of Finance and
Economic Development; Ministry of Works, Housing, and Infrastructure; Ministry of
Education, Science and Technology; Ministry of Information and Communication;
Ministry of Marine Resources; the Ministry of Health and Sanitation; and the Ministry of
Energy. The PFC has the primary responsibility for reviewing and monitoring of the
government budget. The PAC has responsibility for the review of the annual Public
Accounts of the Government. The PAC is also responsible for the review of the report of
the Sierra Leone Audit Services on the annual Public Accounts of the Government.
The interview with the financial secretary covered the MTEF process and the
overall administrative governance of the government budgetary process. The interview
took place in the office of the financial secretary, and it lasted for about 30 minutes.
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I interviewed the director of Budget Bureau in his office on four separate sessions
each lasting for about 30 minutes. As the Budget Bureau has primary responsibility for
the preparation and monitoring of the government budget, most of the data for this study
were obtained from the director. Some of the most important documents and reports
obtained from the Budget Bureau included the annual government budgets, the annual
fiscal reports, the supplementary budgets, the budget call circulars, the budget framework
papers, the strategic plans of ministries, the annual citizens’ budget, 2010 Sierra Leone
Public Expenditure Review, 2014 Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
(PEFA) Assessment in Sierra Leone, and other documents. The interview with the
director of the Budget Bureau covered all questions on the budgetary process as
contained in the interview questionnaire in Appendix A. The last phase of the interview
with the director of the Budget Bureau covered the OECD baseline criteria for good
government budgeting. The baseline criteria served as the analytical framework for
evaluating the efficiency of the administrative governance over the budgetary process. I
ascertained the extent to which the budgetary system in operation fulfills the conditions
as defined in the OECD framework.
The interview with the accountant general dealt with the year-end financial
reports of the government ministries. These financial reports or public accounts document
the actual budgetary outcomes in terms of the actual activities and programs that took
place in the line ministries. The interview took place in the office of the accountant
general and lasted for about 40 minutes. I obtained from the accountant general the
consolidated public accounts of the government for the period 2010 to 2014.
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The interview with the director of the Economic and Policy Research Unit
preceded that of the accountant general, and that interview also took place in the office of
the director lasting for about 30 minutes. This interview dealt with the forecasting models
used for the determination of the fiscal parameters governing each budget year.
The interviews with the vote controllers (i.e., the permanent secretaries) and chief
accountants of each of the six line ministries took place in their respective offices. The
relative interview questions are in Appendix B, and each interview lasted an average time
of 30 minutes. The purpose of these interviews was to unravel the budgetary activities
and processes that take place at the level of the line ministries of government and the
impact on the credibility of the budget. I obtained from the chief accountant of each of
the six line ministries their strategic plan and current budget.
The next set of interviewees was the Chairman of the Parliamentary Finance
Committee, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee, and two
members of Parliament in the Parliament Finance Committee. The two MPs belong to the
two political parties in the Sierra Leone House of Parliament. The interviews of the four
members of Parliament dealt with the role and responsibilities of the Parliament in the
budget process. These interviews uncovered the extent of the adequacy and effectiveness
of legislative budgeting in Sierra Leone. I examined the role of Parliament in the
budgetary process as contained in the 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone and the
Government Budgeting and Accountability Act (2005). The interviews of the
parliamentarians were conducted individually in the offices of Parliament, and each
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lasted for an average time of 30 minutes. The questionnaire in Appendix C covered the
interviews with the Members of Parliament.
All of the participants were given the questionnaire in advance of the interview. I
recorded the responses during the interviews. I wrote the responses in a diary as each
interview progressed. None of the interviews were tape recorded as all participants
declined to talk on tape. I did a handful of brief follow-up interviews over the telephone
mainly to clarify issues that arose during the face-to- face interviews.
Data Analysis
The OECD baseline criteria for sound government budgeting system as set out in
Chapter 3 constituted the framework for analyzing the findings. I noted in Chapter 3 that
the interview questionnaires in Appendices A-C embody the OECD baseline criteria.
Each of the three questionnaires includes various headings covering different aspects of
the OECD baseline criteria. For instance, the first OECD baseline criteria dealing with
institutional framework covered in the questionnaires shown as Appendix A and
Appendix B within the subheadings budget legislation and parliament/executive
relationship. The second OECD baseline criteria relating to the medium-term budget
framework is covered in the questionnaires shown as Appendix A and Appendix B within
the subheadings medium-term-expenditure framework and the budget process. Thus, to
answer the second and third research questions, I used the headings in the three
questionnaires as themes. The four broad themes were budget governance, budget
preparation, budget approval, and budget execution as follows.
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Theme 1: Budget Governance
•

Budget legislation

•

Distribution of responsibilities

•

Parliament/Executive relationship

Theme 2: Budget Preparation
•

Scope of the budget

•

Budget document

•

MTEF

•

The budget process
•

Setting the budget framework

•

Estimate process and documents

•

Capital Investment

Theme 3: Budget Approval-Legislative Budgeting
•

Institutional arrangement
•

Legal authority

•

Organizational structure

•

Capacity

•

Format and contents of budget documents

•

Presentation to Parliament

•

Responsibilities of Parliament

Theme 4: Budget Execution
•

Budget execution and monitoring
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•

Accounting and reporting

•

Financial control

•

Procurement system

•

Management of external funds
Evidence of Trustworthiness

Credibility
Data triangulation provided the internal validity of the findings. The responses
from the face-to- face interviews were cross-checked and analyzed together with the
various budgetary related documentation and reports. For instance, the Fiscal Report for
each year was reviewed and compared to the responses obtained from the interviews.
Also, the interview responses were compared to some of the important reports issued by
international donors to the government budget. Two of such reports were the 2014 Public
Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) Assessment in Sierra Leone and the
2010 Sierra Leone Public Expenditure Report. These comparative reviews illuminated
the credibility of the research findings.
Transferability
The provision of a thick description of both the research setting and the findings
contributed to the attainment of the external validity of the findings. As part of the study
findings, a detailed description is provided of the case study, that is, the government
ministries that constituted the sample including a description of the role of the Parliament
in the budgetary process. A detailed description is also provided of the government
budget cycle in terms of the budgetary process as it obtains centrally at the Ministry of
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Finance, at the level of the six line ministries, and at the Sierra Leone House of
Parliament.
The use of purposive sampling also enhanced the external validity of the findings.
Purposive sampling ensured that the sample consisted exclusively of those participants
who are rich in the data required to answer the research questions ( Sample, 1993).
Sample (1993) adopted purposive sampling approach in the study of the credibility of the
budgeting and reporting practices of 394 school districts in Pennsylvania.
Dependability
The OECD budgeting questionnaire and their baseline criteria contributed to the
reliability of the findings. Both of these OECD instruments have wider international
endorsement and applicability and are, therefore, likely to yield trustworthy results.
Confirmability
The credibility of the study findings was also assured through the use of the
OECD frameworks referred to above. Both of these OECD frameworks have wider
international endorsement and applicability and are, therefore, likely to add to the
credibility of the research findings.
Profile of Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone is in Western Africa, bordering the North Atlantic Ocean, between
Guinea and Liberia. The capital, Freetown, was a British trading post dealing in timber
and ivory, but later it expanded into slaves. Following the American Revolution, Sierra
Leone was established as a British colony in 1787 for resettling the thousands of liberated
African slaves.
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The country possesses substantial mineral, agricultural, and fishery resources, but
it is still recovering from a civil war that destroyed most institutions. Since the end of the
civil war in the early 2000s, the government had relied on external assistance to support
its budget, but it was gradually becoming more independent until the sudden emergence
of the EVD in May 2014. The EVD caused a contraction of economic activity across all
sectors and forced the government to increase expenditures on health care, straining the
budget and restricting other public investment projects.
Sierra Lone has an estimated population of 7 million as at 2016 draft
census report. The government budget for 2014 reported 420 million U.S. dollars in
expenditure needs and 360 million U.S. dollars in revenue. According to the United
Nation’s Human Development Report (2014), Sierra Leone’s Human Development Index
(HDI) ranked 183 out of 187 countries (up from 185).
The 2003 Sierra Leone Integrated Household Survey (2003) report
identified that 66.4% of the population is poor. The Sierra Leone Integrated
Household Survey (2011) report revealed a reduction from that figure to 52.9%.
This figure is still relatively high, but the reduction represents a positive step.
Sierra Leone has an executive president who is the head of government and
assisted by an appointed cabinet. The other important arms of government are the
Judiciary of Sierra Leone and the Sierra Leone House of Parliament. The country is
governed by a democratic constitution passed in 1991.
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Profile of the Sample Government Ministries
According to the 2014 Government Budget, there were 24 government ministries
charged with running the affairs of the country. The study covered seven of these
ministries, namely, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development; the Ministry of
Education, Science, and Technology; Ministry of Health, and Sanitation; Ministry of
Energy; Ministry of Works, Housing, and Infrastructure; Ministry of Information, and
Communication; and the Ministry of Fisheries, and Marine Resources. To aid
understanding of the study findings, a brief profile of each of these government ministries
is as follows.
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development .According to the 1991
Constitution of Sierra Leone, the Ministry of Finance handles the management of the
Consolidated Fund and the control and direction of all public money. This responsibility
is further defined in Section 3(2) of the Government Budgeting and Accountability Act,
2005, to include the following: development of the government’s micro fiscal policy and
the medium-term expenditure framework for the budget; the control and management of
the preparation, monitoring, and implementation of the budget; the management and
control of government cash, banking, and payments arrangements; and the promotion and
enforcement of transparency and sound management in respect of revenue, expenditure,
assets, and liabilities of all government agencies.
The political head of the ministry of finance is the Minister of Finance, and the
Financial Secretary is the administrative head and principal adviser to the Minister. The
Ministry of Finance has the following main departments: Accountant-General, the
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Budget Bureau, the Economic and Policy Research Unit, Aid Coordination Unit, and the
Internal Audit. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Development accounted for about
2.2 % of the budgeted total recurrent expenditure of the government and about 50% of
the total government revenue budget as at 2014. The Ministry of Finance has a budget
committee that is made up of all departmental heads and the financial secretary is the
chairman of the budget committee, and also the budget controller of the ministry.
The Ministry of Education, Science and Technology. The Ministry of
Education, Science, and Technology (MEST) has as its mandate to provide opportunities
for children and adults to acquire knowledge and skills, as well as nurture attitudes and
values that help the nation grow and prosper. The Ministry has a strategic plan called the
Education Sector Plan (ESP) with a theme titled Learning to Succeed as a blueprint for
improving the nation’s education system during the period 2014-2018. The ESP provides
a framework within which the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology (MEST)
can work with various partners to address some of the challenges facing education in
Sierra Leone. The ESP outlines three overriding goals: to improve access, equity, and
completion, to improve the quality and relevance of education, and to strengthen the
education service delivery system.
The Ministry of Education accounted for about 17% of the budgeted total
recurrent expenditure of the government as at 2014. The political head of the ministry is
the minister, and the administrative head is the permanent secretary, who is also the
budget controller of the ministry. There are several professional heads overseeing the
various departments of the ministry all of whom report to the permanent secretary. The
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ministry of education has a budget committee that is made up of all departmental heads,
and the permanent secretary is the chairman of the budget committee.
The Ministry of Information and Communication. The ministry of information
and communication is the mouthpiece of the government. According to its strategic plan,
the vision of the ministry is to transform Sierra Leone into a competitive and prosperous
country, through the development, expansion and innovative use of information and
communications technologies. The strategic plan of the ministry outlines the following
main goals: to optimize the use of information and communication technologies in public
and private sectors; to improve public access to national and international information; to
provide the public with timely, accurate, clear, objective and complete information about
government policies; to provide policy guidance and strategic direction on all matters
concerning access to information and communication technology.
The minister of information and communication is the political head of the
ministry, and the permanent secretary is the administrative head as well as the budget
controller. The ministry has a budget committee that is made up of all departmental
heads, and the permanent secretary is the chairman of the budget committee. The
ministry of information and communication accounted for about 0.6% of the budgeted
total recurrent expenditure of the government as at 2014.
The Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources. The mandate of the Ministry
of Fisheries and Marine Resources (MFMR) is to plan, develop, rationally manage, and
conserve all living aquatic resources of Sierra Leone. According to the strategic plan of
the ministry, the fisheries and marine sector contributes about 10% of the Gross Domestic
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Product (GDP) and is the most important economic activity along the coastline of Sierra
Leone.
The minister of fisheries and marine resources is the political head of the ministry
and the permanent secretary the administrative head as well as the budget controller. The
ministry has a budget committee that is made up of all departmental heads, and the
permanent secretary is the chairman of the budget committee. The ministry of fisheries
and marine resources accounted for about 0.3% of the budgeted total recurrent
expenditure of the government as at 2014.
The Ministry of Energy. The Ministry of Energy has a strategic plan dubbed as
the energy sector strategy 2014-2017. This plan is serving as the basis for the huge
reforms that the energy ministry is going through since the last few years to address the
acute blackout prevalent especially in the rural communities of Sierra Leone. The main
strategic goal is to attract foreign direct investments in three key areas: electricity
generation, transmission and distribution network, and capacity building.
The minister of energy is the political head of the ministry and the permanent
secretary the administrative head and also the vote controller. The ministry has a budget
committee that is made up of all departmental heads and the permanent secretary is the
chairman of the budget committee. The ministry of energy accounted for about 3% of the
budgeted total recurrent expenditure of the government as at 2014.
The Ministry of Works, Housing and Infrastructure. The Ministry of Works,
Housing and Infrastructure is responsible for all public works and infrastructural projects
like roads, bridges, and other projects. The minister of works is the political head of the
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ministry and the permanent secretary the administrative head and also the vote controller.
The ministry has a budget committee that is made up of all departmental heads, and the
permanent secretary is the chairman of the budget committee. The ministry accounted for
about 56% of the total estimated domestic development expenditure for 2014.
The Ministry of Health and Sanitation. The strategic plan of this ministry
outlines the following goals: to improve human resource for quality health care delivery;
to reduce infant, under-five, and maternal mortality; to improve the availability of drugs
and medical technology supply and strengthen health sector governance for quality health
care delivery
The ministry has a budget committee that is made up of all departmental heads
and the permanent secretary is the chairman of the budget committee. The minister of
health is the political head of the ministry and the permanent secretary the administrative
head and also the vote controller. The Ministry of Health and Sanitation accounted for
about 1% of the domestic development budget and about 7% of the recurrent expenditure
budget as at 2014.
Profile of the Sierra Leone House of Parliament
Section 73 (1) of the 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone provides that there shall
be a Legislature called the Sierra Leone House of Parliament. Parliament consists of the
President, the Speaker, and Members of Parliament. Subject to the provisions of the
Constitution, the legislative power of Sierra Leone is vested in Parliament. The function
of Parliament is to make laws for the peace, security, order, and good government of
Sierra Leone.
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There were two political parties represented in Parliament: the governing All
Peoples Congress (APC) and the opposition Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP). The
APC has majority seats in Parliament with a sitting President, Dr. Ernest Bai Koroma,
who is serving a second and final term.
According to Section 111 (3) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone, the Sierra Leone
House of Parliament has the primary responsibility for approving the annual budget and
passing the Appropriation Bill into Law. Parliament is also responsible for monitoring
and overseeing the implementation of the approved budget. In doing so, Parliament
conduct whatever investigations it deems fit to examine the budget estimates before
passing them. The two key statutory committees that deal with matters relating to state
finance are the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and the Parliamentary Finance
Committee (PFC). The PAC has primary responsibility for the review of the year-end
public accounts of the government prepared by the Accountant General. The PAC is also
responsible for reviewing and taking action on the annual audit report on the government
public accounts issued by the Auditor General.
The Parliament Finance Committee (PFC) has direct oversight of the government
budgetary process. The Committee reviews the government budget and makes
recommendations to the House of Parliament as to whether the budget should be
approved or not. Sub- appropriation committees comprising of some members of the PFC
as well as other Members of Parliament, carry out the actual detail review of the budget.
The sub-appropriation committees report to the Finance Committee, which in turn reports
to the House of Parliament.
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Overview of the Budgetary Process of the Government of Sierra Leone
Section 112 (1) of the 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone provides that the
Minister of Finance shall cause to be prepared and laid before Parliament in each
financial year estimates of the revenues and expenditures of Sierra Leone for the next
following financial year. Section (2) of The Government Budgeting and Accountability
Act (GBAA), 2005, describes a budget as the annual estimates of the revenues and other
receipts and expenditures of the Government. The Act describes the medium-term
expenditure framework budget as the 3-year rolling budget containing the budget
estimates for the year to which it relates together with indicative budgets for the
succeeding 2 years.
The Government Budgeting and Accountability Act (GBAA), 2005, outline the
following primary responsibility of the minister of finance as regards the budget:
•

To develop the Government’s macro-fiscal policy and the medium-term
expenditure framework for the budget.

•

Control and manage the preparation, monitoring and implementation of
the budget, including adjustments to the budget, and to ensure that all
interested parties can participate fully in the decision taken on the budget
within the medium-term expenditure framework; and

•

Publish by Government Notice and by any other appropriate means, the
progress of budget implementation on a quarterly basis.

Regarding the preparation and approval of the government budget, the
Government Budgeting and Accountability Act (GBAA), 2005, provides as follows:
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•

The Budget Bureau, under the supervision of the Financial Secretary,
handles the preparation and monitoring of the budget in collaboration
with the budgetary agencies.

•

Each budgetary agency shall establish a budget committee responsible
for preparing the strategic plans and annual estimates of the agency,
apportioning quarterly allocations and monitoring expenditure and
results.

•

The budget laid before Parliament include: a statement of the macroeconomic conditions of Sierra Leone and the budget policies; the
medium- term expenditure framework; summary of revenues and
expenditures, including financing of the budget deficit, if any; estimates
of the revenues and expenditure of each agency; a statement of
government guarantees; and the appropriation bill for the
implementation of the budget.

Concerning budget execution and control, the Government Budgeting and
Accountability Act (GBAA; 2005) provides as follows:
•

When Parliament approves the budget, public money becomes available
for appropriation to the service of the different agencies and ministries.

•

The approved appropriation for any agency shall be used only in
accordance with the purpose described and within the limits set by the
different classifications within the agency’s estimates. Since 2013, the
Budget Bureau allocates resources according to the government of Sierra
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Leone Agenda for Prosperity. The Agenda defines the development path
for the country for the period 2013–17, and comprises eight sectoral
pillars: (a) economic diversification to promote inclusive growth; (b)
managing natural resources; (c) accelerating human development;
(d)promoting international competitiveness; (e) labor and employment; (f)
strengthen social protection systems; (g) governance and public sector
reforms; and (h) gender equality and women’s empowerment.
The government has in place a Public Financial Management Reform Strategy
whose goal is to ensure the continuous operation of a sound Public Financial
Management (PFM), which supports fiscal discipline; the strategic, efficient and effective
allocation of resources, and value for money and probity in the use of public funds. Some
of the reforms already implemented include the following:
•

Enactment of the Government Budgeting and Accountability Act in May
2005.

•

The adoption of the Financial Management Regulation in June 2007.

•

Enactment of the National Public Procurement Act 2004.

•

The publication of the Annual Public Accounts, Audit reports and
quarterly publication of unaudited accounts.

•

The introduction of the Integrated Financial Management Information
System (IFMIS).

•

Formulation of a National Action Plan for Public Financial Management
reform.
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•

Financial Administration Regulation for Local Councils.

The Medium-Term Expenditure Framework Process
According to the 2012 Revised Guidelines of the medium term expenditure
framework (MTEF), MTEF is a tool for achieving the best social and economic outcomes
from available government resources. The resources are first determined and then
allocated in line with government policies and priorities to ministries, departments, and
agencies (MDAs). The MTEF process requires the forecasting of revenues, expenditures,
and macroeconomics over a 3-year period. Each year the medium-term budget is rolled
forward by deleting the previous budget year and adding a new outer year. For instance,
the 2015 budget will cover forward estimates for 2016 and 2017 while the 2016 budget
will drop the 2015 budget; maintain the 2017 estimates and adds 2018 estimates as the
new outer budget year.
The MTEF guidelines clearly delineate a strategic phase and a budget allocation
phase and Figure 1 illustrate the linkage between national planning and the annual
budget.
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Strategy Phase (March to June)
Output: Budget Framework Paper (BFP)
Cabinet approves the BFP (June)
Output: Approved strategy to guide budget formulation
Detailed Budget Phase (July to October)
Output: Final budget documentation

Budget approved by Parliament (December)

Figure 1.Linkage between strategic planning and budget.
The strategic phase of the MTEF deals principally with policy: fiscal policy and
service delivery policy and priorities. The elements that comprise this phase include the
national strategy, ministries’ planning; macro-fiscal analysis and forecasting; public
investment planning; external assistance planning; and the budget policy hearings. The
outcome of these linked processes is a budget framework paper, which provides advice to
the government on the strategy for the medium-term budget, including budget planning
ceilings for each ministry and agency. The Cabinet discusses and approves the budget
framework paper to establish top-down policy guidelines for the development of the
detailed budget. The strategy phase has a target completion date of June each year.
At the budget formulation stage, detailed budget for each ministry is developed
within the context established through the strategy phase. The elements that comprise this
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phase include the preparation of the budget call circular, preparation of detailed estimates
for each ministry and agency, analysis of these submissions by the Budget Bureau and
preparation of briefing notes for budget discussions, and the consolidation of the budget
for presentation by the minister of finance to the House of Parliament. The budget
formulation phase has a target completion date of end October each year.
The ministry of finance prepares the budget call circular (BCC) following the
approval of the budget framework paper (BFP) by the cabinet ministers. All agencies and
ministries receive the BCC detailing all the instructions necessary for the preparation of
the detailed budget. The BCC provides background information on the fiscal capacity and
government priorities; the templates for budget submission; detailed instructions for the
completion of the budget templates; and the indicative budget ceilings for each agency
and ministry.
Each ministry of government is required to have an established budget committee.
The budget committee is responsible for managing the ministry’s strategic planning
process and its budget formulation process. The budget committee is made up of heads of
the different departments in each ministry. The budget committee meetings include
discussions on the budget call circular. The ministries and agencies are then required to
prepare their budget proposals for submission to the Ministry of Finance. The budget
proposals are required to provide credible estimates of the future costs of
programs/activities estimated for the budget year.
The budget proposal informs the participatory budget hearing held under the
guidance of the Budget Bureau. The budget hearing represent a public forum for
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discussing some of the issues that is critical to the finalization of the budget. At the
completion of the budget discussions, the Ministry of Finance will have most of the
information required to consolidate the ministries budget into the government budget.
The final consolidated budget communicates to the Parliament and the country at large
the strategic and operational intent of the budget. Table 1 shows the budget calendar of
the government of Sierra Leone.
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Table 1
Budget Calendar of the Government of Sierra Leone
Budget Activity

Deadline Date

1

MoFED develops the macro-fiscal framework

Feb/March

2

Review and update of MDAs Strategic Plans

April/May

3

MoFED, HRMO and MDAs engage in manpower

May

planning and budgeting consultative process
4

Public Investment Plan finalized for next budget year-

May/June

cost of on-going projects and prioritized list of new ones.
5

MoFED holds discussions with development partners and

May

NGOs on program and project support
6

MoFED finalizes the Budget Framework Paper (BFP)

Mid May

7

MoFED submits Draft Budget Framework Paper to IMF

End May

for review and comments
8

Budget Policy hearings

May/early June

9

Resource envelope and indicative budget ceilings

June

prepared by MoFED
10

MoFED prepares consolidated estimates of Development

By early June

Partners funded activity for next medium-term

(table continues)
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Budget Activity

Deadline Date

MoFED submits draft BFP, resource envelope, and

No later than end

expenditure ceilings to Cabinet for review and approval

June

12

MoFED issues Budget Call Circular (BCC) to MDAs

Early July

13

MoFED and National Revenue Authority prepare daft

July and August

11

Finance Bill
14

MDAs prepared detailed budget submissions in

July and August

accordance with BCC and ceilings
15

Budget Bureau reviews, analyses and prepares briefing

Early September

on MDAs budget submissions to inform budget
discussions
16

MoFED holds budget discussions on MDAs strategic

Late September

plans and Budget estimates
17

The Minister of Finance submits a cabinet paper on the

Mid October

budget to Cabinet
18

MoFED, Law Officers Dept and Government Printing

Mid October

gazette Appropriation and Finance Bills
19

MoFED compiles and finalizes the Budget Speech and

End October

Estimates
20

The Minister of Finance presents the Budget to
Parliament

End October
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(table continues)

21

Budget Activity

Deadline Date

MoFED and other MDAs hold pre-legislative discussions

November

with Parliament Finance Committee, Parliament Public
Accounts Committee and Parliament Transparency
Committee
22

Parliament debates and approves the budget and Finance

Mid December

Bill
23

His Excellency the President signs the Appropriation and

By end December

Finance Bill into law
Note. BFP = Budget Framework Paper, BCC = Budget Call Circular, MDAs= Ministries,
Agencies and Departments, MoFED = Ministry of Finance and Economic Development,
NGOs = Non-Governmental Organizations, HRMO = Human Resource Management
Office
Study Results
Budgetary Variances
In fulfillment of the first research question, a computation was made of the
variances between the approved budget and the year-end financial reports of the
government in respect of four budgetary heads. These budgetary heads were personnel
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expenditure, non salary and noninterest recurrent expenditure, domestic development
expenditure, and domestic revenue collection.
On an annual basis, domestic revenue collection accounts for about 10% of the
total budgeted revenue of the government. The total of personnel expenditure, non salary
and noninterest recurrent expenditure, and domestic development expenditure accounts
for about 80% of the total annual budgeted expenditure of the government. In the next
section are the respective variances for each of the four budgetary heads.
Monetary Variances in Personnel Expenditure
Personnel expenditure accounted for a significant portion of government spending
taking a share of 37.4% of the total budgeted expenditure of the government as at 2014.
Appendix D shows a tabular computation of the absolute amounts that constituted the
variances in personnel expenditure for the period 2010-2014 across the seven ministries.
Table 2 shows the variances between the actual personnel expenditure and the approved
budget expressed in percentage terms.
Table 2
Yearly Monetary Variances in Personnel Expenditures (%)
Government

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Ministry

Variance

Variance

Variance

Variance

Variance

Finance & Eco Dev

3%

-28%

-36%

-32%

-13%

Information &Comm.

41%

-24%

-33%

-11%

-7%

Education , Sc& Tech

9%

-40%

-49%

-51%

-18%

Health & Sanitation

159%

-52%

-45%

-49%

-13%

Marine Resources

4%

-16%

-8%

-7%

-15%

Energy

6%

-16%

-12%

-11%

-
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Works, Infrast & Hous

-8%

-42%

-30%

-34%

-

Note. Finance & Eco Dev = Finance and Economic Development; Information &Comm.
= Information and Communication; Education, Sc& Tech = Education, Science and
Technology; Works, Infrast & Hous = Works, Infrastructure and Housing.
In Table 2 the percentage variances represent the difference between the actual
outcome and the budgeted amount expressed as a percentage of the budgeted amount. A
positive variance represents overspending; that is, spending in excess of the budgetary
provision and negative variances represent under-spending, spending below the budgeted
amount.
The trend in monetary variances in respect to personnel expenditure. As
Table 2 indicates, in 2010, the Ministry of Health over spent its personnel budget by
159% whiles the overspending for the Ministry of Information and Communication was
41%. Table 2 also evidenced that the other five ministries had variances that were within
the acceptable 15% limit. In 2011, all seven ministries under spent their respective
budgets with the ministry of health ranking highest at 52% followed by the ministry of
education, which under spent its budget by 40%. The two ministries interchanged
positions in 2012 with under- spending of 49% and 45%, respectively. Also, in 2013 and
2014, all ministries under spent their budget. The ministry of education ranked highest in
both 2013 and 2014, under- spending its personnel budget by 51% and 18%, respectively.
Monetary Variances in Nonsalary, Noninterest Recurrent Expenditure
Nonsalary, noninterest recurrent expenditure also represented a significant portion
of government spending accounting for about 25% of the total budgeted expenditure as at
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2014. Appendix E shows a tabular computation of the absolute amounts that constituted
the variances in nonsalary, noninterest recurrent expenditure for the period 2010-2014
across the seven ministries studied. Table 3 shows the variances between the actual
personnel expenditure and the approved budget expressed in percentage terms.
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Table 3
Yearly Monetary Variances in Nonsalary, Noninterest, Recurrent Expenditures (%)
Government

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Ministry

Variance

Variance

Variance

Variance

Variance

Finance & Eco Dev

102%

-16%

-10%

-29%

-2%

Information & Comm

1005%

-52%

-41%

-93%

-24%

Education, Sc& Tech

-7%

-17%

-15%

-33%

-21%

Health & Sanitation

-36%

-35%

-23%

-44%

-10%

Marine Resources

-27%

-44%

--43%

-45%

-70%

Energy

656%

-11%

-22%

3651%

-83%

Works, Infrast & Hous

-6%

-22%

-14%

-24%

-12%

Note. Finance & Eco Dev = Finance and Economic Development; Information &Comm=
Information and Communication; Education, Sc& Tech = Education, Science and
Technology; Works, Infrast&Hous = Works, Infrastructure and Housing.
Note: In Table 3 the percentage variances represent the difference between the
actual amount and the budgeted amount expressed as a percentage of the budgeted
amount. A positive variance represents overspending; that is, spending in excess of the
budgetary provision and a negative variance represents under-spending, spending below
the budgeted amount.
The trend in monetary variances in respect to non salary, noninterest
recurrent expenditure. From Table 3, it is evident that in 2010, the ministry of
information overspent its non salary, noninterest recurrent expenditure by an alarming
1005% followed by the ministry of energy which over spent its budget by 656% and the
ministry of finance 102%. The other four ministries under spent their budget with the
ministry of health recording under spending of 36%. From 2011 to 2013 there was under-
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spending across all ministries except for a single instance in 2013, when the ministry of
energy overspent its budget by an alarming 3651%. The highest under-spending of 93%
was recorded in 2013 in the ministry of information, followed by 83% in 2014 in the
ministry of energy.
Monetary Variances in Domestic Development Expenditure
Domestic development expenditure represented about 14% of total budgeted
expenditures as at 2014. Appendix F shows a tabular computation of the absolute
amounts that constituted the variances in domestic development expenditure for the
period 2010-2014 across the seven ministries studied. These variances are shown in
Table 4.Table 4 shows the variances between the approved budget and the year-end
financial reports expressed in percentage terms in respect of domestic development
expenditures.
Table 4
Yearly Monetary Variances in Domestic Development Expenditure (%)
Government

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Ministry

Variance

Variance

Variance

Variance

Variance

Finance & Eco Dev

-74%

-44%

-82%

-76%

-88%

Information &Comm.

-100%

-60%

-22%

-49%

-29%

Education, Sc& Tech

-75%

-23%

-129%

-48%

-96%

Health & Sanitation

--67%

-15%

-39%

-53%

-56%

Marine Resources

-83%

-100%

-5%

-13%

-11%

Energy

42%

-48%

-5%

-90%

-45%

Works,Infrast& Hous

-22%

-13%

-34%

-62%

-25%
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Note. Finance & Eco Dev = Finance and Economic Development; Information & Comm.
= Information and Communication; Education, Sc& Tech = Education, Science and
Technology; Works, Infrast & Hous = Works, Infrastructure and Housing.
In Table 4, the percentage variances represent the difference between the actual
amount and the budgeted amount expressed as a percentage of the budgeted amount. A
positive variance represents overspending; that is, spending in excess of the budgetary
provision and negative variances represent under-spending; that is, spending below the
budgeted amount.
The trend in monetary variances in respect to domestic development
expenditure. Table 4 shows that from 2010 to 2014, all seven ministries under spent
their budget for domestic development expenditure except for one instance in 2010 when
the ministry of energy over spent its budget by 42%. Throughout the period of the study,
the highest under spending was recorded in 2012 in the ministry of education at a level of
129%, followed by 100% under- spending in the ministry of marine resources in 2011.
The ministry of education ranked third-under spending its budget by 96% in 2014.
Monetary Variances in Domestic Revenue Collection
Domestic Revenue represented about 71% of total budgeted revenue and grants as
at 2014. Appendix F shows a tabular computation of the absolute amounts that
constituted the monetary variances in domestic revenue between the approved budget and
the year-end financial reports. Table 5 shows the percentage monetary variances between
the approved budget and the year-end financial reports in respect to domestic revenue.
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Table 5
Yearly Monetary Variances in Domestic Revenue (%)
Government

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Ministry

Variance

Variance

Variance

Variance

Variance

Finance & Eco Dev

326%

-16%

-98%

-106%

-100%

Information & Comm.

818%

702%

294%

446%

-100%

Education, Sc& Tech

-100%

-

-

-

-

Health & Sanitation

348%

-47%

-71%

-99%

-100%

Marine Resources

87%

-1%

-43%

-43%

Energy

-

-100%

-100%

-

-100%

Works, Infrast & Hous

59%

-82%

-100%

-100%

-100%

Note .Finance & Eco Dev = Finance and Economic Development; Information &Comm=
Information and Communication; Education, Sc& Tech = Education, Science and
Technology; Works, Infrast&Hous = Works, Infrastructure and Housing.
In Table 5 the percentage variances represent the difference between the actual
amount and the budgeted amount expressed as a percentage of the budgeted amount. A
positive variance means more collection of revenue above the budget and a negative
variance means less revenue collection relative to the budget.
The trend in monetary variances in respect to domestic revenue. From Table
5, it is indicated that in 2010 except for the ministry of education alone, all other
ministries collected more revenue than their respective budgetary provisions. For 2010,
the ministry of information recorded the highest percentage change of 818% in terms of
collecting more revenue than budgeted. From 2011 to 2013, except for the ministry of
information alone, the actual revenue collected by all the other ministries was less than
their respective budgeted provisions. The ministry of information consistently collected
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more revenue than budgeted from 2010 to 2013 but in 2013, recorded lower revenue than
budget by 100%.
Factors Responsible for the Significant Monetary Variances from 2010 to 2014
In this subsection, the factors responsible for the significant monetary variances
are presented. These variances cover all the four budget heads studied: personnel
expenditure; nonsalary, noninterest recurrent expenditure; domestic development
expenditure; and domestic revenue. In fulfillment of the second research questions, the
factors responsible for the variances have been presented to reflect the three stages of the
budgetary process: budget preparation, budget approval, and budget execution.
According to the Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) used by international
financial agencies in measuring the financial performance of governments, significant
variances are variances greater than 15% or less than -15%. The findings are as follows.
Variances in Budget Planning and Preparation
•

Scope and contents of the budget: There is inadequate institutional capacity in
terms of a sufficient number of technically knowledgeable personnel in long-term
planning and budget formulation in line ministries. This situation was made worse
by the lack of a dedicated planning department or unit in all ministries. Also, there
are no scientific models used for forecasting both revenue and spending in line
ministries. Poor budget planning and preparation meant that budget estimates are
not reliable, and this contributed to the huge monetary variances seen in personnel
expenditure; non salary, noninterest recurrent expenditure; development
expenditure; and domestic revenue collection.
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•

The medium term expenditure framework (MTEF): Further institutional
weakness identified is the lack of detailed knowledge of the Medium-Term
Expenditure Framework and it linkages with the annual Budget. Line ministries
primarily focus on the annual budgetary process and even at that their budgetary
estimates were not particularly reliable. There were wide disparities between the
initial budget submitted by line ministries and the final budget approved by the
Parliament.

•

The introduction of activity-based budgeting in 2014 has posed additional
challenges in budget preparation as almost all the ministries studied mentioned of
the difficulties in defining activities, outputs and outcomes to cover all functions
and programs of their ministries.

•

Even with the introduction of activity-based budgeting in 2014, ministries are
constrained by their inability to develop measurable and achievable performance
indicators for each outcome specified in their strategic plans.

•

Inadequate time frame is allowed for budget planning and preparation in line
ministries. While the Budget Calendar detailed in the MTEF specifies a period of
about two months for ministries to review and update their strategic plan, in
practice, ministries only have an average of one month to put their budget
together for submission to the Budget Bureau. For instance, the Budget Call
Circular for 2015-17, issued on the 30th July 2014 required ministries to submit
their completed budget not later than 29th August 2014.
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•

The budget process: Line ministries officials manifested a lack of faith in the
annual budgetary process. The main reason noted for this was that ministries’
officials see the process as a waste of time as almost invariably actual allocation
of funds are always far much lower than the budget. The Budget Bureau attributes
this situation to the severe constraint posed by revenue and the tendency for the
line- ministries to present a wish list instead of a financial plan.

•

Further, line ministries were severely constrained by the tight budgetary ceilings
imposed by the Budget Bureau. The situation was made worse by the intermittent
imposition of downward revisions to budgetary allocations of line ministries by
the political leadership completely outside the ambit of line ministries.

•

In at least two one of the ministries, inadequate feasibility studies and poor
planning caused significant cost overruns in major capital projects. Also, poor
forecasts of the costs of major personnel reform programs also resulted in
significant overspending.

Variances in Budget Approval
The findings relating to the variances associated with the budget approval
processes are part of the findings under legislative budgeting in Sierra Leone. Legislative
Budgeting in the Sierra Leone House of Parliament are presented in the second
subsection following.
Variances in Budget Execution
•

In several instances, political expediency overrode the need for budgetary
control. The period 2010- 2012 had a significant number of cases involving
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unbudgeted expenditures and extra-budgetary expenditures. Political
considerations necessitated spending on certain activities that were outside both
the annual budget and the Medium –Term- Budget- Framework. Further, the
Ministry of Finance is in some instances not consulted in good time before major
political pronouncements are made having huge budgetary implications. These
expenditures were mainly prevalent in nonsalary, noninterest recurrent
expenditure and development expenditures.
•

Throughout the study period, the actual budgetary allocations made by the Budget
Bureau for line ministries were always significantly lower than the approved
budget of those line ministries. There were cases when the actual budgetary
allocations were at least 50% lesser than the approved budget. Not only were
funds inadequate for all the line ministries, but also, these allocations of funds
were often made very late and resulted in the accumulation of payment arrears in
line ministries . This situation gave rise to severe difficulties in the execution of
the budget of the line ministries.

•

Unbudgeted expenditures relating to both diplomatic appointments and
recruitments of some government officials caused some of the huge variances in
personnel expenditure. Multiple wage-tiers for civil servants of the same grade
especially in 2010-2011 also contributed to the overspending in personnel
expenditures.

•

There were cases of huge under spending due to difficulties in implementing
planned programs.
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•

Under budgeting for major expenditures like subscriptions payable to
international organizations.

•

In 2010, there were huge payments for the completion of certain long- term
projects whose initial costs were not in the budget.

•

Significant expenditures on unbudgeted infrastructural development projects.

•

Unbudgeted procurements of major capital assets

•

Cost overruns in major infrastructural projects like roads.

•

In 2012, 2013 and 2014, there were major revisions to the approved budget that
necessitated the submission of a supplementary budget to the Parliament. The
supplementary expenditures were already incurred by the government and
submitted to Parliament for ratification.

•

Huge build-up of payment arrears from previous years.

•

Inadequate feasibility studies for major capital projects relating to energy and
roads reconstruction lacked realistic costing and resulted in huge cost overruns.

•

MTEF exists, but in practice the budget is annual, and the medium- term
forecasts are at best wild guesses with no clear linkages to approved policy or
plans.

•

The disproportionately higher amounts of mandatory expenditures relative to
discretionary expenditure were a constraint on budget execution. In the 2014
budget, the mandatory expenditures including debt and interest payments
accounted for more than 60% of the total budgeted income.
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•

The 2014 budget was particularly noted to have shown significant variances
caused by two major shocks to the economy of Sierra Leone which resulted in
non-achievement of planned programs. The Ebola Virus Disease epidemic and the
unprecedented decline in the world market prices of iron ore, Sierra Leone’s
major export. The Ebola epidemic and the near collapse of the iron ore industry
resulted in low revenue generation and the diversion of a significant amount of
budgetary resources to end the epidemic. These adverse events contributed to the
large budgetary variances in 2014 across all of the four budgetary heads covered
in the study.

•

A likely case of systematic under budgeting of revenues was observed given the
overly conservative revenue targets set by line ministries. The yearly revenue
targets represented marginal adjustments to historical amounts instead of a
complete annual assessment of the likely revenue streams.

•

The actual total domestic revenue collection was below the budgeted amounts in
2011 and 2014 in the amounts of Le 112 billion and Le 219 billion, respectively.
The 2011 revenue shortfall was attributable to the non-achievement of planned
revenue targets for newly legislated taxes. This situation was partly attributable to
the lack of close coordination between policy formulation and the annual
budgetary process as new taxes were introduced but not fully accounted for in the
annual budget.

•

Sierra Leone scored 39 out 0f 100 in the Open Budget Index for 2013.
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Legislative Budgeting in the Sierra Leone House of Parliament
On Public Financial Management (PFM), the 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone
sets out the legal and institutional framework in Part VI sections 110 to 120 covering the
supremacy of Parliament on matters of taxation and expenditure. Section 114 (2) c
allows the President to authorize warrants under his signature for extra-budgetary
expenditure when he considers that there is such an urgent need to incur the expenditure
that it would not be in the public interest to delay.
Section 107 of the Constitution of Sierra Leone provides that the Minister of
Finance shall cause to be prepared and laid before Parliament in each financial year
estimates of the revenues and expenditures of Sierra Leone for the next following
financial year. The responsibility of Parliament is to review and approve the budget by
passing the Appropriation Bill. The Appropriation Act constitutes the legal authority for
the government to use monies in the consolidated fund in fulfillment of the needs
identified in the approved budget.
Following next are the findings on the adequacy and effectiveness of the role of
the Sierra Leone House of Parliament in the budgetary process.
Institutional Arrangement
•

In line with the practice in most jurisdictions, the Sierra Leone House of
Parliament has a committee structure for dealing with all budgetary
matters. This committee structure has two components: a central
committee called the Parliament Finance Committee (PFC) responsible for
overall budgetary matters; and Sub-Appropriation Committees responsible
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various policy areas. This structure enables Parliament to have both
control over the overall budget process and more specific in-depth inquiry
into various government programs.
•

The PFC meets to review the entire budget after the formal presentation of
the budget to the entire House of Parliament by the Minister of Finance.
The subcommittees conduct separate budget hearings covering different
sectors of the government operations. The primary purpose of these
hearings is to conduct due diligence on the government budget on a lineby-line basis for each government ministry, department, and agency. The
different Sub-Committees carry out the detailed review of the budget and
make a recommendation to the PFC. In turn; the PFC undertakes a further
review of the budget and submits their recommendation to the House of
Parliament. Members of Parliament then debate the budget and vote
whether to pass the Appropriation Bill for the budget to be approved
subject to the various issues that may have come up in the deliberations
held at the Sub-Appropriation Committees.

•

The parliamentary approval process considers the entire budgets at one go.
This approach is contrary to best practice in some jurisdictions where, for
purposes of overall expenditure control, the legislative approval process
follows two stages. In the first stage, the legislature decides on the overall
expenditure ceiling for the budget year. The second stage entails the
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approval of the appropriations and the allocation of resources among
government agencies.
•

Other than the end of year Public Accounts, Parliament is not provided
with periodic reports on the execution of the budget in the course of the
year.

To assess the adequacy and effectiveness of the above institutional arrangement
of the Parliament, I examined the legal authority and capacity of the Sierra Leone House
of Parliament as follows.
Legal Authority
•

There is no specific provision in both the 1991 Constitution of Sierra
Leone and the Government Budgeting Act 2005, spelling out the exact
powers of Parliament to amend the budget submitted by the government.
Both of these instruments do not set out the parameters of the amendment
power of Parliament, such as whether the legislature can revise the
spending up or downward. Parliament can only amend the budgetary
estimates downward. The authority of Parliament to amend the budget
downward is set out in a Parliamentary Standing Order.

•

Also, both the Constitution and the Budget Act contain no provision that
demands that the government budget should be balanced nor is there any
provision that imposes a limit on the level of budget deficit.
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Capacity
Regarding the capacity of Parliament to analyze the budget, consideration was
given to three factors: time, information, and expertise.
•

Time: The government presents the budget to the Parliament late. Section
22 of the Government Budgeting and Accountability Act, 2005, stipulates
that the budget should be laid before Parliament not later than two months
before the beginning of the financial year. The budget presentation to
Parliament is often in the first week of December. With an average time
of one month available to Parliament to analyze and approve the budget,
it stands to reason that time is not sufficient for the budget to be
thoroughly reviewed by Parliament.

•

Information: when it comes to information, Parliament is mainly reliant
on the central government for information relating to the cost of
government programs. Parliament has no independent mechanism for
collecting information to enable a thorough evaluation of the government
budget.

•

Expertise: Parliament lack vital technical resources such as seasoned
research staff of its own to aid the performance of the parliamentary
budgetary function. The Parliamentarians depend entirely on their
individual knowledge for analyzing the budget.
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Parliament/Executive Relationship
On the relationship between Parliament and the Executive, the following were
noted:
•

There is an explicit schedule for presentation of the budget by the government
and its consideration and approval by Parliament.

•

There are procedures for the presentation and approval of supplementary
budget

•

There are no are no defined limits on the powers of the Parliament to amend
the draft budget bill. In fact, the Parliament has no legal authority to amend
the government budget except for a Parliamentary Standing Order. The
Standing Order enables Parliament to withhold the budget of any government
ministry if they are not satisfied with the provisions contained in the said
budget.

•

There is no opportunity for Parliament first to debate or approve the fiscal
framework targets in advance of the detailed budget estimates.

•

It is not the practice for the Parliament to make amendments to the annual
government budget before adoption. In practice, Parliament occasionally does
make suggestions for amendments to the budget and the government usually
accepts.
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Summary
The three expenditure categories—personnel expenditure; non salary, noninterest
recurrent expenditure; and domestic development expenditure—all depicted huge
variances both by way of overspending and under spending. The overspendings were
much more prevalent. There was a tendency to underestimate revenue deliberately,
hence, the frequent cases of under collection of revenue. Inconsistent personnel policies
and the apparent lack of harmonization of the wage bill and other conditions of service
across government ministries were largely responsible for the huge variances in
personnel expenditure. These factors contributed to frequent instances of overspending.
The monetary variances in non salary, noninterest recurrent expenditure were
attributable to weak planning at the budget preparation stage as well as the inadequate
time accorded to the development of detailed strategic plans with clear linkages to the
annual budget process. The variances in domestic development expenditure were mainly
explained by a largely indiscipline budget execution process as political expediency took
priority over budgetary control safeguards. The manner of executing the budget under
these conditions caused huge cost overruns and the implementation of unplanned and
unbudgeted programs as well as major infrastructural projects. The week planning
environment also resulted in instances of under-budgeting of certain major expenditures
like subscriptions due to international organizations of which Sierra Leone is a member.
The lack of specific provision in both the Constitution of Sierra Leone and the
Government Budgeting and Accountability Act (2005) specifying the exact powers of
Parliament to amend the budget serves as a constraint on the effectiveness of the
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parliamentary budgetary process. The capacity of parliament to analyze the budget is also
severely limited as a result of the lack of research and other skilled staff specifically
employed to aid Parliamentarians in their review of the budget. Also, the budget was in
some cases presented to Parliament in less than the stipulated two months, thus leaving
Parliament with insufficient time to thoroughly securitize the budget.
The 2014 budget was particularly problematic regarding its execution given the
devastating impact of the Ebola Virus Disease. There was an adverse impact on domestic
revenue and government expenditures largely diverted towards fighting the epidemic.
The unprecedented decline in the world market price for iron ore, Sierra Leone’s major
export, made the situation worse.
In the final chapter, the implications of the above finding are discussed in terms of
the credibility of the budget of the Government of Sierra Leone and recommendations
made as to some of the reforms needed that could help correct the situation.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
The results of the study are discussed in this chapter as well as the accompanying
conclusions and the recommendations thereof. The purpose of the study was to develop a
budgetary reform agenda in support of some of the changes needed for enhancing the
credibility of the budget of the government of Sierra Leone. The first and second research
questions addressed the significant monetary variances between the approved budget and
the end-of-year public accounts of the government and the main factors responsible for
such variances. The third research question addressed the governance over the budgetary
process as it relates to the adequacy and effectiveness of the role of the Sierra Leone
House of Parliament in the budgetary process.
The section immediately following provides an interpretation of the findings as
presented in the previous chapter. Next are the limitations of the study and the
implications of the findings for practice and social change. Toward the end of the chapter
are the recommendations regarding the reforms for addressing the weakening budget
credibility.
Interpretation of Findings
The conceptual framework for the study presented in Chapter 2 depicted the NPM
as an integrated administrative reform framework with the aim of reinventing
government. NPM theorists seek leaner and better governmental performance by
challenging agencies of government to do more with less. NPM places emphasis on
economic efficiency and budgetary control as priorities for governments. Given the spate
of spending on unbudgeted projects and the frequent instances of extra budgetary
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expenditures, budgetary control is largely weak within the government ministries. Weak
budgetary control is a recipe for inefficiencies in governmental performance as regards to
the allocation and use of taxpayers’ monies. Any budget operated in this type of
environment would probably lack credibility as there are bound to be gaps between
budgetary estimates and their actual outcomes.
Political expediency appeared to have taken priority over the need to attain
economy and efficiency as seen in the level of cost overruns and overspending across all
the three expenditure categories covered in the study. Also, contrary to a central theme in
the NPM that calls for a leaner and efficient government, the composition and size of
some expenditure category, especially in personnel expenditures and domestic
development expenditure, suggests that the size of the government of Sierra Leone is
increasing. An increase in the size of government administration demands a proportionate
increase in the level of efficiencies required in the use of resources to assure budget
credibility.
The sizes and frequency of overspending and spending on unbudgeted programs
further suggest that the budget preparation lacked thoroughness. A well-prepared budget
should, on the spending side, make provision for every single program, large and small.
The budget should detail spending for each agency as well as each office within each
agency. The primary purpose of this level of detail information presented is to make it
possible for the legislature to review and oversee government spending.
Of the four dominant budgeting theories articulated in the earlier sections of the
conceptual framework, I found that the budgetary practices of the Government of Sierra
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Leone are akin to incremental budgeting. The current year’s budgetary estimates for both
revenue and expenditures were dependent on the previous years’ estimates.
The introduction of activity-based budgeting in 2014 was yet to change the
underlying incremental nature of the budgetary process as all ministries use the previous
budgets as a base for making adjustments needed to arrive at the next year’s budget. One
deficiency of incremental budgeting is the risk of transferring the inefficiencies of the
current budget to the next budget.
The conceptual framework outlined the three objectives of government
budgeting as fiscal discipline, allocative efficiency, and technical efficiency. Fiscal
discipline and allocative efficiency underpin budget credibility. Fiscal discipline
requires overall expenditure control both at the aggregate level and at the level of
individual agencies. To this end, fiscal discipline presupposes realistic revenue forecasts
and the capacity to set budgetary targets and enforce them.
Strategic planning is weak in line ministries because of institutional weaknesses
such as the lack of an adequate number of skilled personnel, the lack of scientific
forecasting models, and the absence of dedicated planning departments. These
weaknesses are likely to translate into inadequacies in the setting up of budgetary targets
in line ministries. The prevalence of unreliable budgetary targets, especially in line
ministries, suggests that fiscal discipline was a challenge hence the high level of
overspending seen throughout the 5 year study period. Also, aggregate expenditure
controls require defining of realistic and reliable budgetary targets at the budget
preparation stage. Aggregate expenditure control poses a challenge given the largely
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unreliable budgetary estimates submitted by line ministries. However, there existed
strong institutional capacity within the ministry of finance as regards the preparation of
t h e an nu al m acroeconomic and fiscal framework governing each budget year.
As regards allocative efficiency, the government of Sierra Leone’s Agenda for
Prosperity provides a consistent framework for allocating resources among priority areas
as well as deciding on sectoral financial envelopes. Since 2013, government ministries
are required to align their medium-term strategic plans to the objectives and programs
specified under their respective pillars in the Agenda for Prosperity. This prevalent
structure is in conformity with the budgetary objective of allocating resources in line with
government policy priorities thereby rendering the process credible.
Politics affects the attainment of aggregate fiscal discipline and the efficient
allocation of resources. The many claimants to a government budget have different
preferences over the manner in which the budget should be allocated, thereby creating
pressure for increased expenditures. I found increased political intervention in both the
allocation and the use of budgetary resources resulting in cases of overspending as well
as the implementation of unbudgeted programs. This situation adversely affected budget
discipline as explained by some of the variances between the budget and the actual
outcomes. Across all four budget heads studied, there were, in the majority of cases,
variances that exceeded the maximum threshold of 15% deviations from the approved
budget. This level of variances partly explained the weakening credibility of the budget
of the government.
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While there is a MTEF governing the budgeting process of the government,
medium-term budgetary estimates are only indicative and cover only broad expenditure
aggregates. The lack of detailed medium-term budgetary estimates renders the
budgetary process as being annual. There is less preference for detailed medium-term
budgetary estimates that are the essential ingredients of long-term budgetary control.
The absence of medium-term budgetary estimates that are detailed and reliable could
contribute to the lack of fiscal discipline from a medium to long-term perspectives. The
lack of budget discipline is a causal factor for weak budget credibility.
A detailed medium-term outlook is also necessary because the time frame of an
annual budget is too short to allow for meaningful changes to expenditure priorities. At
the time of budget preparation, most of the expenditures of the annual budget are
already fully committed. For instance, the salaries of permanent civil servants, pension
payments, and finance costs of debts are relatively fixed in the short- term, and these
expenditures constituted the major portion of the annual budget. The other costs
contained in the budget can be adjusted but only marginally. This situation means that
any meaningful adjustment to expenditure priorities has to take place over several years,
hence the justification for detailed medium-term estimates.
In several instances, the government did not implement the budget in conformity
with both the financial and policy authorization granted by the Sierra Leone House of
Parliament. A typical case was the implementation of unbudgeted programs by the
government. Also, there were cases of policy changes that had budgetary implications,
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but the relative changes were not initially envisaged or subsequently accommodated in
the budget.
Budget overruns are partly attributable to the noncompliance of budget managers
with the expenditure limits set in the budget when obligating expenditures. Given that
there are controls over the cash allocated to ministries for approved expenditures, these
overruns are likely to generate spending arrears as was the case identified in some of the
ministries. Also, overruns can be attributable to deficiencies in the preparation of a
budget. A typical deficiency is a failure to account for the impact of inflation on wages.
The cases of under spending identified did not mean that there was good fiscal
discipline. In poor countries with weak system of governance, under spending of the
approved budget may coexist with large amounts of off-budget spending. When there are
overestimations of budgetary expenditures amid unrealistic revenue projections, there are
bound to be pressure for budget revisions during budget execution. The existence of such
pressure could explain the revisions to the approved budgets of 2012, 2013, and 2014.
The introduction of activity-based budgeting in 2014 represented an attempt at
addressing some of the deficiencies of the traditional/line-item budgeting that had existed
for ages. Activity-based budgeting is designed to strengthen the link between activity and
budgets, and such linkages increases competition, enhances efficiency, and facilitates
control. However, given the challenges on the part of the line- ministries in defining
activities, the realization of the benefits of activity-based budgeting may take some time.
The lack of provisions in both the Constitution and the Budgeting Act as regards
the power of the legislature to amend the government budget is a constraint on the
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effectiveness of legislative budgeting in the Sierra Leone House of Parliament. This
situation is made worse by the absence of legislative staff with skills in the operations of
government budgeting to aid Members of Parliament in the appraisal of the government
budget. The legislature will often exercise its decision-making power by reviewing the
executive budget, gathering more information from the government, seeking public input,
revising the budget based on legislative priorities, and passing the budget. The ability to
revise the budget lies at the heart of legislative oversight and decision-making power, and
this is missing in the Sierra Leone House of Parliament.
Legislative oversight also covers the budget execution phase involving two ways:
periodic reporting and revision to the approved budget. The budget becomes binding on
the government following enactment by the legislature, and the government cannot make
any changes without prior legislative approval. For the budget execution to follow the
approval granted by the legislature, the government has to submit periodic reports to the
legislature (monthly, quarterly, and semiannually). The periodic reports by the
government should cover actual revenue collection and spending, as well as a comparison
with budgeted revenue and spending.
The Sierra Leone context revealed non-compliance with the mandatory periodic
reporting to the legislature by the ministry of finance. Also, revisions made to the
approved budget by the ministry of finance were only approved retroactively by the
legislature. The legislature must give prior approval to all decisions involving revisions to
the budget by the government. The legislature should not rubber-stamp decisions
effectively taken already. The situation as highlighted in the findings suggests weak
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legislative oversight, thereby contributing to undermining the credibility of the annual
budget.
In terms of revenue, there appeared to be a consistent underestimation of revenue
growth by a substantial margin. While the underestimation of revenue is arguably not a
major concern, consistent underestimation over many years may indicate either very poor
budgeting and forecasting skills or a deliberate underestimation of revenue collection,
both of which pose a problem for the credibility of the budget.
The attainment of budget credibility requires fulfillment of the three budgetary
functions of control, management, and planning. A good budgeting system maintains the
right balance among these functions, and the findings suggest that the budgeting system
of the government is lacking in meeting these functions. In practice, the actual time
allocated for budget planning within line ministries is short; spanning about two calendar
months. Also, the fragmented planning environment suggests that the budgeting system
of line ministries is incapable of concisely determining government objectives as well as
the evaluation of alternative programs for the attainment of such objectives. This
situation partly explains the gaps evident between the initial budgets prepared by line
ministries and the final budget recommended by the Budget Bureau to the Parliament.
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that because the budget relates to the
future, changes are inevitable, and hence, the actual outcomes will almost certainly be
different from the budget approved by the legislature. The government can, however,
minimize the size of the variances in two main ways: the use of advanced scientific
models to produce reliable forecasts for both revenue and spending and having a sizeable
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reserve fund to cover unanticipated fiscal events. I found that scientific models are only
available in the ministry of finance while line ministries have to determine manually their
forecasts of future events. Hence, strategic planning and the budget formulation process
are much more reliable only at the ministry of finance. As regards the size of reserve
funds, it was noted that funds set apart for contingency events represent about 2% of the
budgeted spending, and this was insufficient to accommodate major shocks such as the
Ebola virus that emerged in the mid of 2014 and caused a reduction in the funding of
existing programs.
Limitations of the Study
The findings of the study and their interpretations as outlined in the previous
sections have limitations. Firstly, the sample size of seven government ministries was
selected based on the ranking of variances that were computed using historical data. The
trend in the respective variances may change depending on the parameter such as forecast
spending instead of actual historical spending. Also, only four budget heads were
examined, three of which are expenditure heads thus rendering the study more skewed
towards expenditure budgeting. A study looking at the entire budget may yield different
results and interpretations.
Secondly, the participants’ selection was biased toward senior government
officials with direct roles in the budgetary process. Middle level and junior government
officials are also part of the budgetary process and may hold different views about the
reasons underpinning the huge variances. Thirdly, the use of secondary data mainly in the
form of the published reports of international agencies providing budgetary support to the
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government has its bias. The underlying purposes of these published reports were
different from that of this study.
Lastly, the main analytical framework for this study, the OECD baseline criteria
and the OECD questionnaire for efficient government budgeting system, is based on the
experience of other countries with contexts that are different to that of Sierra Leone.
Thus, the conditions for and problems of government budgeting may be significantly
different in Sierra Leone. Some of the features of least developed countries like Sierra
Leone include a high rate of poverty, a narrow revenue base, and weak systems of
governance. These factors together represent significant constraints on effective
government budgeting systems in such countries (Schick, 2013). Despite these
limitations, the baseline criteria have wider international applicability and endorsement
by international financial institutions; hence, they constituted a useful benchmark for this
study.
Recommendations for Further Studies
As this study represents one of the few academic initiatives which exclusively
focus on the construct of budget credibility within the government of Sierra Leone, there
is obvious need for further research in this area. Future researchers may want to broaden
the scope of the study by involving more government ministries and recruiting
participants that cut across all cadres of personnel. In particular, future researchers may
want to give equal premium to both the revenue and expenditure components of the
annual budget so as to provide a complete picture of the underlying variances and how
they impact budget credibility. Also, following the roll-out of activity-based budgeting in
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2015, future researchers can undertake a comparative study of the budgetary variances
over a period covering pre and post activity-based budgeting.
One assumption underpinning the study was that policy formulation is an
independent process of the budget preparation process albeit the two are interrelated. It
would be worthy for future researchers also to investigate the link between policy
formulation and budget preparation and how the interaction of the two impacts budget
credibility. Finally, given the importance of the MTEF, there is the need for a separate
study on the success and failures of the MTEF process itself.
Implications
Improving the credibility of the budget of the government of Sierra Leone
requires major reforms to the budgeting process and rewriting of the current budget law
guiding the budget process. A list of some of the reforms requiring consideration by the
government is as follows:
•

One of the most important reforms is to amend the Constitution of Sierra
Leone and/or the Government Budgeting and Accountability Act to reflect
the principle of balance of power. It is important to establish firmly that
the Sierra Leone House of Parliament should have the decision-making
power in the budgeting process. The Sierra Leone House of Parliament
should be able to review, approve, amend, and veto the budget, as well as
overseeing the execution of the budget. The government should only
operate under the budget approved by the Parliament, and there should be
provisions requiring sanctions against violation of the approved budget.
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•

For the Parliament to fulfill the above responsibility, the capacity of
parliamentarians should be improved. Firstly, Parliament should have its
legislative staff with skills and experience in the government budget
process. Such staff should have the capacity to obtain independent
information needed for the effective review of the budget submitted by the
government. Also, Parliament should insist that the government submits
the budget by the end of October so as to ensure adherence to the
stipulated 2 months time frame for the review of the budget by Parliament.

•

The budget law should introduce new fiscal provisions for a balanced
budget rule and another rule that imposes the level of budget deficits.

•

The current provision in the Government Budgeting and Accountability
Act relating to the MTEF should be amended to reflect the increasing
importance of MTEF as the strategic framework for incorporating
government priorities into the annual budget. The existing provision that
calls for only indicative estimates for the MTEF should be amended to
include detailed and specific estimates based on realistic medium-term
projections of both revenue and expenditures.

•

There is the need to enhance the budgeting capacity of the line ministries.
The thoroughness in the preparation of the budget is bound to impact on
how well it is executed. There is a need for the accurate forecasting of
both expenditure and revenue using advanced econometric models.
Precise forecasting is a necessary and sufficient condition for minimizing
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budget variances and is an important component that adds credibility to
the budgeting process.
•

The Budget Bureau should on a regular basis communicate all large
variances to the line ministries with the view to aiding budget execution
and control.

•

There is a need for a review of the budget preparation processes to ensure
that the budget proposal submitted by the government to the Parliament is
comprehensive and detailed. A comprehensive budget includes all
government revenue sources and expenditures items, both on budget and
off budget. A detailed budget provides information on all spending at
different levels. It is only when the government budget is comprehensive
and contains in-depth fiscal information will it serve to hold the
government accountable, and enable Parliament to exercise its oversight
authority effectively.

•

Concerning budget execution, the Budget Bureau needs to furnish
information periodically (at least every month) to the Sierra Leone House
of Parliament about spending and revenue figures based on the originally
approved budgeted figures. Such updates will tell the Parliament whether
the government is executing the budget according to the approval granted
by the Parliament. A consistent form of reporting the budget execution to
Parliament will help to hold the government accountable for its spending,
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and also give the Parliament time to prepare for necessary changes to the
original budget.
•

Since 2002, with the help of the European Union (EU), the UK
Department for International Development (DfiD), the African
Development Bank (AfDB) and the World Bank, the government has
made good progress in strengthening its public financial management
framework and systems. This progress has resulted in significant public
financial management achievements over the years, including the
establishment of the legal and regulatory framework for budgeting, and
the implementation of a financial management information system in the
Accountant General’s Department. Basic budgeting, procurement,
accounting, and reporting procedures are in existence across ministries. As
a result, despite the very low starting point at the end of the civil war, the
scores from the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA)
assessment for Sierra Leone carried out in 2007, and 2010 show some
apparent improvements, 30 percent of the indicators in 2010 improved on
their scores in 2007.

•

The re-establishment of crucial governance institutions like the National
Revenue Authority, the Audit Service, and the Anti-Corruption
Commission has contributed to improvements in public financial
management practices. To build on the progress of reforms achieved to
date and to respond to the inherent challenges; the government has
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prepared a comprehensive program of public financial management
reform strategy for the period 2014-2017.
•

Despite the above progress made in public financial management, the
findings reveal a significant gap between the existing public financial
management policies, rules and procedures, and their actual
implementation in practice in line ministries. Budget credibility was at a
low point in the few years to 2010 but improved in 2010 before receding
again in 2011 - 2012. The particular problems identified include budget
credibility and predictability, fiscal management challenges, weaknesses
in expenditure control; particularly development expenditure, and low
levels of transparency in budget execution. Also, there are issues relating
to the incomplete collection and reporting of revenues; fragmentation
between the budget and planning process; the recurring high level of offbudget expenditures, and a budget system largely based on inputs rather
than the achievement of outputs. These weaknesses create inefficiencies
in the allocation and management of public finances; both of which are
primary activities in the annual budget process.

•

The Ebola outbreak and the sharp drop in iron ore prices impacted
negatively the economy of Sierra Leone. The epidemic disrupted
economic activities, and the sharp drop in iron ore prices compounded
these difficulties by shuttering the main iron ore mines. These twin shocks
prompted a severe slump in economic activity. According to the
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) predictions, Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) for 2016 is set to contract by some 21.5% to about 5%. Therefore,
the government needs to focus policy on generating fiscal space to tackle
the lingering impact of the Ebola epidemic, and contend with the effects of
the collapse in iron ore production.
•

Further, the budgeting process of the government has exhibited
weaknesses, which undermine the sustainability of the development
benefits underpinning budgetary support from budget support institutions
like the Word Bank, and the African Development Bank. The relatively
poor record on the mobilization of domestic revenues is a serious
weakness. The government needs to increase its level of revenue
collection so as to be able to finance the recurrent cost of infrastructure
and services.

•

The poor quality of public procurement processes is another critical
weakness. The Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) used by the
budget support partners of the government reported that in 2013, 72% of
public contracts were sole-sourced. The Auditor General has regularly
identified irregularities in public procurements.

•

Significant problems in budget credibility have also emerged since 2010,
with the 2014 Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA)
assessment reporting that deviations between the actual and budgeted
levels of aggregate expenditure averaged 21% per year over 2010-2013, as
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compared with 8% over 2006-2009. The findings suggest that although the
volatility of iron ore prices has clearly been a constraining factor
especially in the execution of the 2014-15 budgets; there is also evidence
of political directives for significant changes to the budget during the
process of implementation.
•

The persistence of the above weaknesses means that, notwithstanding the
genuine benefits achieved with budgetary support from development
partners, the fiduciary risks on the part of the government remain high,
while the sustainability of the benefits is uncertain. The government,
therefore, has to focus on ways to address these persistent weaknesses,
while maximizing the potential benefits associated with external budgetary
support. To this end, the following are worth consideration by the
government.

•

The budgeting process should be partnership based, serving to reinforce
government ownership and responsibility for results. Thus, it is essential
that a high-level political commitment to a shared set of objectives
underpins the budgeting process and the approved annual budget. High
level political engagement in the annual budget process is necessary for
the attainment of efficient budget execution and budgetary control. There
is a need for a regular reaffirmation at the political level of all the
technical discussions involved in the budget process. There is a need for a
high-level political commitment by the Government to a modern, effective
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budgeting system incorporating an efficient and fair revenue collection
process.
•

The budgeting process must enhance the predictability of resources and
reduce their volatility. The significant variances suggest that the
government budget is highly volatile over the medium term while annual
disbursements have been less predictable than desirable. Attention to this
issue will require a firmer commitment by the budget support partners like
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to medium
term disbursement targets, as well as steps to simplify disbursement
requirements.

•

The budgetary objectives and the supporting budgeting processes should
focus on poverty reduction as its primary goal. In principle, the annual
budget document laid in Parliament has always focused on poverty
reduction as its main objective but in practice, the implications of this
commitment have not always been given due consideration. According to
the 2015 IMF report on the performance of the economy, one of the main
constraints to more successful poverty reduction in Sierra Leone has been
a lack of strategy. While the government Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper II (PRSP II) and the Agenda for Prosperity (AfP) identify high-level
objectives and broad lines of action, the two documents do not address the
detailed strategic requirements at the sector level for setting out specific
inputs into the annual budget.
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•

The budgetary support from international agencies should be big enough
in scale to make a difference but not so big as to create excessive risks to
sustainability. While external budget support should be big enough in
scale to help the government take advantage of its development agenda,
yet, it must not reach a size where it would create a major fiscal crisis in
the event of premature termination.

•

The government needs to ensure that external budget support is
replaceable in the medium term through increased domestic revenue
collections. In the meantime, though, there is every need for the
government to re-establish the national budget as a credible planning and
control instrument. One aspect that is vital to the attainment of such a goal
is the development of stronger linkages between the political leadership of
government and the technicians of the ministry of finance.

•

Further, a clear decision-making nexus has to be created between the
ministry of finance and the line ministries. The findings suggest that the
focus of the budget dialogue is at the senior technical level within the
ministry of finance. For operational purposes, this is appropriate, but it is
not adequate when there is a need for a whole of government commitment
to meet agreed targets in the strategic plans.

•

The government needs to create a sustainable domestic revenue base. For
reasons of sustainability and self-reliance, it is essential for the
Government to establish a viable domestic revenue base by upgrading the
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current revenue mobilization strategies. For instance, there is need to
consolidate the responsibility for the collection of all sources of domestic
revenue within the designated agency of government. To this end, the
government, through the ministry of finance, has to strengthen revenue
policy and oversight of revenue collection with the view to improving the
efficiency and integrity of revenue administration.
•

The government needs to re-establish the credibility of its budget as a tool
of planning and expenditure control. The following measures may be
necessary to establish control over the approved budget. Introduce
improvement to the design of contingency budgeting arrangements so as
to deal with uncertainty in revenue flows.

•

Establish and impose limitations on the introduction of new activities or
projects during the implementation of the approved budget.

•

There is a need to action all decisions affecting the wage bill before the
finalization of the budget, rather than during the process of execution.

•

There is a need for reforms in the processes associated with public
procurement. Public procurement is one of the high-risk areas within the
system of budgetary control and execution. There is a need for a
fundamental re-think of current policies on procurement, as line ministries
are only subject to ex-post controls on procurement decisions. I
recommend that the Government should work with its budget support
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partners to review the current system thoroughly and to establish a new
action plan for procurement reforms.
•

There is the need to strengthen policy design and implementation in line
ministries. A strong policy formulation framework provides the baseline
for the development of comprehensive and sustainable budget parameters.

•

There is a need to enhance the predictability of the budgetary
disbursements made by the ministry of finance to line ministries. Such
predictability would reduce the annual volatility and improve the
timeliness and consistency of disbursements of funds to line ministries.
The related changes would require the ministry of finance to streamline
the administrative procedures for disbursements of approved budgetary
allocations to line-ministries.

•

The government may consider the introduction of incentives for enhanced
domestic revenue mobilization. In the medium to long term, budget
support will be unsustainable unless the government can raise its domestic
revenue mobilization to a meaningful level. There is an urgent need for
the government to pursue vigorously revenue reforms and revenue
collection targets.

•

The annual accumulation of arrears owed to various suppliers for goods
and services of previous budget years suggests that government is facing
serious challenges with the management of its cash. It is indicative that the
periodic budget allocations are made to line ministries without adequate
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cash cover at the treasury thereby resulting in such arrears. There is,
therefore, need for a review of the processes underpinning allotment and
cash management so as to exercise improved controls and strengthened
cash planning.
•

The EPRU has to strength budgetary and macro-fiscal planning and
forecasting.

•

The Budget Bureau needs to strengthen the budget framework and
formulation.

•

The Accountant General together with the Internal Audit Department need
to devise measures that will improve financial systems controls,
accounting and reporting.

•

The Sierra Leone House of Parliament need to enhance the legislative
oversight of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and the Finance
Committee (FC) to carry out their functions effectively.

One of the biggest challenges facing the government of Sierra Leone is
convincing the international financial institutions providing budgetary support to Sierra
Leone that the government not only has a sound budget but will also carry it out. This
study contributes to the promotion of good budgeting practices by highlighting the
problems undermining the credibility of the annual budget of the government as well as
proposing reforms for addressing the same. The study serves as a basis for promoting
sound public financial management practices by way of refined budgetary practices that
promote budget credibility. From a theoretical standpoint, the significance of this study is
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that it may be the first academic initiative to articulate in details the construct of budget
credibility in the context of the government Sierra Leone. Improvement in the credibility
of the annual budget of the government would mean improvements in value-for-money in
the use of taxpayers' monies by the government. It would also mean improvements in the
procedures, processes, and goals that the annual budget is expected to achieve. In turn,
these improvements could contribute to the overall reform efforts of the government in
developing a stronger public financial management organization causing improved
economic and financial reporting, thereby promoting positive social change for the
people of Sierra Leone. The ultimate positive impact could be in government efforts at
reducing the high-level of poverty in a country that still ranks in the bottom 10 of the
United Nations Human Development Index.
Conclusions
Despite many reforms implemented in Sierra Leone’s public financial
management over the past 10 years, the government’s budget still exhibits a lack of
credibility. Most evident are the large variances between the budget as approved by the
Sierra Leone House of Parliament and end-of -year public accounts of the governments.
The factors underpinning these variances include institutional weaknesses in line
ministries, political influence in the budget execution process; and the inadequate
capacity of the Sierra Leone House of Parliament. Some of the potential reforms needed
to enhance budget credibility include rewriting of the country’s budget law, the use of
scientific models in forecasting, the recruitment of legislative staff for Parliament, and the
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enhanced use of detailed medium-term budget framework for long-term budgetary
control.
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Appendix A: Questionnaire for the Ministry of Finance
Introduction
This questionnaire is the eproduct of some changes made to the OECD Questionnaire for
evaluating the technical efficiency of government budgeting system. The questionnaire is intended
as a tool for budget reformers, to analyze the current budgeting system of the
government of Sierra Leone with the view to proposing reforms. Most questions
demand a“yes or no” answer, and a negative answer suggests that actions should be
considered to produce the situation described in the question.
Budget Legislation
Do the constitution and budget laws:
1. Provide a clear and comprehensive definition of public money and
a. Determine that all of it is to be managed in accordance with the budget
law?
b. Limit the creation of extra-budgetary funds to special cases, authorized by
separate statute?
c. Authorize the government accounts into which all public money
must be paid and from which expenditures are made only by
appropriation of the parliament?
2. Establish a relationship between parliament and the executive?
3. Establish the following elements of intergovernmental fiscal relations?
d. The basic principles of supervision, intervention and audit
responsibilities, and of revenue sharing arrangements, if any?
e. Ministries o f government are allowed to borrow only from the
centralgovernment?
f. That their borrowing is subject to approval by ministry of finance?
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g. The budget accounting classifications are coherent and common to all
levels of government?
4. Establish the scope of the budget as described in Item c)?
5. Establishtheformand
structureoftheannualbudgetlaw
(orfinancebill)
tobevotedby parliament, including the definition of main headings or
accounts that are controlled by parliament.
6. Establishadefinitionofthebudgetdeficitandsurpluswhichexcludesborrowi
ngsfromreceipts, and excludes repayments of principal from expenditure?
7. Providealegalbasisfortheformulationandexecution of the budget including
the role and authorities of the ministry of finance.

Parliament/Executive Relationships
Do the constitution and other budget laws provide:
1. Anexplicitscheduleforpresentationofthebudgetbygovernmentandforitsconsiderati
onand approval by the parliament?
2. Proceduresandschedulesforthe
presentationandapprovalofsupplementaryspendingauthorities during the year if
needed?
3. Definedlimitsonthepowersoftheparliamenttoamendthedraft budgetbill
(suchasrequiringa spending increase to be offset by reductions in other
expenditures)?
4. For
interimfundingtocontinuenormalgovernmentbusinesswhenparliamenthasnotappr
oved the Budget in time for the start of the fiscal year (such as monthly release of
1/12 of prior year appropriations)?
5. Restrictiveconditionsonthegovernment’suseofreservefundsandemergencyspendin
g, suchas requiring approval by the minister of finance and full reporting to
parliament?
6. Forthemandatory
presentation
bygovernmentof
an
essentialminimumofbudgetdocumentation whichspecifiesfiscalpolicyobjectives,
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themacroeconomicframework,
identifiable fiscal risks?

thepolicybasisfor

thebudget,andmajor

7. Thatnewlegislationwithfiscalimplicationscomesintoforceonlyafterithasbeeninclu
dedinan approved budget?
8. Thetimetablefor
totheparliamentduringtheyearendinthefinalaccountand
external audit of government accounts?

reporting
arrangements
for

9. Foranexternalauditor
orintheformofasupremeauditinstitutionwhichisindependentof
government and reports to the parliament?

the

executive

10. A special parliamentary committee to study the final account and external audit
reports?
11. Aspecialparliamentarycommittee(e.gbudgetcommitteeorfinancecommittee)torev
iewthe budget and fiscal policy generally?
12. Authorityforthebudgetcommitteetooverrule, orat leastcoordinate,therecommendationsofsectoralcommittees?
13. Anopportunityforparliamenttodebate,ortoapprove,thefiscalframeworktargetsinadv
ance of the detailed budget estimates?
Scope of the Budget
1. Does the annual budget law include:
a) Clearly defined appropriations for all spending authorities to be voted?
b) All transactions of statutory extra-budgetary funds with the budget?
c) All fiscal transfers to ministries and other agencies of government for general
and special purposes?
d)
Allinvestments,transfersorothertransactionsbetweenthebudgetands
tate-owned enterprises?
e) Asset and liability transactions by type and with full details of major items?
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f) A borrowing clause to authorize the new ceiling on government debt for the
fiscal year?
2. Does the budget documentation submitted to parliament include:
a)
Fiscalpolicyobjectives,themacroeconomicframework,thepolicybasisfo
rthebudget, and major identifiable fiscal risks?
b)
Completeinformationonpastandprojectedspendingunderanypermanentap
propriationswhich are not annually voted?
c) Complete information on financial plans and operations of statutory extrabudgetary funds?
d) Allfinancingfromaiddonors and other international agencies providing
budgetary support to the government?
e)
Astatementofcontingentliabilitiesresultingfromstateguaranteesofthirdp
artydebtsand an estimate of payments likely to be required under those
guarantees during the budget year?
Medium-Term Fiscal and Budget Frameworks
a. Isthereamedium-termfiscalframework
(MTFF)
and/oramediumtermbudgetframework
(MTBF),
whichprojectsaggregaterevenueandexpendituretargetsoverathree-to-five
year horizon, consistent with the macroeconomic targets?
b. DoestheMTFF
linkmacroeconomicandbudgetprojectionsandincludethefinancialplansofextrabudgetary funds?
c. DoestheMTFFprovideMediumtermbudgetaryobjectivesintermsofbalanceorsurplus,andthepathofadjustmen
ts in the deficit and debt ratio?

d. Are the economic forecasts and fiscal targets made public and widely
disseminated?
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e. Doesthemedium-termframeworkincludesexpenditureprojections
bybroadprogrammingand/or prepared by line ministries?
f. Is the MTFF updated annually?
g. Isthepolicyandplanningprocesstightlylinkedtotheannualbudgetprocesstoensur
eaffordability?
h. Areconflictsbetweenresourceneedsandavailabilityreferredtothecou
ncilofministersfor discussion with sufficient time for resolution?
The Budget Process
Setting the Framework.
1. Macroeconomic and expenditure forecasting
a) Is this responsibility assigned to the ministry of finance?
or
if divided between ministries/agencies, are roles precisely defined?
b) Arefiscalforecastsupdatedatspecifiedintervals?
d)
Dotheexpenditureforecastsincludebothannuallyvotedfundsandperman
ent/standing appropriations (if any)?
e)
AretheforecastsusedtoformulaterevenueandexpenditureassumptionsforaMTFF/M
TBF?
Oran annual framework of fiscal targets?
f)
Arethesameeconomicassumptionsgiventospendingunitstobeusedintheirbudgetestim
ates?
g) Are the fiscal targets sent for approval by the cabinet of ministers?

2. Ministries envelopes/ceilings ;

a)
Arebudgetceilingsforaggregatespendingandforsectorministriesrecommendedbyth
e ministry of finance?
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b) Are the ceilings for sector ministries approved by the council of ministers?
c) Do they cover both current and capital components of the budget?
d)
Aretheycommunicatedtospendingunitspriortothepreparationoftheirestimatesubmissi
ons?
e)

Aresectorministersabletoreallocateexpendituresamongtheiragencieswithinthesector
ceiling
(recognizingthatchangestospecificprogramsmaybereservedtothecouncilof
ministers)?

Estimates Process and Documents.
1. Is there a well-defined, and widely accepted, sequence of steps in the budget
process?
2. Does the schedule allow practical intervals for the work at each stage?
3. Isthereanannualbudgetcircularorregulationissuedbytheministryoffinanceand
doesitprovide:
•Aclearsetofrulesforthebudgetprocessandthemainformstobeusedinestimatessubmiss
ions?
•The macroeconomic assumptions to be used in estimates?
• Information on government priorities?
• Spending ceilings or targets?
4.
Arenewpolicyproposalsexcludedfromestimatessubmissionsuntiltheyhavebeenapprov
edthrough the normal policy decision process?
or
Doesthebudgetprocessincludeawelldefinedprocedureforobtainingdecisionsonnewpolicy proposals?
5.
Isthereaclearrolefortheministryoffinanceinanalyzingandassessingestimatessubmiss
ions prior to inclusion in the draft budget?
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6. Doestheministryoffinancestaffhavethenecessaryinformationandskillsin
ordertoconduct microeconomic, financial, and policy analysis of estimates
submissions?
7.
Isthereaclearroleforthefinancialmanagementstaffoflineministriesinanalyzingandas
sessing estimates submissions of subordinated agencies?
8.
Doesthefinancialmanagementstaffoflineministrieshaveskillsinaccounting,
microeconomic analysis and financial management?
9.
Arethereestablishedrulesorpracticestoguidetheministryoffinancenegotiatio
nswithline ministries?
10.Aretherecleararrangementsforarbitration,bythe
president
orthecouncilofministers,of
remainingdifferencesbetweentheministryoffinanceandspendingunits(parti
cularlydesirable when there are binding top-down ceilings)? Orare there
clear
authorities
for
the
minister
of
financetonegotiatedifferencesbilaterallywithotherministers (preferable in
the absence of such spending ceilings)?
11. Personnel costs
a)
Arecostestimatessupportedbyadependablesystemofcontrolsonemployeeh
eadcounts, either by the ministry of finance or by line ministries
themselves?
b)
Areforecastincreasesinsalariesandbenefitsrequiredtobeconsistentwitht
heministry of finance assumptions or regulations?
c)
Arefundsforallbonusesandspecialallowanceidentifiedseparatelywithinth
epersonnelcosts subhead of the estimates?
d) Are there controls to prevent the unauthorized transfer of funds from
salaries budget to other budgets like allowances and bonuses?
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Presentation to Parliament.
Does the draft budget show the following information:
a. Documentationoffiscal
policy
objectives,themacroeconomicframework,theprioritiesfor the budget, and the
major identifiable fiscal risks?
b. Aclearandcomprehensiveplanforallpublicspending,includingalllevelsofgovernm
ent and all extra-budgetary funds?
c. Thelinkageofappropriationstoorganizationsandthehierarchyofaccountabilityam
ong persons and organizations to be entrusted with appropriated funds?
d. The linkage of expenditures to specific organizations, objectives and activities?
e. Identificationoffundingfornewpolicyinitiatives,clearlyseparatedfromthef
undingfor continuation of existing programs?

Preparation of Capital Investments Programs.
1. Arelineministriesrequiredtocarryoutexantetechnicalandeconomicappraisalsofcapital investment projects?
2. Are current and capital investment budgets integrated into a single process?
or
Aretherecurrentcostimplicationsofinvestmentscalculatedandtheresultsin
incorporated inthe annual budget and MTBF?
Budget Execution and Monitoring.
Cash management or treasury function
1. Are there laws, regulations and procedures which ensure that:
a) All public revenues are deposited directly:
–tothetreasurysingleaccountundercontroloftheministryof f i n a n c e
ortreasury?
b)
Ifseparatebankaccountsarepermitted,theministryoffinanceisresponsibleforopening,
closing, and either directly operating them or monitoring their operation?
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d) Payments are made:
–
throughthecentraltreasury,whichauthorizesandprocessespaymentordersfromspendin
gunits?
or
– byspendingunits,fromtheirsubaccountswithinthe
fi nan ci al
limits
authorizedbythe ministry of finance for the subaccounts?
e)
Whereseparatesubaccountsarepermitted,budgetcreditsarereleasedtothemonlyatrater
equired for payments obligations?
f)
Informationonactualexpenditureisavailabletotheministryoffinance/treasuryintim
e for effective monitoring?
g) The ministry of finance/treasury controls cash balances daily relative to
borrowings?
h) Theministryof fi n an ce/treasurymakesdaily/weekly/monthlyforecastsofcash
spending against which it monitors actual spending?
i)
Spendingunitsreporttotheministryoffinance/treasuryontheircommitments(obligatio
ns)
to ensure that expenditures do not exceed budget?
j) There are procedures to report and correct overspending?
Legal and policy framework
3. Are there laws, regulations or
policies which:
a) Limitand d efi n e th e
authoritiesateachleveloftheadministrationfortransferringfunds
(Virement) within the approved budget?
b) Preventtransfers,inboth direction, between personnel costs
andothersubheadsofthebudget?
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c) Specify how budget funds that are unspent at the end of the fiscal year should be
treated?
d) Establish sanctions for overspending?
e) Definethepermittedusesofthebudgetreservesandthedecision-makingauthoritiesfor
approving allocations from the reserves?
Distribution of responsibilities
1. Is the ministry of finance (and/or the council of
ministers) empowered to:
a)

Issue
(normallythroughthetreasury)thewarrants,orequivalent,
whichauthorizespending units to begin spending their budget
appropriations?
or
Approvebudgetimplementationplansofspendingunits,withdiscretiontoi
mposedelaysor conditions on specific elements in the plans?

b)
Reduceauthorizationsbelowthelevelofparliamentaryappropriationsifrev
enues fallbelow expectations?
c)
Givepriorapprovalfortransfersoffundsbetweenchapterswithinthesamebu
dgetheading, and to set rules for transfers among items within chapters?
d)
Controlthereleaseofinvestmentfundsfromofficialdonorsandobtainreportsonexecuti
on?
e)
Makeregulationsinallareasofbudgetpreparationandexecution,accountin
gandreporting, fees and charges, financial management, management
control, internal audit, cash and debt management, public procurement
etc.?
2. Are the line ministries required to:
a) Maintain accounting and control systems to ministry of finance standards?
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b)
Makeforecastsofmonthlycashflowsforthebudgetyearandsubmitfortheministr
yoffinance/treasury approval?
c)
Makeregularreportstotheministryoffinance/treasuryonspendingincompariso
ntobudget and cash flows in comparison to forecast?
d)
Review,approve,andmonitordirectdisbursementprogramsbyofficialdonorsin
their sector?
4. Is the Parliament responsible for :
a) Reviewing periodic reports on economic and financial performance relative to the
budget?
b) Revising targets and/or policies as required by the changed circumstances?
c) Approvingsupplementarybudgetbills,ifrequired,includingproposalstotra
nsferfunds between main headings of the approved budget?
d) Approvingsupplementarybudgetbills, ifrequired,including
proposalstotransferfunds between main headings of the approved
budget?
Accounting and reporting
1.

Isthereaunifiedaccountingandbudgetingclassification
regulatedbytheministryof finance/treasury?

system

2.
Doesthebudgetclassificationincludeanadministrativecategorypluseconomi
candfunctional categories?
3.
Thechartofaccountsshouldbecomprehensive.Doesitintegrateaccountsconta
iningassets, liabilities, government equity, revenues and expenditures to
facilitate the preparation of financial statements?
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4.
Doestheaccountingsystemdefineeligibleexpenditures,commitments,payment
s,etc?
5. Istheaccountingsystemcoherentandcommontoall levelsofgovernments
soastoallowa consolidated presentation of the state of public finances?
6.

Arethereeffectiveandup-todatemanualssettingoutproceduresandregulationsfortheaccounting system?

7.
Areexpenditurestatementsproducedduringthefiscalyearforthecouncilofmin
istersandtabled in parliament?
8. Arethefinalaccountsproduced,auditedandtabled inparliamentshortlyafter
theendofthefiscal year?

Appendix B: Questionnaire for Other Ministries of Government
Introduction
This questionnaire is the product of some changes made to the OECD Questionnaire for
evaluating the technical efficiency of government budgeting system. The questionnaire is intended
as a tool for budget reformers, toanalyzethecurrent budgeting system of the
government of Sierra Leone with the view to proposing reforms.
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Mostquestionsdemanda“yesorno answer”,
andanegativeanswersuggeststhatactionshouldbeconsideredtoproducethesituationdescribe
dinthe question.
The Budget Process
Setting the Framework.
1. Macroeconomic and expenditure forecasting
a) Is this responsibility assigned to the ministry of finance?
or
if divided between ministries/agencies, are roles precisely defined?
b)Arefiscalforecastsupdatedatspecifiedintervals?
d)
Dotheexpenditureforecastsincludebothannuallyvotedfundsandperman
ent/standing appropriations (if any)?
e)
AretheforecastsusedtoformulaterevenueandexpenditureassumptionsforanMTFF/
MTBF?
oran annual framework of fiscal targets?
f)
Arethesameeconomicassumptionsgiventospendingunitstobeusedintheirbudgetestim
ates?
g) Are the fiscal targets sent for approval by the cabinet of ministers?

5. Ministries envelopes/ceilings ;

a)
Arebudgetceilingsforaggregatespendingandforsectorministriesrecommendedbyth
e ministry of finance?
b) Are the ceilings for sector ministries approved by the council of ministers?
c) Do they cover both current and capital components of the budget?
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d)
Aretheycommunicatedtospendingunitspriortothepreparationoftheirestimatesubmissi
ons?
e)

Aresectorministersabletoreallocateexpendituresamongtheiragencieswithinthesector
ceiling
(recognizingthatchangestospecificprogramsmaybereservedtothecouncil
of
ministers)?

Estimates Process and Documents.
1. Is there a well-defined, and widely accepted, sequence of steps in the budget
process?
2. Does the schedule allow practical intervals for the work at each stage?
3.
Isthereanannualbudgetcircularorregulationissuedbytheministryoffinanceanddoesitprovi
de:
•Aclearsetofrulesforthebudgetprocessandthemainformstobeusedinestimatessubmiss
ions?
•The macroeconomic assumptions to be used in estimates?
• Information on government priorities?
• Spending ceilings or targets?
4.
Arenewpolicyproposalsexcludedfromestimatessubmissionsuntiltheyhavebeenapprov
edthrough the normal policy decision process?
or
Doesthebudgetprocessincludeawell-definedprocedureforobtainingdecisions
onnewpolicy proposals?
5.
Isthereaclearrolefortheministryoffinanceinanalyzingandassessingestimatessubmiss
ions prior to inclusion in the draft budget?
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6.
Doestheministryoffinancestaffhavethenecessaryinformationandskillsinordertocon
duct microeconomic, financial, and policy analysis of estimates submissions?
7.
Isthereaclearroleforthefinancialmanagementstaffoflineministriesinanalyzingandas
sessing estimates submissions of subordinated agencies?
8. Doesthefinancialmanagementstaffoflineministrieshaveskillsinaccounting,
microeconomic analysis and financial management?
9.
Arethereestablishedrulesorpracticestoguidetheministryoffinancenegotiatio
nswithline ministries?
10.Aretherecleararrangementsforarbitration,
bythe
president
orthecouncilofministers,
of
remainingdifferencesbetweentheministryoffinanceandspendingunits(parti
cularlydesirable when there are binding top-down ceilings)? orare there
clear
authorities
for
the
minister
of
financetonegotiatedifferencesbilaterallywithotherministers(preferable in the
absence of such spending ceilings)?
11. Personnel costs
a)
Arecostestimatessupportedbyadependablesystemofcontrolsonemployeeh
eadcounts, eitherby the ministry of finance or by line ministries
themselves?
b)
Areforecastincreasesinsalariesandbenefitsrequiredtobeconsistentwitht
heministryof finance assumptions or regulations?
c)
Arefundsforallbonusesandspecialallowancesidentifiedseparatelywithint
hepersonnelcosts subhead of the estimates?
d) Are there controls to prevent the unauthorized transfer of funds from
salaries budget to other budgets like allowances and bonuses?
Preparation of Capital Investments Programs.

206
1. Arelineministriesrequiredtocarryoutexantetechnicalandeconomicappraisalsofcapital investment projects?
2. Are current and capital investment budgets integrated into a single process?
or
Aretherecurrentcostimplicationsofinvestmentscalculatedandtheresultsincor
poratedinthe annual budget and MTBF?
Budget Execution and Monitoring.
Cash management or treasury function
1. Are there laws, regulations and procedures which ensure that:
a) All public revenues are deposited directly:
–tothetreasurysingleaccountundercontroloftheministryof f i n a n c e or
treasury?
b)
Ifseparatebankaccountsarepermitted,theministryoffinanceisresponsibleforopening,
closing, and either directly operating them or monitoring their operation?
d) Payments are made:
–
throughthecentraltreasury,whichauthorizesandprocessespaymentordersfromspendin
gunits?
or
– byspendingunits,fromtheirsubaccountswithinthe
fi nan ci al
limits
authorizedbythe ministry of finance for the subaccounts?
e)
Whereseparatesubaccountsarepermitted,budgetcreditsarereleasedtothemonlyatrater
equired for payments obligations?
f)
Informationonactualexpenditureisavailabletotheministryoffinance/treasuryintim
efor effective monitoring?
g) The ministry of finance/treasury controls cash balances daily relative to
borrowings?
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h) Theministryof
fi n an ce/treasurymakesdaily/weekly/monthlyforecastsofcashspending against
which it monitors actual spending?
i)
Spendingunitsreporttotheministryoffinance/treasuryontheircommitments(obligatio
ns)
to ensure that expenditures do not exceed budget?
j) There are procedures to report and correct overspending?
Distribution of responsibilities
.Are the line ministries required to:
a) Maintain accounting and control systems to ministry of finance standards?
b)
Makeforecastsofmonthlycashflowsforthebudgetyearandsubmitfortheministr
yof finance/treasury approval?
c)
Makeregularreportstotheministryoffinance/treasuryonspendingincompariso
ntobudget and cash flows in comparison to forecast?
d)
Review,approve,andmonitordirectdisbursementprogramsbyofficialdonorsin
their sector?
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Appendix C: Questionnaire for Members of Parliament
Introduction
Thisquestionnaireisthe product of some changes made to the OECD Questionnaire for
evaluating the technical efficiency of government budgeting system. The questionnaire is intended
as a tool for budget reformers, to analyze thecurrent budgeting system of the
government

of

Sierra

Leone

with

the

view

to

proposing

reforms.

Mostquestionsdemanda“yesornoanswer”,
andanegativeanswersuggeststhatactionshouldbeconsideredtoproducethesituationdescribe
dinthe question.
Budget Legislation
Do the constitution and budget laws:
8. Provide a clear and comprehensive definition of public money and
h. Determine that all of it is to be managed in accordance with the budget
law?
i. Limit the creation of extra-budgetary funds to special cases, authorized by
separate statute?
j. Authorizethegovernmentaccountsintowhichallpublicmoney must
be paid and from which expenditures are made only by
appropriation of the parliament?
9. Establish a relationship between parliament and the executive?
10. Establish the following elements of intergovernmental fiscal relations?
k. Thebasicprinciplesofsupervision,interventionand
auditresponsibilities,andofrevenue sharing arrangements, if any?
l. Ministries o f
governmentareallowedtoborrowonlyfromthecentralgovernment?
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m. That their borrowing is subject to approval by ministry of finance?
n. The budget accounting classifications are coherent and common to all
levels of government?
11. Establish the scope of the budget as described in Item c)?
12. Establishtheformandstructureoftheannualbudgetlaw
(orfinancebill)
tobevotedbyparliament, including the definition of main headings or
accounts which are controlled by parliament.
13. Establishadefinitionofthebudgetdeficitandsurpluswhichexcludesborrowi
ngsfromreceipts, and excludes repayments of principal from expenditure?
14. Providealegalbasisfortheformulationandexecutionofthebudgetincluding
the role and authorities of ministry of finance?
Parliament/Executive Relationships
Does the constitution and other budget laws provide:
14. Anexplicitscheduleforpresentationofthebudgetbygovernmentandforitsconsiderati
onand approval by the parliament?
15. Proceduresandschedulesforthepresentationandapprovalofsupplementaryspending
authorities during the year if needed?
16. Definedlimitsonthepowersoftheparliamenttoamendthedraftbudgetbill
(suchasrequiringa spending increase to be offset by reductions in other
expenditures)?
17. Forinterimfundingtocontinuenormalgovernmentbusinesswhenparliamenthasnota
pproved the budget in time for the start of the fiscal year (such as monthly release
of 1/12 of prior year appropriations)?
18. Restrictiveconditionsonthegovernment’suseofreservefundsandemergencyspendin
g, suchas requiring approval by the minister of finance and full reporting to
parliament?
19. Forthemandatorypresentationbygovernmentofanessentialminimumofbudgetdocu
mentation
whichspecifiesfiscalpolicyobjectives,
themacroeconomicframework,thepolicybasisfor
thebudget,
andmajor
identifiable fiscal risks?
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20. Thatnewlegislationwithfiscalimplicationscomesintoforceonlyafterithasbeen
includedinan approved budget?
21. Thetimetableforreportingtotheparliamentduringtheyearandinthefinalaccountan
d arrangements for external audit of government accounts?
22. Foranexternalauditorintheformofasupremeauditinstitutionwhichisindependentoft
he executive government and reports to the parliament?
23. A special parliamentary committee to study the final account and external audit
reports?
24. Aspecialparliamentarycommittee(e.g. budgetcommitteeorfinancecommittee)
toreviewthe budget and fiscal policy generally?
25. Authorityforthebudgetcommitteetooverrule,oratleastcoordinate,therecommendationsof sectoral committees?
26. Anopportunityforparliamenttodebate,ortoapprove,thefiscalframeworktargetsinadv
ance of the detailed budget estimates?
Does the budget documentation submitted to parliament include:
a)
Fiscalpolicyobjectivesthemacroeconomicframeworkthepolicybasisfor
thebudget, and major identifiable fiscal risks?
b)
Completeinformationonpastandprojectedspendingunderanypermanentap
propriationswhich are not annually voted?
c) Complete information on financial plans and operations of statutory extrabudgetary funds?
d) Allfinancingfromaiddonors and other international agencies providing
budgetary support to the government?
e)
Astatementofcontingentliabilitiesresultingfromstateguaranteesofthirdp
artydebtsand an estimate of payments likely to be required under those
guarantees during the budget year?
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Presentation to Parliament.
Does the draft budget show the following information:
I.

Documentationoffiscalpolicyobjectives,themacroeconomicframework, thepriorities for the
budget, and the major identifiable fiscal risks?

II.

Aclearandcomprehensiveplanforallpublicspending,includingalllevelsofgovernmentand all
extra-budgetary funds?

III.

Thelinkageofappropriationstoorganizationsandthehierarchyofaccountabilityamong
persons and organizations to be entrusted with appropriated funds?

IV.

The linkage of expenditures to specific organizations, objectives and activities?

V.

Identificationoffundingfornewpolicyinitiatives,clearlyseparatedfromthefundingfor
continuation of existing programs?

Is the Parliament responsible for:
I.

Reviewing periodic reports on economic and financial performance relative to the
budget?

II.

Revising targets and/or policies as required by the changed circumstances?

III.

Approvingsupplementarybudgetbills,ifrequired,includingproposalstotra
nsferfunds between main headings of the approved budget?
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Appendix D: Monetary Variances in Personnel Expenditures
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Government
Ministry
Finance &
Economic
Development

2012

2012

2013

2014

2014

2014

2012

2013

2011

2013

2011

2011

2010

(3,379)

2010

22 703

2010

26 109

Variance

(8 066)

Budget Actual

17 286

Variance

25 352

Variance Budget Actual

(8 335)

Actual

15 038

Budget

23 373

Variance

(4 363)

Actual

11 012

Variance Budget

15 375

Budget Actual

185

(86 492)

6 328

(345 757) 490 677 404 185

(18 677)

6 143

(102 745) 144 534 125 857

(185)

(638)

1 082

8 802

(154 906) 611 163 309 045 (302 118 672 131 326 374
)

1 267

5 450

9 440

(72 789) 208 962 106 217

( 67)

5 450

3 845

(810)

884

(816)

3 845

6 786

951

6 879

(1 328)

7 596

89 360

(65)

7 695

2 551

(720)

(81 540) 162 149

777

(627)

3 879

1 450

234 443

842

4 390

(998)

2 170

389 349

76 375

(111)

5 017

2 345

(308)

13 535

157 915

563

(572)

3 343

962

154 012 167 547

38 935

674

2 992

(1 355)

1 270

63 369

21

3 564

1 848

157

Education,
Youths &
Sports
24 434

566

166

3 203

539

Health &
Sanitation
545

2 879

(150)

382

Marine
Resources
2 713

1 665

Information &
Communication

Energy & Water
resources
1 815

-

-

Works, Housing
& Infrastructure
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Appendix E:Monetary Variances in Non Salary, Non Interest, Recurrent Expenditures
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Variance Budget Actual

2010

15 539

(2 924)

Variance Budget

2011

21 803

19 730

Actual

2012

(2 073)

Variance Budget

2012

38 264

27 088

Actual

2013

(11 176)

Variance

2013

48 286

Budget

2014

47 514

Actual

2014

(772)

Variance

2014

2013

2010

18 463

(1 290)

2012

2010
Actual

7 915

4 032

2011

Budget

15 649

5 322

2011

7 734

(34 667)

Ministry
Finance &
Economic
Development

2 595

(46 124)

37 262

217 877 171 753

(11 898)

(1 818)

121 358 109 460

(1 139)

2 605

(71 804)

490

(2 390)

4 423

145 803

(28 527)

1 629

497

(1 116)

(2 223)

217 607

36 179

(448)

2 887

8 088

2 025

(23 865)

64 706

556

38 082

9 204

4 248

134064

(14 536)

1 004

39 125

(1 780)

10 723

48 953

(480)

1 043

5 757

11 790

63 489

639

(3 424)

7 537

1 067

(16 375)

1 119

12 322

(1 792)

Information &
Communication

30 481

(560)

15 746

11 050

(16 397) 157 929

46 856

719

(1 664)

12 842

78 850

(15 870)

1 279

14 011

(2 176)

95 247

27 655

(212)

15 675

7 735

(5 022)

43 525

559

39 012

9 911

64 806

Health &
Sanitation

771

44 957

(318)

69 828

Marine
Resources

5,945

4 831

Education,
Science &
Technology

Energy & Water
resources

5 149

`

Works, Housing
& Infrastructure
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Appendix F: Monetary Variances in Domestic Development Expenditures
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2013

2013

2013

2014

2014

2014

(15,835)

2012

2.249

2012

18,804

2012

(5,693)

2011

1.807

(5,384)

2011

7,500

13,325

2011

(4,207)

18,709

2010

2010

953

(4,551)

2010

5,160

4,699

Variance Budget Actual Variance Budget Actual Variance Budget Actual Variance Budget Actual Variance

(2,205)

9,250

(2.600)

Budget Actual

2,796

(2,187)
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Ministry

5,001

7,611

2,707

(28,452)

9,798

(600)

10,111

(1,800)

644

38,463

1,200

1,244

Finance &
Economic
Development

3,000

(1,216)

(22,800)

(276)

-

940

(5,270)

22,800

(600)

4,196

Information &
Communication

2,002

9,466

2,602

(3,560)

(12,767)

3,143

4,274

6,703

17,041

(1,174)

Education,
Youths & Sports

1,836

24,744

3,010

28,945

(4,201)

(25,370)

(1,165)

12,517

9,163

37,887

10,328

Health &
Sanitation

(674)

(800)

(52610)

4,329

-

64,813

5,003

800

(714,870) 117,423

(123 428)

(349)

(13,978)

(353 499) 489 521 366 093

6,753

2,881

(54,361) 104,401

59,479

(119 139) 567 049 213 550

7,102

16,679

32,012 113,840

(23 079) 355 607 236 468

Marine
Resources

108,733

(38 912) 184 555 161 476

77,307

76,721

140 430

(5,617) 792,117

Energy & Water
Resources

179 342

99,784

Works, Housing
& Infrastructure
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Ministry
Finance &
Economic
Development
Information &
Communication

2010

2010

2010

111

5 342

473

4 760

362

2011

241

2011

202

1 539 12 338

2011

2012

2012

2012

2013

2013

2013

2014

2014

2014

256

5

(251)

256

(271)

250

-

(250)

(15)

(39)

-

(2 000)

-

(3 860)

-

-

-

2 935

2 000

-

3 860

2 935

14 604

(3 112)

-

(620)

3 271 17 875

38

(5 894)

-

(3 350)

4 808

3 150

7 954

620

-

6 444

( 2 221)

13 848

-

3 350

1 636

929

(5 988)

(4 980)

10 799

Budget Actual Variance Budget Actual Variance Budget Actual Variance Budget Actual Variance Budget Actual Variance

582

3 150

7 880

(478)

-

(1 395)

13 848

-

-

2 963

(144)

478

(11)

11,994 11 850

(449)

(4 960)

11

864

-

20

Education,
Youths &
Sports
248

5 727

449

4,980

1 568

Health &
Sanitation
6 571 12 298

156

(3 839)

1 112

Marine
Resources

156

846

Energy & Water
Resources

4 685

4 980
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369

588

Works, Housing
& Infrastructure
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Appendix H: Letters of Cooperation from the Director of Budget Bureau and the Deputy
Speaker of Parliament
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Appendix I: Consent Forms

CONSENT FORM
Officials of Government Ministries
You are invited to take part in a research study about the credibility of the
budget of the government of Sierra Leone. The researcher is inviting
budget/vote controllers and heads of finance in government ministries to
be in the study. This form is part of a process called “informed consent” to
allow you to understand this study before deciding whether to take part.
This study is being conducted by a researcher named PatrickSaiduConteh,
who is a doctoral student at Walden University based in the United States
of America.
Background Information:
The purpose of this study is to develop a budgetary reform agenda in
support of some of the changes that could enhance the credibility of the
budget of the government of Sierra Leone.
Procedures:
If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to:
• engage in a face to face interview with the researcher in at most two
different sessions with each session lasting not more than 30 minutes
• provide answers to questions relating to the budget process at the
level of line ministries
• make available a copy of the strategic plan and current budget of the
ministry you work for
Here are some sample questions:
Ministries envelopes/ceilings;
a) Are budget ceilings for aggregate spending and for sector ministries
recommended by the ministry of finance?
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b) Are the ceilings for sector ministries approved by the council of
ministers?
c) Do they cover both current and capital components of the budget?
d) Arethey communicatedto spending units prior to the preparation of
their estimate submissions?

Voluntary Nature of the Study:
This study is voluntary. Everyone will respect your decision of whether or
not you choose to be in the study. No one at the Ministry of Finance and for
that matter the entire government of Sierra Leone will treat you differently
if you decide not to be in the study. If you decide to join the study now, you
can still change your mind later. You may stop at any time.
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study:
Being in this type of study does not pose any risk to you personally.
The findings of the study could provide a basis for budgetary reform
with the view to strengthening public financial management, thereby
causing improvements in the economic and social well-being of the people
of Sierra Leone.
Payment
No payment either in cash or kind will be made to you for participating in
this study
Privacy:
Any information you provide will be kept confidential. The researcher will
not use your personal information for any purposes outside of this research
project. Also, the researcher will not include your name or anything else
that could identify you in the study reports. Data will be kept for a period of
at least 5 years, as required by the university.
Contacts and Questions:
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You may ask any questions you have now. Or if you have questions later,
you may contact the researcher via email at
patrick.conteh@waldenu.edu.If you want to talk privately about your rights
as a participant, you can call Dr. Leilani Endicott. She is the Walden
University representative who can discuss this with you. Her phone number
is +1 612-312-1210. Walden University’s approval number for this study is
11-25-15-0172998 and it expires on 11-24-2016.

The researcher will give you a copy of this form to keep.

Obtaining Your Consent
If you feel you understand the study well enough to make a decision about
it, please indicate your consent by singing below

Printed Name of Participant
Date of consent
Participant’s Signature
Researcher’s Signature

Patrick SaiduConteh

225

CONSENT FORM
Members of Parliament
You are invited to take part in a research study about the credibility of the budget
of the government of Sierra Leone. The researcher is inviting Members of
Parliament in the Parliament Finance Committee to be in the study. This form is
part of a process called “informed consent” to allow you to understand this study
before deciding whether to take part.
This study is being conducted by a researcher named PatrickSaiduConteh, who
is a doctoral student at Walden University based in the United States of America.
Background Information:
The purpose of this study is to develop a budgetary reform agenda in support of
some of the changes that could enhance the credibility of the budget of the
government of Sierra Leone.
Procedures:
If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to:
• engage in a face to face interview with the researcher in at most two
different sessions with each session lasting not more than 30 minutes
• provide answers to questions relating to the budget process in the Sierra
Leone House of Parliament
Here are some sample questions:
Parliament/Executive Relationship
Does the constitution and other budget laws provide:
27. An explicit schedule for presentation of the budget by government and for
its consideration and approval by the parliament?
28. Procedures and schedules for the presentation and approval of
supplementary spending authorities during the year if needed?
Is the Parliament responsible for:
1. Reviewing periodic reports on economic and financial performance relative
to the budget?
Voluntary Nature of the Study:
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This study is voluntary. Everyone will respect your decision of whether or not you
choose to be in the study. No one at the Ministry of Finance and for that matter
the entire government of Sierra Leone will treat you differently if you decide not to
be in the study. If you decide to join the study now, you can still change your
mind later. You may stop at any time.

Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study:
Being in this type of study does not pose any risk to you personally.
The findings of the study could provide a basis for budgetary reform with
the view to strengthening public financial management, thereby causing
improvements in the economic and social well-being of the people of Sierra
Leone.
Payment
No payment either in cash or kind will be made to you for participating in this
study
Privacy:
Any information you provide will be kept confidential. The researcher will not use
your personal information for any purposes outside of this research project. Also,
the researcher will not include your name or anything else that could identify you
in the study reports. Data will be kept for a period of at least 5 years, as required
by the university.
Contacts and Questions:
You may ask any questions you have now. Or if you have questions later, you
may contact the researcher via email patrick.conteh@waldenu.edu.If you want
to talk privately about your rights as a participant, you can call Dr. Leilani
Endicott. She is the Walden University representative who can discuss this with
you. Her phone number is +1 612-312-1210. Walden University’s approval
number for this study is 11-25-15-0172998 and it expires on 11-24-2016.

The researcher will give you a copy of this form to keep.

Obtaining Your Consent
If you feel you understand the study well enough to make a decision about it,
please indicate your consent by singing below
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Printed Name of Participant
Date of consent
Participant’s Signature
Researcher’s Signature

Patrick SaiduConteh
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Appendix J: Research Ethics Training Certificate

